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I will do the impossible and it will work.
-Claude Monet'
1 Michael Brenson, Monet's Complexity and Grandeur, Through His Series Paintings, N.Y.
TimEs, Feb. 7, 1990, at C15 (quoting Claude Monet).
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INTRODUCTION:
VIEWING THE CATHEDRAL; SEEING THE FEMININE
In his Rouen Cathedral series,2 Claude Monet attempted the im-
possible task of capturing the moment.3 Traditional painting fails be-
cause it has an artificial permanence that experience lacks. Life is
within time, but painting is outside of time; life is a process, a painting
is an event.4 In the moment of experience, we lose ourselves in ec-
stasy. We stand outside ourselves and have no consciousness that we
are having the experience because we are one with the experience.
The instant we become aware that we are experiencing something, we
no longer enjoy it in its immediacy. Future enjoyment is always medi-
ated by anticipation, and past enjoyment is always mediated by
memory.5
2 The following is my highly idiosyncratic Lacanian analysis of Monet's series paint-
ings. I base this analysis on theories I previously have proposed. See, e.g.,JEANNE LORRAINE
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FAscEs: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE
(1998) (articulating the Hegelian-Lacanian philosophy upon which this Article builds).
3 Monet stated, "'[O]ne must know how to seize the moment of the landscape on
the very instant, for that moment will never return.'" VIRGINIA SPATE, CLAUDE MONET 201
(1992). Sylvie Patin, Chief Curator at the Mus6e d'Orsay, expressed that the Rouen Cathe-
dral "'series offers the most dazzling and convincing demonstration of Monet's determina-
tion to capture instantaneousness.'" Alan Riding, Monet's Fixation on the Rouen Cathedra,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at C9.
4 One critic has opined that the Rouen Cathedral series illustrates Claude Monet's
resistance to Academic painting, with its linear precision and fixed struc-
ture, and reinforce his argument for the primacy of shifting and timeless
nature. In his series paintings, everything seems soft and flowing, and there
is no beginning, middle and end. At the same time there is a continuous
sense of inevitability and finality. Where Monet found the essence of a
fleeting moment, he also found a slice of eternity.
Brenson, supra note 1. This meeting of the moment, inevitability, and eternity perfectly
describes the Lacanian impossible real.
5 Charles Sanders Peirce called this pure immediacy of quality "Firstness." 1 CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE, Collected Essays, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 148-59
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1960). He called the violent moment of separation
or differentiation "Secondness." M at 161-70. He explained the contrast between First-
ness and Secondness in terms of the difference between having an experience and realiz-
ing that one is having an experience. See i&t at 159-61. He gave the following example of
Firstness (immediacy).
Imagine me to make and in a slumberous condition to have a vague,
unobjectified, still less unsubjectified, sense of redness, or of salt taste, or of
an ache, or of grief or joy, or of a prolonged musical note. That would be,
as nearly as possible, a purely monadic state of feeling.
Id. at 149. As soon as one becomes conscious that one is tasting something, for example,
there is no longer one thing-the pure essence of the taste; rather, there are two, the taste
and the taster. One no longer has an unmediated experience of the quality of taste, but
one has a mediated or interpretive experience. One may speculate that a few seconds
before the consciousness one might have had an immediate, purely physical experience,
but one can never know this directly.
Jacques Lacan, building on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, similarly critiques Refie
Descartes's cogito. See SLAVOJ ZI2EK, TARRYING wrrH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE
CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 58-61 (1993) (providing a detailed account of the Lacanian inter-
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Jacques Lacan called this sense of lost immediacy "jouissancd'6-
"feminine enjoyment." She is "Eurydice twice lost." You anticipate
jouissance as that which has not yet come, but the instant you turn to
try to hold her in your arms, or fix her in your gaze, you realize that
she is always already gone.
Monet wanted to capture his jouissance of the Rouen Cathedral's
facade, but each attempt was frustrated because it changed moment-
by-moment.7  He devised an ingenious solution. Every day, he
brought several canvasses with him to the Cathedral. He started at
daybreak and painted one canvass until the lighting changed; he then
moved on to a second, then to a third, and continued until sunset.8
pretation of the Cartesian cogito). Descartes's famous assertion, "I think therefore I am,"
has two distinct meanings: immediate existence and consciousness-mediated awareness
of existence. The former meaning "I think (therefore I am)," reflects the being who, in
the act of thinking, is unaware of herself as separate from her thoughts-at this moment
she is pure existence. See id. This is the psychoanalytically feminine position. The latter or
masculine reading of the cogito is "I think 'therefore I am.'" This is the moment one be-
comes aware of one's existence and asserts it thereby mediating the experience with
thought. See id.
As is always the case with Lacan's paradoxes of sexuality, these readings of the cogito at
first blush seem to reflect stereotypes of feminine passivity and masculine activity. At sec-
ond look, however, it reflects them like a mirror-they are reversed. If the feminine posi-
tion seems to be that of pure objectivity-merger with the object world of existence-it is
not because she is passive, but because she seeks the active role. That is, she seeks to be in
the active role of thinking (speaking), but by doing so she becomes thought itself-pure
being. The masculine, in contrast, seeks the passive role of pure existence. Yet, by concen-
trating on what it is to exist, by trying to capture the experience, he becomes not thought,
but the thing that thinks (speaks). See id.
6 JACQUES LAcAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONcEPTrs OF PsycHo-ANALYsIS 281 (Jac-
ques-Alaln Miller ed. & Alan Sheridan trans., 1978) (providing a definition ofjouissance in
the translator's note). The beautiful Eurydice had died from a snake bite at her wedding
to Orpheus. Although Orpheus had lost Eurydice once through death, he could not ac-
cept that she was forever lost and persisted in the impossible dream that he again could
embrace her. With this hope, Orpheus descended to the underworld, Tartarus, in order to
retrieve her. Persephone, the queen of death, promised Orpheus that Eurydice would
follow behind Orpheus as he climbed the long passage out of Tartarus back to life, but
Persephone forbade Orpheus to turn back and look at her. Orpheus could not control
himself and turned around to embrace his beloved, but as Persephone had warned, Euryd-
ice already was gone. He only knew, from the trace of her loss, that she once had been
there-the fading echo of her farewell. See THOMAS BULFINCH, THE GOLDEN AGE OF MyTH
AND LEGEND 229-32 (1993); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of
Law and Economics, 112 HARv. L. REv. 483, 485 (1998).
7 See SPATE, supra note 3, at 229. "Monet's perception of the motif became more
acute as he struggled to embody its transient moments in a form both stable and evanes-
cent." Id. After weeks of working on the Cathedral series, Monet recorded that he was
shocked by "the sight of my canvases which seemed to me atrocious, the lighting having
changed. In short I can't achieve anything good." Id. (quoting Letter from Claude Monet,
artist, to Alice Monet, his wife (Mar. 29, 1893)).
8 See id. at 227. Monet started the Cathedral series in late winter and early spring
1892 and returned the following year at about the same time in order to recapture the
same light. He reworked the paintings over the next year in his studio at Giverny and
exhibited 20 paintings from the series in 1895. See WitLuAM C. SErrZ, CLAUDE MONET 116
(1982); SPATE, supra note 3, at 226-27. Monet would paint in front of the Cathedral from
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This series of views of the Cathedral constitutes, in effect, one work of
art reflecting the subtle changes in color of the Cathedral's facade
over the course of a day.
Monet's paintings have been reproduced with such frequency
that it is hard to reclaim them from the banality of the overly-familiar.
With this in mind, I recently refreshed my memory by visiting two of
the Rouen Cathedral series which are displayed in the National Gal-
lery of Art in Washington, D.C. What surprised me when viewing the
originals is how nearly he succeeded despite his failure. Or more ac-
curately, how he succeeds because he fails. The differences in colora-
tion of even two paintings in the series illustrate that experience is so
fleeting that its totality could never be captured, regardless of how
many canvasses were used.9 That was Monet's secret.
dawn to dusk and then continue on his canvasses in the evening at his hotel. See id. at 227.
He started with nine canvasses a day, but found that the light kept changing. He increased
the number of canvasses to ten, then twelve, then fourteen. See id. at 227-29. Eventually,
he would change his canvass every half hour, "expressive of his resolve to capture the spe-
cific moment (instantangite) as perceived by his ever more sensitive eye." STEPIA KOJA,
CLAUDE MONET 120 (John Brownjohn trans., 1996). First, he rented one studio across the
street from the Cathedral and later rented space in a ladies apparel shop a few doors down.
See id. His obsession turned him into such a fixture that the demure nineteenth century
ladies became too embarrassed to enter the shop. Finally, the shopkeeper built a screen
around the artist to shield the ladies from his lugubrious presence. See Riding, supra note
3.
9 See SErrz, supra note 8, at 116. Monet eventually completed thirty paintings of the
Cathedral, including twenty-eight of the facade. See Riding, supra note 3. As described by
Georges Clemenceau, who was so impressed by the inaugural exhibition of twenty of the
series that he immediately wrote an editorial on the front page of the Paris journal La
Justice urging the French government to buy the entire series to keep it intact, see id., " 'The
painter has given us the feeling.., that he could have.. . made fifty, one hundred, one
thousand, as many as the seconds in his life.'" SErrz, supra note 8, at 116 (quoting Clemen-
ceau). Clemenceau continued, "'[for] each beat of his pulse he could fix on the canvas as
many moments of the model.'" SPATE, supra note 3, at 230 (quoting Clemenceau) (altera-
tion in original). The paintings inspired in Clemenceau "'a lasting vision not of twenty,
but a hundred, a thousand, a million states of the eternal cathedral in the immense cycles
of the sun.'" Id. (quoting Clemenceau).
Spate agreed with Clemenceau's interpretation. She believed that Monet chose the
cathedral as his subject precisely because he thought its stone architecture would be rela-
tively unchanging, enabling him to capture it in "a work of 'no weather and no season.'"
Id. at 232 (quoting Monet). As he started to paint he realized he was wrong and became
'totally absorbed in the representation of ephemeral effects." Id. Eventually, Monet
sought, "to embody not only an external reality which was ceaselessly changing, but also a
continuous perceptual experience of that reality, and the more intensely he focused on
changing light, the more the stable reality of the cathedral disintegrated." Id. at 231 (foot-
note omitted).
Having grown used to countless mediocre reproductions of Monet's water lily paint-
ings on greeting cards and posters, it is easy to dismiss him as a simple painter who merely
reproduced his immediate impressions of pretty scenery. Even his contemporary Paul C&
zanne declared that Monet was " ' only an eye, but what an eye!'" John Russell, Art View: The
Poet Who Kick-Started a Stalled Cazanne, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1991, § 2, at 27. Nonetheless,
Monet understood that immediacy was impossible. The fact that Monet did not complete
his Rouen series until he returned to his studio two years after he started indicates that
[Vol. 84:394
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The series suggests the existence of an enjoyment that can never
be captured. Enjoyment of the Cathedral is not that which we view in
the paintings, but our view of the paintings reminds us that an "excess
enjoyment" beyond our view must have existed in the past and will
again exist in the future.10 The paintings let us know feminine enjoy-
ment not by depicting her presence, but by suggesting her absence.
They are her footprints, the fading echo of her voice, the stain of her
lost virginity." The paintings, therefore, mediate between the viewer
and the impossibility of immediacy. In Monet's own words, he did not
attempt to depict the Cathedral directly, but rather "to reproduce...
what exists between the [Cathedral] and me."12
Monet's understanding of his limitations stands in stark contrast
to claims a famous law review article, which invokes his work, makes.
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed published their seminal analy-
sis of environmental nuisance 13 disputes, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,14 twenty-six years ago.
Their article has generated virtually endless discussion in the
literature.' 5
they are "not fleeting impressions," but his "least sketch-like" paintings done with "great
consideration." Michael Kimmelman, Eclectic Monet, Bathed in Chicago's Ballyhoo, N.Y.
TiNrEs, July 24, 1995, at C9.
Spate accurately stated that Monet's was an "inherently terrifying vision of reality."
SPATE, supra note 3, at 231. This observation is precisely correct. Although we long for the
real, our occasional contacts with it are occasions of abject, sickening terror. The real is,
after all, the total obliteration of our subjectivity. Consequently, Slavoj Ziiek, who has de-
veloped Lacan's psychoanalytical theory into a philosophic system, used references to sci-
ence fiction, horror stories, and most frequently, the films of Alfred Hitchcock to express
the disturbingly uncanny nature of the real. See SIAvoj ZIEx, LOOKING AWxRv AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 88-106, 116-22 (1991).
10 As E.H. Gombich noted in his classic work Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology
of PictorialRepresentation, in the painting that depicts the Cathedral at noon, Monet suggests
"the effect of the midday sun by exploiting the dazzle that results from its glare, and such
pictures will even gain in poetry from the artist's determination to achieve the impossible."
E.H. GOMBECH, ART AND ILLUSION: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PIcTOAL. REPRESENTA-
TION 49 (1969).
11 See Schroeder, supra note 6, at 485.
12 National Gallery of Art, Rouen Cathedra West Facade, Sunlight-Notes (visited Sept.
20, 1998) <http://www.nga.gov/cgi-bin/pinfo?Object-46371+0-note>.
13 In this Article, I am not limiting the term "nuisance" to its legal meaning. Rather,
for lack of another suitable term, I use the term expansively as shorthand for claims that
one person is harmed by the polluting acts of another, regardless of whether such claims
are based on tort, property, or other principles. My terminology reflects Calabresi and
Melamed's project of developing a unified economic analysis of environmental harms.
14 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
15 One numerically inclined pair of authors recently reported that Westlaw listed over
388 law review articles citing the original Calabresi and Melamed article through 1995. See
James E. Krier & StewartJ. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another
Ligh 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 440 n.4 (1995). A recent search of Westlaw'sjournal and law
review database revealed that 595 pieces have cited the Calabresi and Melamed article. See
Search of Westlaw, JLR library (Sept. 6, 1998). They speculated that there are no doubt
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Their title, an allusion to Monet's Rouen Cathedral series, sup-
posedly expressed modesty. Calabresi and Melamed claimed that
their taxonomy of property rights was not an attempt to capture all of
property or environmental law, but rather only one way of looking at
these fields-a way that might be a useful tool for legal scholars and
decision makers. They state that their "article is meant to be only one
of Monet's paintings of the Cathedral at Rouen. To understand the
Cathedral one must see all of them. 16
In fact, their protestations of humility are evidence of hubris.
Modesty is psychoanalytically feminine in that it only exists insofar as
it slips away. The moment modesty announces itself it has already
been replaced by pride. Unlike Monet, who through multiple repre-
sentations suggested that which cannot be captured, Calabresi and
Melamed claimed to capture the immediacy of property. They
claimed to give one view of the Cathedral and insisted that we can
understand the Cathedral if we see all of the views.' 7 Monet's point,
however, was that we can only understand the Cathedral when we real-
ize that the real-excess enjoyment-can never be seen, even in an
infinite number of views.
The difference between their respective approaches is the differ-
ence between metonymy and metaphor. Monet's paintings are a pic-
torial example of metonymy, which in Lacanian psycho-analysis is the
feminine trope of signification.18 In metonymy the signifier suggests
the signified through proximity. It describes not the thing itself, but
parts of the thing or that which surrounds it. Calabresi and Melamed,
in contradistinction, adopted the masculine trope of metaphor. In
metaphor, the signifier attempts to capture the signified and to re-
duce signification to meaning by declaring the essential similarity or
identity of the signifier and the signified. In metaphor, the signifier
stands for the signified; in metonymy, the signifier stands by the
signified.19
hundreds of other citations, not included in the computerized sources. See Krier &
Schwab, supra, at 440 n.4. Recently, the Yale Law Journal published a symposium issue, see
Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective,
1.06 YALE LJ. 2081 (1997), based on panel discussions on the impact of the Calabresi and
Melamed article at the Association of American Law Schools 1997 Annual Meeting.
16 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1089 n.2.
17 See id.
1s SeeJANE GALLOP, READING LACAN 121-31 (1985).
19 Lacan defined metaphor as the substitution of "[olne word for another," and meton-
ymy as the substitution of"word-to-word." JACQUES LACAN, The Agency of the Letter in the Uncon-
scious orReason Since Freud, in tcPiTS 146, 156-57 (Alan Sheridan trans., W.W. Norton & Co.
1977) (1966). For a good, albeit critical, introduction to Lacan's concepts of metaphor
and metonymy, see JEAN-Luc NANcY & PHILIPPE LACOuE-LABARTHE, THE TITLE OF THE LET-
TER: A READING OF LACAN 71-76, 96-97, 139-40 (Frangois Raffoul & David Pettigrew trans.,
State Univ. of N.Y. Press 1992) (1973).
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Perhaps because Calabresi and Melamed intuited that the imme-
diacy they sought cannot be captured, they did not, like Monet, try to
suggest immediacy through its absence. Instead, they alternated be-
tween pretending that they had captured it and claiming that it does
not exist. Specifically, Calabresi and Melamed repressed the psycho-
analytically feminine aspects of property law: the element of enjoy-
ment (use) and the existence of the silent and unknown third-the
"other." This repression of the feminine third can take the form
either of the refusal to acknowledge third parties who are not a party
to a contractual relationship (the jus tertii of property law) or of the
failure to recognize the mediating object of the property rights de-
bated by two competing subjects. In Lacanian terms, this repression
of the feminine third is the masculine response to the universal
human experience of loss of wholeness, which Lacan called "castra-
tion, '20 and which I sometimes call "violation."21 The masculine re-
sponse inevitably and necessarily is unsuccessful, as is the alternative
feminine response. As Lacan reminds us, however, repression is not
destruction, and what is repressed always returns to wreak its re-
venge.22 As discussed below, the unacknowledged feminine aspects of
property haunt the Calabresi and Melamed analysis.
The reader should not infer that I am suggesting that some "femi-
nine" analysis of property would be superior.23 In Lacanian theory,
neither of the sexuated positions is superior, they are just two differ-
ent modes of failure.24 Nor do the Lacanian terms "masculine" and
"feminine" refer to anatomy. Rather, they designate two possible strat-
20 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 10-11 ("This sense that part of ourselves is not
ourselves but is somehow cut off from ourselves is one aspect of what Lacan called
'castration.'").
21 See id. at 245 (explaining that "the masculine metaphor ... perceives loss as castra-
tion" and "the feminine metaphor ... perceives loss as violation").
22 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OFJACQUES LACAN, BOOK III: THE PSYCHOSES 1955-56
86 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Russell Grigg trans., 1993).
23 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 234-35 ("[T]o develop a human theory of the legal
person, we need to recognize that [the masculine view of] property is a necessary, but
insufficient, aspect of the legal regime of object relations."). Indeed, in Lacanian terms,
the masculine position is absolutely necessary. Without it, we literally are gibbering idiots
because the masculine is the position of the speaking subject. In order to speak and write
one needs to claim to have "it," to claim that the words we use-the signifiers-in fact
capture the significance of that which one intends to signify. Consequently, all human
beings must at least temporarily take on the masculine position. See EuzABEm GRosz,
JACQUES LAcAN: A FEMINISr INTRODUCTION 71-72 (1989).
24 Lacan thus moves as far as possible from the notion of sexual difference as
the relationship of two opposite poles which complement each other, to-
gether forming the whole of "Man." "Masculine" and "feminine" are not
the two species of the genus Man but rather the two modes of the subject's
failure to achieve the full identity of Man. "Man" and "Woman" together do
not form a whole, since each of them is already in itself a failed whole.
RENATA SALECL, THE SPoILs OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER THE FALL OF
SOCIALISM 116 (1994).
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egies one can adopt to deal with the sense of loss.2 5 Every human
being must, on occasion, adopt both of these inconsistent strategies.
Nevertheless, Lacan intended the "gendered" terminology to reflect
the way we map these purely symbolic concepts onto anatomy by con-
flating them with what seems to be their anatomical counterparts. As
a result, anatomically female human beings tend to adopt the psycho-
analytically feminine position, and anatomically male human beings
tend to adopt the masculine. However, all human beings on occasion
adopt both psychoanalytical positions.
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the legal concept of property
serves a role in the creation of legal subjectivity, which parallels the
role of sexuality in the creation of psychoanalytical subjectivity.26 The
object of property is a form of "phallus" in the psychoanalytical
sense-the object of desire possessed, enjoyed, and exchanged among
subjects. "Sexuality" is the symbolic position the subject takes with re-
spect to the phallus. The masculine position is that of claiming to
possess and exchange the phallus. The feminine position is that of
being and enjoying the phallus. Both sexes fail in their attempts to
achieve wholeness because the phallus is not in the symbolic order of
law and language. The term "phallus" stands for that which we sense
has been lost forever in castration. It is our sense that there is some-
thing we cannot describe in language (the symbolic) or depict in im-
agery (the imaginary). It is the ephemeral essence of the Cathedral
that Monet knew he could not capture.
We long for a permanence and wholeness of the real, which is
unattainable in the artificial order of the symbolic. Consequently, we
seek to replace symbolic concepts with real ones. We do this in the
imaginary by identifying specific physical or natural "objects," which
seem to serve as the "real" analogs to the symbolic. In the case of
sexuality, we conflate the phallus with that which one anatomical sex
has-the male organ-and which the other is and enjoys-the female
body. That is, anatomic sexuality is a metaphor for symbolic sexuality,
rather than the other way around.
25 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 245.
26 See id. at 52-54;Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Citique of the
Disaggregation of Property, 93 MicH. L. REv. 239, 244-55 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder,
Chix];Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37WM. & MARYL. REv. 455,
510-13 (1996) [hereinafter, Schroeder, Legal Surrealism]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Vestal
and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, 16 CAmozo L. REV. 805,
816-17 (1995) [hereinafter Schroeder, Vestal and the Fasces]; Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder,
Virgin Tenitory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79
MiNN. L. Rav. 55, 155-65 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, Virgin Territory].
This discussion is based on my argument in Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Juno Moneta:
On the Erotics of the Marketplace, 59 WAsH. &L E L. REv. 995, 1008-09, 1016-17 (1997) [here-
inafter Schroeder, Juno Moneta].
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We also use implicit anatomic sexual imagery to describe the psy-
choanalytically phallic concept of property. In this Article, I explore
the persistent use of what I have called the masculine and the femi-
nine phallic metaphors for property.27 The masculine metaphor re-
lies on implicit metaphors of the male organ and envisions property as
the sensuous grasp of a tangible thing to be displayed and wielded
before others. The loss of property is analogized to castration-the
taking away of possession. The masculine metaphor is an unsuccessful
attempt to reduce property, which is necessarily a mediated trilateral
(or even quadrilateral) relationship, to an immediate bilateral one.
Consequently, the masculine metaphor vacillates between identifying
property solely with the element of possession-seen as the relation-
ship of the owning subject to the owned object 2 8-and identifying it
solely with the element of exchange-seen as the relationship be-
tween two legal subjects to which the object is irrelevant.29 In ex-
change, the object of exchange becomes monetized and irrelevant in
that each party is indifferent between retaining its object of exchange
and obtaining whatever is offered in exchange. Therefore, the Cala-
bresi and Melamed system sees property regimes (possession) and lia-
27 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at xvi, 4, 111-12; Schroeder, Juno Moneta, supra note
26, at 1022.
28 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, Tm RIGrr TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 34 (1988) (defining
property as the rules of allocation of tangible resources and analyzing legal interests in
intangibles as only being analogous to property). As I will discuss, the allocation of re-
sources-the identification of the rightful owner-is the definition of possession, which is
only one of the three elements of property, albeit the most primitive one. See SCHROEDER,
supra note 2, at 37-39 (discussing possession as one of Hegel's three elements of property);
see also Schroeder, Chix, supra note 26, at 264-66 (critiquing Waldron's view of property as
rules of allocation).
29 See Schroeder, Juno Moneta, supra note 26, at 1024. For example, both Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld and Thomas Grey insisted that property is solely a relationship among legal
actors that does not require an object. They argued further that because property without
an object is indistinguishable from a number of other traditional legal rights, property is
irrational and should disappear as a separately identifiable legal category. SeeWFsLY NEW-
COMB HoHnEuD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning II, in FUNDA-
MENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS
65, 71, 78-86 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEP-
TnONs]; Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY. NoMos XXII 69, 81 (J.
Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
This ridiculous conclusion is based on their implicit adoption of the phallic metaphor.
They both agreed that the concept of object can only be thought of as a tangible thing and
that the concept of possession can only be thought of as the sensuous grasp of the tangible
thing-the phallic metaphor. See HOHFELD, supra, at 85-86; Grey, supra, at 70-71. They
then, correctly, concluded that this view of property is inadequate. See HOHFELD, supra, at
86; Grey, supra at 71. It does not, for example, account for copyright or other intangibles.
Rather than realizing that this view shows only the absurdity of the masculine phallic im-
agery of property, they believed that it means that property itself is absurd. See HoHFELD,
supra, at 95; Grey, supra, at 71. They accuse others who insist on the objectivity of property
as being naive, precisely because they have a naive view of objectivity. See SCHROEDER, supra
note 2, at 1-7, 114, 156-66, 170-80; Schroeder, Chix, supra note 26, at 290-95.
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bility regimes (exchange) as alternatives.30 This approach reflects the
two alternate and inconsistent strategies that the masculine position
can take in a vain attempt to deny castration.
In contrast, the feminine phallic metaphor relies on the imagery
of the female body. The owning subject identifies with the owned ob-
ject in such a way that they become indistinguishable. Property is that
which one enters and enjoys and that which one protects from inva-
sion by others. Property is reduced to the single element of enjoy-
ment. Loss of property is imagined as violation, as loss of self.31
30 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1106-10.
31 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 4; Schroeder, Juno Moneta, supra note 26, at 1016,
1023. The feminine metaphor, with its language of protection, of entrance, of enjoyment,
and of violation, creeps into much of property discussion, particularly when real estate is
involved. In my experience, however, it is usually subordinate to the more common mas-
culine metaphors.
In American jurisprudential scholarship, the most significant exception to this general
rule of subordination is MargaretJane Radin who has attempted to develop an entire juris-
prudence of property, which is, unintentionally, based on feminine bodily imagery and
which privileges the element of enjoyment over those of possession and alienation. See
Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 26, at 62-67. The works of Radin which I critique as
reflecting the feminine phallic metaphor for property include Margaret Jane Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1667 (1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849 (1987)
[hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability]; MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood]; and Margaret Jane
Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 341 (1991). These articles have been
reproduced, with minor changes, as part of MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROP-
ERTY (1993) (collection of articles). More recently, she rewrote some of these Articles and
integrated them with new materials in MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES
(1996).
A recent critique of the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy also unwittingly privileges en-
joyment over the other elements. Specifically, Madeline Morris collapses Hohfeld's con-
cepts of rights and privileges into a single right of "in-kind enjoyment of the object,"
thereby not only misunderstanding Hohfeld's taxonomy, which suppresses objects entirely,
but also subsuming the right of possession entirely into the right of enjoyment. Madeline
Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 822, 830-33 (1993). Is it telling that
female scholars wrote these two articles which privilege the feminine element of "enjoy-
ment"? Is it telling that pairs of men co-authored the most important articles based on the
Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy, including the original?
An interesting example in which environmental nuisances were analyzed in terms of
enjoyment, rather than possession, is the recent case of L6pez Ostra v. Spain, 303-c Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1994), before the European Court of Human Rights. L6pez Ostra lived near
a foul smelling waste treatment plant. See id at 43. She sued the local municipality, which
licensed the offending plant for interfering with her rights to personal integrity that the
European Convention on Human Rights granted. See id. at 50. Specifically, she relied on
that part of Article 8 which declares that: "'[e]veryone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.'" Id. at 53 (quoting European
Commission of Human Rights art. 8, sec. 1).
The court expressly found that environmental pollution "may affect individuals' well-
being and prevent [the plaintiffs] from enjoying their homes." Id. at 54. Further,
although Article 8 expressly provides that an individual's right of personal integrity can, in
some circumstances, be subordinated to a state's proper imposition of its police power to
assure "'the economic well-being of the country,"' id. at 53 (quoting European Commis-
sion of Human Rights art. 8, sec. 2), in this case "the State did not succeed in striking a fair
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My thesis is that the law and economics debate on environmental
"nuisances," based on Calabresi and Melamed's trichotomy, is one of
the most extreme examples of the masculine phallic metaphor for
property in contemporary legal scholarship. It represses the psycho-
analytically feminine aspects of property. It implicitly adopts the mas-
culine phallic metaphor for property as either unmediated
possession-the unfettered and exclusive physical custody of tangible
objects by an owner-or unmediated alienation through exchange-
economic bargaining for which specific objects are irrelevant. Be-
cause their trichotomy represses enjoyment, the feminine third, Cala-
bresi and Melamed cannot accurately describe environmental
disputes. Environmental nuisances involve neither the taking of pos-
session of a single object, nor the mere exchanging of entitlements.
Rather, environmental nuisances involve rival claims of enjoyment of
different objects by different owners in such a way that one party
claims to be violated by the other.3 2
Moreover, the law and economics debate represses the necessary
jus tertii of property law. From the psychoanalytical position-the un-
recognized third-that is, the necessity of mediation is also an aspect
of the "feminine." The debate at one moment imagines not merely
that property can be reduced to possession, but that possession is a
simple, immediate relation of subject to object which exists outside of
law. The mediating regime of law does not define the relationship of
the owner with respect to other persons in society; it merely enforces
the pre-existing concept of possession. Property is seen initially as a
binary relationship between subject and object, rather than the trilat-
eral interrelationship of legal subjects with respect to a mediating ob-
ject of desire. When the debate is forced to recognize the existence of
another subject, the relationship once again becomes binary as the
mediating object disappears and is replaced totally by the intersubjec-
balance between the interest of the town's economic well-being-that of having a waste-
treatment plant-and applicant's effective enjoyment of her right[s]." Id. at 56. The court
further upheld the finding of the court below that the activities of the local authorities
'amounted to unlawfuil interference with her right to respect for her home and [were] also
an attack on her physical integrity." Id. at 45, 56.
Although framed in terms of enjoyment, this case is not quite the same as using a
feminine phallic metaphor for property. Rather than using metaphors of the female body
to describe L6pez Ostra's enjoyment rights in her property-her home-the court found
that the pollution literally injured her body. See id. at 58.
32 The literature only occasionally and sporadically recognizes this point. For exam-
ple, Polinsky states that environmental nuisances involve "incompatible land use." A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. Rv. 1075, 1075 (1980). Polinsky is probably the most insightful
scholar working within the Calabresi-Melamed debate, and I refer approvingly to his analy-
sis throughout the notes to this Article. Unfortunately, he did not fully internalize the fact
that the logical implications of his insight form a critique of the Calabresi-Melamed
taxonomy.
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five fungibility of money and economic indifference. Most impor-
tantly, the analysis of this immediate two party relationship of
exchange both ignores and cannot account for the existence of third
parties who are potential rival claimants for the forgotten object of
desire. 3 This difficulty is precisely why law and economics has em-
braced game theory so fervently. Although theoretically possible,
multi-party games are not only extremely difficult but rarely lead to
one clear solutionA4 Consequently, the games played by the followers
of Calabresi and Melamed involve only two parties, reducing all
human relationships to unrelated series of binary relations. The rec-
ognition of the third (the feminine) is always postponed to the
future.3 5
The prevalence of the masculine metaphor and the repression of
the feminine metaphor in the legal literature on environmental nui-
sances is even more remarkable considering the historic dominance
of the feminine metaphor in discussions of man's exploitation of na-
ture.36 The very term "pollution" means "defilement" in the religious
and sexual sense and was not extended to cover environmental harm
until the nineteenth century.3 7
This Article is not intended to be a comprehensive account of the
literature begat by Calabresi and Melamed. Rather, it critiques the
theoretical assumptions and implicit imagery underlying this litera-
ture. First, I introduce the Calabresi-Melamed dichotomy-or more
accurately, trichotomy. I argue that it implicitly reduces property to a
single element, vacillating between possession and exchange. The tri-
chotomy thereby fails to achieve its stated goal of serving as a taxon-
33 Even as insightful an author as Polinsky, who realized that the Calabresi-Melamed
taxonomy focuses only on the two-party dispute issues, see id. at 1075-76, does not recognize
that property necessarily implicates third-party interests, which cannot be added on
cumulatively.
34 SeeJohn Cassiday, The Decline of Economics, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 2, 1996, at 50.
Carol Rose implicitly noted this problem of the standard economic approach. For exam-
ple, she critiqued Ayres and Talley's analysis for "remov[ing] the large numbers of partici-
pants in those cases, and instead treat[ing] nuisances as two-party matters." Carol M. Rose,
The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2183 (1997).
35 The other way of reducing multiparty relations to two-party games is to pit one
individual player against an aggregate of other parties. An example of this can be found in
the first chapter of ERic RASMUSEN, GAMEs AND INFORMATION (1989), one of the standard
introductory game theory text books. Rasmusen set forth an introductory game based on a
hypothetical meeting of OPEC. See id. at 21-27. Although he described this as a game
among five players who are playing simultaneously-Saudi Arabia, Libya, Venezuela, Ku-
wait, and Nigeria, in fact the game played in the text is between two parties-Saudi Arabia
and "Others." Id. at 25, 26.
36 Arguably, we can trace this tradition in Western culture back to the Biblical crea-
tion story in which God tells Adam to "subdue" the earth. Genesis 1:28. For a feminist
critique of this tradition, see, for example, CAROLYN MERcHATr, THE D.ATH OF NATURE:
WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND THE SCMENTIFC REVOLUTION (1980).
37 WEBSTER's THRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1756 (1986).
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omy of environmental nuisances that involve disputes over enjoyment.
Second, I show how the Calabresi-Melamed analysis further fails be-
cause it cannot be applied in a world with more than two parties. The
coherence of the trichotomy depends on maintaining a distinction be-
tween property and liability regimes. In a world of three parties (or
dynamite), however, this distinction cannot be maintained. In this
connection I on occasion turn to certain recent refinements to the
Calabresi and Melamed thesis proposed by Ian Ayres and Eric Talley38
and show that these refinements replicate, rather than solve, these in-
herent flaws.
The first part of my critique stands by itself and does not depend
on my jurisprudential theory. Nevertheless, I believe that psychoanal-
ysis can explain the failures inherent in the trichotomy. My theory of
property, which I base on the political philosophy of Hegel and the
psychoanalytic theory of Lacan, seeks to explain why we cling to the
concept of property as sensuous grasp-what I call the masculine
phallic metaphor-even as we recognize its ineptness.3 9 But, psychoa-
nalysis is not destiny. Its goal, like that of philosophy, is the actualiza-
tion of human freedom.4° It seeks to help us understand our
tendencies so that we can be more critically aware of the choices we
make.41 I suggest that the trichotomy springs from the psychoanalyti-
cally masculine response to the universal longing for wholeness-the
unsuccessful denial of loss through the attempted repression of the
psychoanalytically feminine roles of enjoyment, negativity, and
mediation.
Lacanian psychoanalysis is an account of how our unconscious
minds Work. It provides, therefore, a tool both for analyzing the un-
spoken assumptions and imagery underlying any given legal theory
and for imagining potential alternate theories based on other assump-
tions and imagery. I have found that it can reveal and explain why
some theories, such as Calabresi and Melamed's, are not merely intui-
tively appealing, but seductive.
I
THE CALABRESI AND MOELAMD TRiCHOTOMY
A. Introduction
A sea of ink has been spilled purporting to derive concrete policy
recommendations from the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy.42 Their
38 See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining. Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facili-
tate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE LJ. 1027 (1995).
39 See ScHROEDER, supra note 2, at 3-4.
40 For a thorough examination of psychoanalysis, see LAcAN, supra note 6.
41 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
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trichotomy soon became one of the foremost schools of property anal-
ysis in contemporary American jurisdictions. The Calabresi and Me-
lamed article richly deserves its high reputation. It is bold, elegant,
concise, and thought provoking. It is also wrong. It reflects an un-
workable, naive conception of property-the masculine phallic meta-
phor-and concentrates on the wrong elements of property-
possession as both physical custody and alienation through exchange.
This Article is a critique, not a criticism, of Calabresi and Me-
lamed. The mere recourse to phallic metaphors cannot be objection-
able; it may be inevitable. My own writings are full of such imagery.43
Indeed, Lacanian linguistic theory holds that all language necessarily
consists of metaphor and metonymy.44 Problems arise, however, when
we unconsciously accept our metaphors and let them control analysis.
Metaphors are always simultaneously true and false. They are true in
that they presuppose some essential similarity between the signifier
and the signified. They are false because a metaphor is, by definition,
the substitution of one thing for another. Some essential dissimilarity
between the signifier and the signified always exists. Otherwise, the
signifier would be the signified. In this Article, I am trying to make the
use of metaphors explicit so that we can be critically aware of how we
use them and how they use us.
Contemporary scientific theory proposes that progress can only
be made through a combination of the three logical processes of ab-
duction, induction, and deduction. 45 Through abduction a new hy-
pothesis is proposed, which one tests by trying to falsify it through
inductive and deductive reasoning.46 The growth of knowledge de-
mands that we propose and eliminate interesting but ultimately "false"
hypotheses. Consequently, the fact that a hypothesis is eventually
proved wrong does not mean that it was not a valuable contribution to
the search for knowledge. In the words of Professor Pierre Schlag,
being wrong has a "bum rap."47 Unfortunately, the Calabresi and Me-
lamed analysis has not been rejected but has spawned a progeny that
goes beyond the original failed attempt to analyze environmental
harms and misapplies it to a number of other property priority
disputes. 48
43 See sources cited supra note 26.
44 See generally LACAN, supra note 19, at 146-59 (discussing the place of metonymy and
metaphor in language).
45 SeeJeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the
Logic of Imagination, 70 TEx. L. REv. 109, 179-85 (1991).
46 See id. at 180-83.
47 Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. LJ. 37,
50 n.65 (1987).
48 See Part IV.
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Calabresi and Melamed tried to find a way t6 unify, and thereby
clarify, the seemingly disparate areas of environmental property and
tort law.49 From an economic perspective, they suggest that all envi-
ronmental claims involve either assertions of entitlement or allega-
tions of interference with an entitlement.50 To Calabresi and
Melamed, the first task of both property and tort law is to decide
which of two rivals should be awarded a disputed entitlement.51 Once
the entitlement is allocated, the law must then decide what remedies
it will use to protect this allocation. Remedies either can maintain or
restore the status quo ante with respect to the entitlement or can com-
pensate the original entitlement-claimant for the transfer or the loss
of the entitlement. Sometimes the law removes the entitlement from
the market entirely.
Economic theories of either wealth or utility maximization ask
whether it is more efficient to retain the status quo ante of entitle-
ment allocation or to encourage the transfer of the entitlement.52
Consequently, Calabresi and Melamed suggested that, from an eco-
nomic standpoint, it might be useful to classify causes of action not on
the basis of the specific entitlement claimed, the nature of the harm
alleged (i.e., in terms of whether the claim sounds in property or
tort), or even the identity of the claimant initially allocated the entitle-
ment, but rather on the basis of the type of remedy used to enforce
the entitlement.53 They thought that classifying causes of action by
the type of remedy involved might better enable society to achieve
pareto efficiency (i.e., insuring that the entitlement remains with, or is
transferred to, the highest valuing user)54 Calabresi and Melamed
also suggested, secondarily, that an examination of remedies might
enable society to determine whether the law serves distributional or
"other justice reasons."55
Calabresi and Melamed broadly categorized all remedies into
three, theoretically distinguishable subsets: property rules, liability
49 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1089.
50 See id. at 1089-92.
51 See id. at 1090. Polinsky implicitly recognized that Calabresi and Melamed were
incorrect in analyzing this task as an allocation of a "thing." He more accurately described
the choice in the environmental nuisance situation as a decision "as to who is entitled to
prevail" in a specific dispute. Polinsky, supra note 32, at 1076.
52 The concept of Pareto optimality more accurately relates to this question. Pareto
optimality is not the only concept of economic efficiency, but it is the one that Calabresi
and Melamed discussed, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1094-98, and that the
Calabresi-Melamed inspired literature expressly or implicitly adopted, see, e.g., Jules L.
Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theoy of Legal Rights, 95 YALE LJ. 1335, 1358-60
(1986).
53 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1090-93.
54 See id. at 1093-94.
55 Id. at 1098-1105.
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rules, and inalienability rules.56 As we shall see, this terminology is
not merely useless, it is pernicious. The terminology not only fails to
reflect any existing legal regime, but also posits a legal regime that is
both empirically and theoretically impossible in a world of more than
two people.
The Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy is flawed for a number of
closely interrelated reasons: (1) it confuses the definition of rights
with the enforcement of rights; (2) it misidentifies the element of
property that classic environmental disputes invoke, concentrating on
possession, and to some extent alienation, rather than enjoyment; and
(3) it inaccurately characterizes property as a binary relationship, pre-
empting description of any actual or possible property regime in
which three parties (or dynamite) exist. Indeed, the distinctions be-
tween property and liability remedies, upon which Calabresi and Me-
lamed's taxonomy depends, break down in the real world of multiple
parties and destruction of property.
Other authors partially have raised a number of these critiques.
For example, Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus have chided Calabresi
and Melamed both for their conflation of the definition of rights and
the enforcement of rights5 7 and for their confusion of damages for
prior harms with a purchase price for involuntary sales.58 Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell suggested, as I do, that environmental nui-
sances cause harms fundamentally distinct from those caused by pos-
sessory property disputes.59 James Krier and Stewart Schwab noted
the empirical inaccuracy of the models based on the trichotomy.60
56 Calabresi and Melamed were perfectly aware that as an empirical matter these cate-
gories may not have dearly defined borders in the sense that some remedies may have
both property-like and liability-like aspects. "It should be clear that most entitlements to
most goods are mixed." Id. at 1093. As I have discussed extensively elsewhere, and will
turn to again later, this uncertainty is probably true of all qualitative distinctions and is not
in and of itself a reason to reject the trichotomy. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam
To-day: On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence, 84 GEo. LJ. 1531, 1554-58 (1996).
57 See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 52, at 1342-47. Despite this criticism, Coleman
and Kraus did not accurately identify the nature of the rights involved in environmental
nuisances. At least, they mentioned the right of enjoyment in passing. "Once a commu-
nity settles on a set of legitimate holdings (or entitlements) [i.e., the right of possession], it
needs to specify the uses to which these holdings might be lawfully or otherwise legiti-
mately put." Id. at 1344. Unfortunately, they then lapsed back into the masculine phallic
metaphor and analyzed environmental nuisances not in terms of incompatible enjoyments,
but in terms of takings. Even their one sentence discussion of enjoyment immediately
metamorphosizes into a discussion of alienation. "Among the uses to which right-holders
may wish to put their entitlements are those which involve or require transactions. Conse-
quently, a community requires a set of norms that specify the conditions of lawful or legiti-
mate transfer." Id.
58 See id. at 1356-64.
59 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARv. L. Rxv. 713, 715-18 (1996). They used the economic term "harmful
externalities" for what I call incompatible enjoyment See id. at 716.
60 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 477-83.
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Ian Ayres and Eric Talley implicitly challenged Calabresi and Me-
lamed's identification of property with equity.61 Dale Nance implicitly
recognized a number of my criticisms including my observations that
the trichotomy does not deal adequately with the possibility of the
destruction of the object of entitlement, that the property/liability di-
chotomy cannot be applied prospectively, and that just because
tortfeasors only pay limited damages does not mean they have a "call"
on the entitlements of tort victims. 62
Nevertheless, these authors treat these insights as quibbles. They
basically accept the Calabresi and Melamed paradigm and work within
its strictures. This stance is particularly surprising because Calabresi
and Melamed purport to base their paradigm largely on Ronald
Coase's seminal analysis of environmental nuisances, The Problem of So-
cial Cost.63 As I briefly discuss later in this Article 64 and explore exten-
sively elsewhere, 65 not only does Coase recognize that environmental
disputes involve what I call the feminine element of enjoyment.
Coase's primary point was to chide his fellow economists for assuming
what I call the masculine phallic metaphor.
In this Article, I present a unified critique, which shows that these
seemingly disparate criticisms all spring from the same fatal flaw that
61 Ayres and Talley did identify liability rules with legal remedies and property rules
with equitable ones. SeeAyres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1031. Their later identification of
property with punitive damages undermines this dichotomy. See id at 1037, 1050-51; infra
text accompanying note 336.
62 See Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedra
83 VA. L. REv. 837, 842-58 (1997). Nance's article is an interesting attempt to rescue the
Calabresi-Melamed analysis. He correctly realized that the analysis ultimately breaks down
as an account of remedial regimes. He suggested, instead, that many legal rules should be
seen as "guidance rules," rather than "enforcement rules." Id. at 840. This argument is
similar, but not identical, to my point that the legal regimes Calabresi and Melamed identi-
fied do not merely allocate and protect entitlements, but also define them. For example,
Nance argued that most people do not follow the law merely out of fear of criminal punish-
ment or civil liability. Rather, people follow the law because they believe in the rule of law
for one reason or another. See id. at 860. When society requlres a tortfeasor to pay dam-
ages to a tort victim it does not declare that future tortfeasors have a call option to "buy"
the bodily integrity of future tort-victims. Rather, it represents a societal judgment that the
act was wrongful and should be avoided. See id. at 847-50. The vast majority of the popula-
tion will accept this consensus and will eschew the bad behavior rather than engage in an
economic calculus as to whether the penalty for violation of the rule-the call price-is
greater or less than any potential gain. See id. at 864-65.
Although Nance's thoughtful and imaginative approach deserves serious considera-
tion, I believe that it is beyond the scope of this Article. I believe that in his attempt to
reform Calabresi and Melamed, he substantially rewrites their analysis. Despite Nance's
protests to the contrary, Calabresi and Melamed expressly presented their analysis as one
of enforcement regimes, and its utility for law and economics depends on the proposition
that the distinction between property and liability regimes can be maintained and applied
prospectively. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1105-10.
63 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
64 See infra Part I.D.
65 See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 6, at 521-30.
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renders the original trichotomy worthless: the trichotomy privileges
the masculine phallic metaphor for property and represses the femi-
nine metaphor for property and law. Because the trichotomy cannot
recognize thirdness, it vacillates between treating property as an im-
mediate binary relation of subject to object (possession confused with
physical custody) and treating it as an immediate binary relation of
subject to subject (alienation and exchange confused with the physi-
cal transfer of custody). The trichotomy ignores the feminine as "the
trick of singularity"66 -the identification of subject with object in en-
joyment. Furthermore, it ignores the feminine as trilateral relation-
the necessity of mediation in all legal relations. The trichotomy
presumes that property entitlements exist outside of and prior to law
and that the law merely allocates and enforces property. It sees prop-
erty rules and liability rules as alternate enforcement regimes. In fact,
however, entitlements and law are mutually constituting. All property
regimes define, rather than merely allocate, entitlements. Rather
than being alternates, property rules and liability rules necessarily co-
exist. I hypothesize that these errors all reflect the single perspective
of the psychoanalytically masculine sexuated position.
B. The Trichotomy
1. Property Rules
Under a "property" regime, an entitlement can only be trans-
ferred with the consent of the original holder. That is, society will
respect the entitlement holder's own idiosyncratic or "subjective" valu-
ation of her entitlement and will not impose its collective valuation.
In Calabresi and Melamed's words, "[p]roperty rules involve a collec-
tive decision as to who is to be given an initial entitlement but not as
to the value of the entitlement. '67
Property remedies are, therefore, those that prevent a second
party from taking an entitlement holder's property without her con-
sent or those that restore the status quo ante by returning the object
to the original claimant if the rival already has wrested possession of
the entitlement from the original holder. 68 While Calabresi and Me-
lamed did not expressly specify what actual judicial remedies would
fall within these categories, they briefly discussed injunctions. 69 They
also suggested that meaningful criminal sanctions would seem prop-
66 WILLIAM SHAKiSPEAPE, TWELUru NirHT act 2, sc. 5 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
67 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1092.
68 See id. at 1118.
69 See id. at 1116.
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erty-like. 70 In context, however, it seems fairly clear that Calabresi and
Melamed seem to have been thinking primarily in terms of the tradi-
tional equitable remedies of injunction and of specific performance
and the traditional property remedy of replevin.71 At first blush, this
analysis seems to follow from the identification of property as posses-
sion because possession can be restored.
Unfortunately, the element of property involved in environmen-
tal harms is the feminine element of enjoyment. Once enjoyment is
violated, it is not clear that the status quo can ever be restored because
the object itself (and the owning subject) may have been irretrievably
changed by the experience. She, as well as her object, are "polluted"
in the original sexual and religious sense of violated, desecrated, de-
filed, or made impure.7 2
Even in the case of a true possessory dispute, the reduction of
property rights to injunction and replevin is a fantasy. In our world,
which has more than two possible claimants to the objects of desire,
the law is often unsuccessful in preventing a taking. In addition, if a
taking has occurred, it is often practically and theoretically impossible
to give it back.
70 I say "meaningful" because, as Kaplow and Shavell correctly pointed out, some os-
tensibly criminal sanctions are so light that they are more accurately characterized as liabil-
ity rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 753. The most obvious examples are
traffic violations. The fines imposed are designed merely to discourage, rather than en-
tirely eliminate, certain behavior. See id. For example, in my home town of New York City,
even the substantial fines charged for illegal parking are treated by delivery companies as
merely a.cost of doing business.
71 For example, in one of the best analyses to come out of the Calabresi-Melamed
debate, Polinsky largely avoided the property-liability terminology in favor of speaking
about the relative advantages of injunctive and damage remedies. See Polinsky, supra note
32, at 1075-78.
72 Interestingly, at least one critic of Calabresi and Melamed implicitly recognized this
feminine sexual aspect of pollution. Richard Epstein gives as an example of the absurdity
of the notorious "hypothetical four," see infra Part II.B.4, by applying it to the law of rape.
The enormous risk of this rule should be seen instantly if we propound its
analogy for violations to the person. Just to say that "a woman can stop a
man from raping her, but if she does she must compensate him" shows how
far this position is from an ordinary understanding of rights, and it is with
great relief that Calabresi and Melamed do not carry their innovation to
this extreme. Rather, they note elsewhere that concern with "bodily integ-
rity" precludes the application of an ordinary liability (take and pay) in
these contexts. Obviously [hypothetical four] would be still more
grotesque.
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE
LJ. 2091, 2103-04 (1997) (footnote omitted). Epstein damns Calabresi and Melamed with
the faint praise that the only reason that their analysis is not totally "grotesque" is that they
do not have the courage of their convictions to apply it to hard cases. Id. Of course,
Richard Posner, the most ardent believer of law and economics, does not flinch from gro-
tesquerie (and does not recognize that the grotesquerie is itself an argument against his
analysis). Posner came close to analyzing rape in the market terms Epstein condemned.
See RIcHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 383-95 (1992).
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Recently, Ayres and Talley have suggested that property remedies
can be defined as damages set so punitively high that they will discour-
age any rational economic actor from attempting to take another's
entitlement.73 Although they do not specifically so state, their theory
follows from an economic analysis that considers everything monetiz-
able in the sense that there is always some price at which a claimant
can be made indifferent between any two choices. This approach is
ultimately unsuccessful. It does, however, at least intuitively see as
through a glass darkly74 that a simple equation of property with equity
matches neither our existing property regime nor any theoretically
possible one.
2. Liability Rules
Under a Calabresi-Melamed "liability" regime, society imposes its
intersubjective valuation on entitlement holders. 75 This means that
involuntary transfers will be upheld, despite the protests of the origi-
nal entitlement holder, as long as the transferee gives the intersubjec-
tive value of the thing taken to the transferor.76
As I discuss in more detail below, Calabresi and Melamed's fol-
lowers debate whether a liability regime should adopt "tailored" or
73 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1041. Kaplow and Shavell also, in passing,
included draconian damages in their definition of property remedies. See Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 59, at 723.
Ayres went even further in a recent article he co-authored withJack Balkin by asserting
that "property rules are actually a special case of liability rules." Ian Ayres &J.M. Balkin,
Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE LJ. 703,
705 (1996).
74 1 Corinthians 13:2.
75 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1092. They referred to society's valua-
tion as being "objective[ ]." Id. By doing so they were not invoking the definition of "ob-
jective" as to external, scientific "truth." The English word "objective" is a chameleon of
constantly changing shades of meaning. See generallyJeanne L. Schroeder, Subject: Object; 47
U. Mimk L. REv. 1 (1992) (discussing various definitions of "object," and comparing these
definitions to those used by selected legal scholars who had criticized or defended "objec-
tivity in the law"). I believe Calabresi and Melamed are using the common alternate defini-
tion of that which is decided by intersubjective consensus, or what I have called
"Community Objectivity." Id. at 17-24. This usage is "objective" in the sense that it is the
opposite of that which is unique to any one individual subject. See id. at 17. Consequently,
Calabresi and Melamed also referred to the objective value as the "collective determination
of the value." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1106. Although I often adopt this
common and useful definition, I generally avoid it in this Article as confusing for my pres-
ent purposes. Unless I expressly state otherwise, when I use the word "objective" in this
Article, I am limiting it to the philosophic and psychoanalytic sense of that which relates to
object relations. In my terminology, the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy is "objective" when
it attempts to reduce property to the immediate relationship of subject and object-posses-
sion as physical custody-even though this attempt also requires the enforcement of the
owning subject's "subjective" valuation of the object. When Calabresi and Melamed ana-
lyzed property rights in terms of exchange and collective valuation of society, it is more
accurately termed "intersubjective."
76 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1092, 1106.
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"nontailored" damages.77 In this context, tailoring means that a court
should attempt to set damages equal to the victim's subjective valua-
tion of her loss. In contrast, nontailored damages are set by an objec-
tive measure.
The concept of tailored damages ignores Calabresi and Me-
lamed's model, which expressly states that the victim receives society's
valuation under a liability regime. 78 Moreover, tailored damages are
inconsistent with the existing legal regime and probably with any
other practical legal regime that one could devise. Calabresi and Me-
lamed did not discuss tailored damages presumably because their goal
was a descriptive taxonomy of remedies that are available under our
regime of law. Property damages are set by reference to market
value79 (intersubjective valuation) and make no attempt to determine
the victim's subjective valuation of her loss.
But even if Calabresi and Melamed were accurate in recognizing
that damages are usually based on society's intersubjective valuation of
loss, their solely economic approach works another radical sea change
in damages. As Coleman and Kraus have complained, Calabresi and
Melamed transformed damages intended to compensate a victim for a
77 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1036-72 (providing a model of untailored
liability and property rules and discussing the perverse effects of tailoring liability). In
contradistinction, Polinsky, writing fairly early in the debate, implicitly recognized that our
system of property law does not, in fact, tailor damages. See Polinsky, supra note 32, at
1086-87. Indeed, it is unlikely that a court could accurately calculate actual subjective dam-
ages even if it wished to make such a calculation. See id
78 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1092. They did suggest that the collec-
tive valuation by society "may be what it is thought the original holder of the entitlement
would have sold it for." Id. Calabresi and Melamed believe that the essence of liability
rules is the imposition of society's, not the individual's, valuation as shown by their concern
over the problem that sometimes the collective valuation may be less than the owner's
actual valuation. See id at 1108-09. This conception of valuation is a problem because a
liability regime should be adopted only if it would serve Pareto efficiency by encouraging
the transfer of the entitlement to the higher valuing user. Suppose, for example, that the
owner's subjective valuation of the entitlement is $100 and the rival's valuation is $90.
Under the Pareto criterion, the status quo should be maintained. Now imagine that sod-
ety's valuation-the measurement of damages under applicable law-is $75. Because this
valuation is less than the rival's valuation, the rational rival would "take" the entitlement.
This result would be inefficient.
Whether or not one thinks this scenario is a serious problem depends on one's judg-
ment of the accuracy of courts in setting damages. Property damages usually are set by
reference to market price. If the market price of the entitlement is $75, why does the rival
not go and buy an equivalent entitlement in the market rather than taking the entitle-
mento Presumably, because few equivalent entitlements are available or other conditions,
which inhibit a market for entitlements, exist. But the same conditions that would inhibit
a market also, presumably, would make it difficult for a court to come up with an accurate
measure of damages. Krier and Schwab based much of their critique of the empirical
vacuousness of most analyses the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy generated on the implica-
tions stemming from the difficulty of measuring damages. See Krier & Schwab, supra note
15, at 452-64.
79 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 781.
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loss into a purchase price payable by the torffeasor for purchase of an
entitlement from an involuntary seller.8 0 The tortfeasor is, in effect,
deemed to have a call option on the tort-victim's "entitlement" to bod-
ily integrity. The Calabresi-Melamed description tries to achieve im-
mediate binary relations by suppressing the objective aspect of the
property relation in favor of the intersubjective. The object of prop-
erty loses all independent significance because it is completely mone-
tized. In this economy, the parties are completely indifferent between
retaining the object of desire and obtaining the purchase price: the
object ceases to be desired. In the final Part of this Article, I argue
that this shift reflects the second masculine strategy for denying castra-
tion.81 When one is forced to admit that the object of desire is gone,
the masculine subject claims that he only temporarily relinquished the
object of desire in exchange for a future substitute object.
Moreover, if damages are equivalent to a call option for the pur-
poses of economic analysis, it does not follow that they are equivalent
for legal or philosophical purposes. This analysis fundamentally mis-
perceives not only the nature of the property right being infringed in
an environmental harm, but also the nature of the infringing action.
As I will discuss, liability remedies may be all that any law can
guarantee.8 2 This result, however, can never completely be satisfac-
tory. To pretend that monetary compensation is payment for the
taken object is to pretend that one consented to castration. Accord-
ing to Coleman and Kraus, a super-wealth maximizer like Judge Rich-
ard Posner would consider all transfers to be "voluntary" under a
proper liability regime; it is just that sometimes the consent is
purchased retroactively through the payment of damages.83 As Cole-
man and Kraus previously have argued within a different philosophi-
cal tradition, such an attempt to satisfy retroactively the consensual
aspect of exchange is doomed.8 4 Although we may be able to restore
the economic value of the lost object of desire, it does not follow that
we can relieve the psychic injury of the lost control over one's life.
That is, when something is taken without the consent of the original
entitlement holder, there are two harms: first, the loss of the entitle-
80 See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 52, at 1357.
81 See infra Conclusion.
82 See infra text accompanying notes 333-36.
83 Coleman and Kraus recognized that Posner did not state this view expressly, but
argued that it is implicit in, and required by, "the internal logic of his argument." Cole-
man & Kraus, supra note 52, at 1358-65.
84 See id. at 1359-65. Coleman and Kraus specifically critiqued Posner for trying to
interpret damages as a form of retroactive consent. See id. As they accurately stated, this
insistence on consent shows a solicitude towards autonomy which is peculiar for a wealth-
maximizer like Posner. A true wealth-maximizer need not concern himself with consent so
long as weath is maximized. See id. at 1361.
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ment that the Calabresi and Melamed analysis identifies; and second,
the injury to the claimant's personal autonomy.
To put it another way, if what is violated is not only the masculine
element of possession, but also the feminine element of enjoyment,
monetary compensation will not restore the lost experience. Damages
are metaphor-the substitution of one term for another. Even the
most rabid Benthamite recognizes the empirical difference between
having clean water, on the one hand, and having dirty water plus
money in the bank, on the other, regardless of their economic equiva-
lence. Accepting arguendo that one could be indifferent between the
two objects-clean water and money-provided that the price were
high enough, it does not necessarily follow that one also would be
indifferent between having the exclusive right and power to make this
decision and having the choice thrust upon one in exchange for
money.8 5 This loss of autonomy is violation-the feminine analog to
castration.8 6
Moreover, as the hypotheticals I explore in the next Part will
make clear,8 7 Calabresi and Melamed are once again incorrect in
identifying this as a "remedy regime." Their concept of a remedy re-
gime necessarily presupposes that the entitlement pre-exists as an
identifiable possessory right that the law merely assigns to one party
and enforces. The monetization of a right, however, is by definition
the division of the right between or among claimants. Consequently,
a "liability" regime is necessarily a rule of entitlement definition, not
merely one of entitlement enforcement.
3. Inalienability
As its name suggests, under an "inalienability" regime, an entitle-
ment may not be transferred in any (or at least most) market circum-
85 For example, I have disagreed elsewhere with Margaret Radin's concept of "per-
sonal property" as the identification of subject with object such that loss of the object of
property is loss of self. See generally Schroeder, Virgin Teruitory, supra note 26 (critiquing a
series of Radin's articles establishing a feministjurisprudence of property law). The arche-
typical example of the object of such a "healthy" property relation is the wedding ring. See
Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 31, at 959-61. This relation is the feminine phal-
lic metaphor for property which is as incomplete and inapt as the masculine version I
critique in this Article.
Although I have a sentimental attachment to my wedding ring, I would not hesitate to
sell it if someone made me a good offer. It does not follow from this decision that I would
not feel violated if someone were to steal my ring even ifI was generously compensated for
its loss by insurance or otherise-the sense of violation would relate to the thief's invasion
of my personal autonomy, not the loss of the object itself.
86 Of course, the pure utilitarian would argue that violation is just another form of
disutility. Consequently, if damages are designed to make the victim indifferent, they
should be set not merely at the victim's subjective valuation of the entitlement itself, but at
that amount plus some additional amount to compensate her for her loss of integrity.
87 See infra Part II.B.
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stances.88 For example, in this country, most of my body parts are
market inalienable.8 9 This means that not only will the courts refuse
to enforce a contract that I might make to sell one of my kidneys, but
also the state might use its police power to enjoin such a contract or to
impose criminal or civil penalties on the contracting parties.
Most commentators ignore, or give cursory treatment to, this fi-
nal category and treat the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy as though it
were a dichotomy. This miscategorization may occur because classic
law and economics theorists usually deem all entitlements monetiz-
able;90 at the appropriate price, one is indifferent between owning the
entitlement or receiving the price. The fact that entitlements are
monetizable suggests that, in theory, they also should be alienable.
Typically, inalienability is defended in terms of paternalism or jus-
tice,91 about which the law and economic analysis arguably has little
original to add.
88 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1111.
89 Blood is a rare exception to this rule, but even the alienation of blood tends to be
highly regulated. Some body parts may be alienable in other nonmarket contexts. For
example, although we generally consider it base to buy and sell kidneys, we considere it
noble to donate one. Although the sale of bodies in prostitution is illegal in mostjurisdic-
tions, and gifts of the sexual use of bodies to most people is frequently illegal and deemed
immoral, the contractual sexual exchange of bodies between spouses is not only permitted,
it is considered rightful and beneficial. Indeed, both the medieval legal notion that each
spouse had a marital lien on the sexual services of the other and the more recent late (and
not lamented) doctrine that there was no such thing as rape in marriage, confirm that the
law frequently has mandated these exchanges. SeeJeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Histori-
cized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist JurispMdenr 75 IowA L. Rxv.
1135, 1195-99 (1990).
90 For example, Richard Posner, one of the founders and foremost proponents of law
and economics has championed the goal of wealth maximization. Wealth is defined as
"the value in dollars or dollar equivalents.., of everything in society." Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J. LEGAL S=U. 103, 119-20 (1979). This defini-
tion of wealth is not limited to that which a lay person would think of as economic goods
traded in the market. Rather, it includes any "good thing," tangible or intangible that a
member in society would want if the member would be willing to pay to have it. Conse-
quently, it is not necessary for there to be an explicit market for the good thing. "Even
today, much of economic life is organized on barter principles; the 'marriage market,'
child rearing, and a friendly game of bridge are some examples. These services have value
which could be monetized by reference to substitute services sold in explicit markets or in
other ways." Id. at 120. The monetary value of other good things can be determined by
reference to "'hypothetical' market[s]." Id.
Since, however, the determination of value (that is, of willingness to pay)
made by a court is less accurate than that made by a market, the hypotheti-
cal-market approach should be reserved for cases, such as the typical acci-
dent case, where market-transaction costs preclude use of an actual market
to allocate resources efficiently.
Id.
91 Calabresi and Melamed analyze inalienability in these terms. See Calabresi & Me-
lamed, supra note 14, at 1111-13. Of course, there is a utilitarian way of defending inaliena-
bility. The sale of body parts might so offend a portion of the population that the
aggregate utility lost by society generally would exceed any utility gained by the parties to
any contract for such a sale. The libertarian might argue that we should not give these
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Perhaps more importantly, there seems to be something intui-
tively wrong with including this last category within a taxonomy of en-
forcement remedies. As a result, there is a tendency to exclude
inalienability rules from the analysis on the grounds that they are not
fundamentally similar to property and liability rules. Calabresi and
Melamed somewhat sheepishly step back from their trichotomy be-
cause this third category seems to fit poorly with the other two: "Un-
like [property and liability] rules, rules of inalienability not only
'protect' the entitlement; they may also be viewed as limiting or regu-
lating the grant of the entitlement itself. '92
In contradistinction, I defend Calabresi and Melamed's initial in-
stinct that the third category belongs with the other two, and I instead
criticize their belated attempt to distinguish it. The very reason that it
seems intuitively inappropriate to analyze inalienability as a remedy
applies equally, albeit less obviously, to property and liability rules.
Calabresi and Melamed's concept of property and liability rules im-
plicitly assumes that entitlements pre-exist outside of law: the law just
allocates and enforces entitlements.93 This assumption is the fantasy
that we can transcend the artificial, temporary order of law and lan-
guage (which Lacan calls the symbolic9 4) and achieve immediate con-
tact with the natural and permanent (which Lacan calls the order of
the real).95 For this reason, Calabresi and Melamed implicitly start by
reducing property to physical possession.96 The problem is that enti-
tlements are legal, symbolic concepts, not real ones. Although one
may have an entitlement to have physical custody of a tangible thing,
not all objects of desire are tangible (such as debts and copyrights)
and not all possessory interests are custodial in nature (such as a se-
cured party's perfected security interest9 7). Yet, as I already have indi-
cated, all entitlement disputes merely define-or in Calabresi and
feelings political weight-contracts between private individuals are nobody's business but
their own. The utilitarian, in contrast, cannot make such a value judgment. If contracts
for the sale of body parts reduce the aggregate utility of society, then they should be
prohibited.
92 Id. at 1093.
93 See id. at 1106-10.
94 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 64.
95 See id. at 65-66.
96 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1106-07 (providing an example in which
the parties focus on a park and their desire "to have it").
97 Elsewhere, I argued extensively that, from a Hegelian perspective, perfection of a
security interest through filing should not be seen as a substitute for the unproblematic
norm of possession as physical possession. See Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra note 26, at
509-21. Rather, filing is itself a form of Hegelian possession in the sense of the intersubjec-
tive recognition of the right of one subject to exclude other subjects from the object of
desire. See id. at 521-24 (noting that parties can file to create security interests, which "are
examples of a minimum form of Hegelian possession through positive law-intersubjec-
tively recognizable identification of object to subject"); infra Part III.B.
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Melamed's terminology, "limit[ ] and regulat[e]" 98-the scope of the
entitlement. In the next Part, I demonstrate this concept by applying
a standard Hohfeldian analysis to the six possible hypotheticals that
the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy can generate.
More importantly, however, the presumption underlying the Cal-
abresi-Melamed taxonomy-that one can analyze environmental nui-
sances in terms of the possession and exchange of entitlements-
logically requires the inalienability category. If the ability to be free
from pollution or to pollute is a thing that one can possess and alien-
ate through exchange, then this necessarily implies that these ex-
changes have terms and that society could impose restrictions on the
terms of exchange. As we will see, however, the concept of inalienabil-
ity is incoherent when the polluter is the entitlement holder. This
inconsistency necessarily implies that the fundamental assumptions of
the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy also are fatally flawed.
Perhaps the reason inalienability rules are all but ignored is be-
cause they dimly reflect the repressed feminine aspect of property and
of environmental nuisances. Inalienability rules deny the adequacy
and potency of the masculine regime of possession and of exchange.
These rules imply a unique relationship between the "entitlement
claimant" and her "entitlement," which suggests the psychoanalytically
feminine position of identifying with one's objects of desire. Unlike
the masculine regimes, which pretend that castration can be cured,
inalienability regimes recognize that some losses-like that of virgin-
ity-are permanent and irremediable. Inalienability-the removal of
certain objects from the market regardless of the owner's wishes-is,
however, the masculine response to the imagined fragility of feminine
integrity-"the forced chastity of the veil" and the gynaeceum.99
C. The Utility of the Trichotomy
Because I fundamentally disagree with not only the accuracy of
but also the theoretical possibility of the Calabresi-Melamed taxon-
omy, I will not dwell at any length on the uses to which they and their
followers put it. Suffice it to say that Calabresi and Melamed adopted
the standard law and economics proposition that law should seek to
be efficient in the sense of maximizing wealth or utility.100 Wealth (or
98 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1093.
99 SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 232-35.
100 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1093-1101. This adoption is not to im-
ply that Calabresi and Melamed denied that law could not or should not also consider
other values. Indeed, they were very careful to admit the possibility of distributional and
what they called "other justice reasons," although they admited that they were at a loss to
imagine an example of the latter which can not be subsumed into the categories of effi-
ciency or distribution. See id. at 1102-05. The various competing definitions of efficiency
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utility) maximization requires that the good things of the world'0 1 be
transferred to the highest valuing user.10 2 Wealth maximization sug-
gests that if the original entitlement holder values her entitlement less
than another party, efficiency would dictate that she transfer her enti-
tlement to that other party. Ordinarily, based on the assumption that
individuals are the best judges of their own values and utilities and
that values and utilities can be monetized, law and economics theo-
rists prefer to leave these entitlement transfers to the voluntary world
of contract.' 03
The Coase Theorem maintains that absent "transaction costs,"
parties will instantly contract so that all good things immediately end
up in the hands of the highest valuing user, regardless of the original
location of the entitlement. 0 4 Indeed, they always already have done
so because in the so-called Coasean universe of the perfect market
there is no time.'05 Needless to say, we do not, nor could we ever, live
in a Coasean universe-as Coase was the first to point out.'0 6 Various
and wealth (or utility) maximization that one should apply are beyond the scope of this
Article.
101 As I will discuss, we should not confuse the concept of "good things" or "objects of
desire" with "goods"-tangible things. See infra text accompanying notes 228-31.
102 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1093-96.
103 See, e.g., Pcam RDA. PosNER, ECONOMICANALYsis oFLAw86 (5th ed. 1998) (explain-
ing that "the law should make property rights freely transferable" and noting that
"[p]eople know their interests better than courts do").
104 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1094-95; see also Schroeder, Juno Moneta,
supra note 26, at 995 (discussing the feminine and phallic nature of property). My col-
league Charles Yablon has suggested somewhat facetiously, although accurately, that the
Coase Theorem can translate into ordinary English as follows: "In a perfect world, law
doesn't matter. In an imperfect world, who knows whether law matters."
For an excellent, extended, and highly amusing critique of the Calabresi-Melamed
debate on similar grounds, see Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 482-83. Krier and Schwab
concluded to the effect that although this debate is arid, jejune, and often meaningless,
engaging in such debate is what all law professors (including themselves) do. See id.
("What comes along will come along, and most of it will be useless but a little of it might
not be .... It doesn't matter if it doesn't matter. It's what academics do. It's what we do.").
As an author who compares property to penises, I can hardly pretend that all legal
scholarship be aimed at immediate, practical results. I idealistically hope, however, that
theoretical analysis can lead to the growth of human knowledge and, eventually, to practi-
cal implications. Indeed, I have applied my highly abstract theories of property law not
only in commercial law doctrinal scholarship, but also in legal practice in which I believe it
has been very successful. In any event, I have won cases based on it.
105 In Coase's words, "eternity can be experienced in a split second." R.H. CoASE, The
Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE FroM THE MARKET AND THE LAw 1, 15 (1988). As
Epstein stated according to the Coase theorem, "the holdout danger from a property rule
would be of no consequence [in a perfect market] because the two parties could exchange
an infinite number of offers within an infinitesimal period of time; in essence, that is what
a world of zero transaction costs would entail." Epstein, supra note 72, at 2092.
106 Although it is common to call the hypothetical world without transaction costs a
Coasean universe, Coase always insisted that this was a misnomer. One of Coase's primary
points in his seminal work The Problem of Social Cost is that economists should stop using the
model of the perfect market precisely because it is impossible and has little to tell us about
actual markets. See Coase, supra note 63, at 43 ("But the whole discussion [of ideal worlds]
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circumstances, generally referred to as "market failures," prevent or at
least hinder negotiation and contract. As a result, Calabresi and Me-
lamed asked whether, given the existence of various types of transac-
tion costs, we can manipulate remedial regimes in order to mitigate
market failure and can encourage good things to flow to higher valu-
ing users.10 7 Although I believe that Calabresi and Melamed's idea is
a dead horse, which their followers sadistically continue to beat, at
least it once seemed a fruitful mare of an idea; unfortunately, she
foaled a barren herd of intellectual mules.
The entire debate generated by the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy
assumes that the parties competing for an entitlement bargain in the
shadow of a remedy regime. Consequently, parties always must know
which regime would apply to them if a dispute were to arise. In fact,
in a world with more than two parties and with the possibility of de-
struction-our world-no party can ever have this certainty. As I will
show, property rules devolve by necessity into liability rules.'08
D. A Brief Word on Coase' 0 9
Although Calabresi and Melamed purport to base their trichot-
omy largely on the Coase Theorem, Coase himself almost entirely
avoided their errors. Indeed, Coase expressly emphasized not only
the symbolic nature of legal rights but also what I identify as the femi-
nine aspect of environmental disputes. Coase did not, of course, use
my Lacanian terminology. The tendency to repress the feminine is so
is largely irrelevant for questions of economic policy since whatever we may have in mind
as our ideal world, it is clear that we have not yet discovered how to get to it from where we
are."). Coase was asserting that because costs always exist, economists should concentrate
on the real world of costs, not a hypothetical perfect costless world. This approach re-
quires that economics adopt an appropriate definition of costs.
A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation
approximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a pro-
posed policy change and to attempt to decide whether the new situation
would be, in total, better or worse than the original one. In this way, con-
clusions for policy would have some relevance to the actual situation.
Id.
107 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1119-21.
108 Legal scholars have, on occasion, recognized the impossibility of applying the tri-
chotomy prospectively. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106
YALE L.J. 2083, 2086 (1997) ("[In the absence of fairly determinate rules dictating the
choice of remedy in classes of cases, the court's eventual selection of a property rule or a
liability rule will have little effect on a potential defendant's decision whether to bargain or
to take without consent."). As I discussed, Nance is one of the few who have recognized
that this impossibility totally vitiates the utility of the Calabresi-Melamed analysis as an ac-
count of remedy regimes. See Nance, supra note 62, at 842-58. Consequently, he quite
heroically tries to rewrite their analysis in terms of guidance rules. See id. at 908-17.
Although interesting, this revision is a radically different project than that Calabresi and
Melamed and their followers undertook.
109 I develop my analysis of Coase more thoroughly in Schroeder, supra note 6.
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strong, however, that legions of law professors continue to ignore the
precise language of Coase's argument.
Coase's primary points were to chide economists for conflating
economic costs and legal harm and for assuming that legal rights are
pregiven." 0 For example, suppose B has a widget factory next to A's
consumer plot, which has a spring that she uses for drinking water.
According to this hypothetical,"' economists tend to assume that A
has a pre-existing right to clean water. When B pollutes, A, by defini-
tion, will suffer a legal harm. From the conclusion that A suffered a
legal harm, traditional economists would infer the non sequitur that B
also caused an economic loss." 2 Widget production becomes an exter-
nality by definition because it interferes with A's pregiven right.
Coase thought that this analysis was wrong for three reasons.
First, economic costs should be defined in terms of economic goals,
just as legal harms should be defined in terms of legal norms. While
economics and law are not necessarily in conflict, there is no a priori
reason to think that they share identical goals. To Coase, economics
has the limited goal of the maximization of total production in soci-
ety.113 In Coase's view, the law (included in the broader concept of
"welfare economics") should consider broader ideals (like 'Justice,"
however defined), which are, strictly speaking, irrelevant to econo-
mists.114 Economic costs should, therefore, be defined as those things
that interfere with profit maximization. Legal harms are, presumably,
those things that create injustice. Consequently, there is no a Priori
11o In Coase's words, economists "obscure the nature of the choice" which needs to be
made. Coase, supra note 63, at 2. The heart of Coase's article is a critique of the Pigouvian
tax, which seeks to make producers internalize costs. See id. at 28-29.
111 For convenience I will continue to use my clean water-widget production hypotheti-
cal. Coase used a variety of other hypotheticals to illustrate necessarily inconsistent rights
of enjoyment such as the rival claims of a cattleman whose roaming herd tramples the
crops of a neighboring farmer, see id. at 6-8; a doctor whose waiting room abuts a noisy
confectioner's factory, see id. at 8-9; a coconut-fiber weaver whose mats are stained by the
emissions from a nearby chemical plant, see id. at 10; and a farmer growing combustible
crops next to a railway that emits sparks, see id. at 29-34.
112 Coase uses the example of a smoke nuisance to make this point.
The judges' contention that it was the man who lit the fires who alone
caused the smoke nuisance is true only if we assume that the wall is the
given factor. This is what the judges did by deciding that the man who
erected the higher wall had a legal right to do so....
Judges have to decide on legal liability but this should not confuse
economists about the nature of the economic problem involved.
Id. at 13; see also Schroeder, supra note 6, at 523-26 (noting that economists "conflate[ ] the
legal status quo with economic reality").
113 Consequently, Coase defined efficiency as the maximization of the aggregate value
of production in society. See CoASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FiRm Tm
M A N THE LAw, supra note 105, at 157, 158; Coase, supra note 63, at 15, 34.
114 See Coase, supra note 63, at 15 (noting that "many of the factors on which [a court]
decision turns are, to an economist, irrelevant").
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reason to think that legal harms always will be the same as economic
costs.
Second, law is not pregiven, dosed, and symmetrical. That is, it is
not "imaginary," in the Lacanian sense. 115 Thus, if the law grants B a
right to make widgets and to dump the resulting industrial waste in
A's water, then there are no legal externalities to B's production be-
cause, by definition, A did not lose anything (i.e., one cannot lose that
to which one is not entitled). While this formulation may make sense
from a legal perspective, it obviously does not from an economic one.
Law focuses on the individual harm caused to specific rights holders.
Whether a harm has occurred depends on how rights are allocated.
In contradistinction, economics examines the aggregate production of
the economy. The allocation of wealth per se does not necessarily
increase or decrease the total wealth of society. Economics, as under-
stood by Coase, is concerned with the size of the pie, while law may
also be concerned with how the pie should be divided. 116
Coase's final criticism flows from his understanding that environ-
mental nuisances do not involve disputes over possession or exchange
of a single thing. Rather, they involve disputes over necessarily incom-
patible enjoyments of different things.
Consequently, he ends The Problem of Social Cost by stating:
A final reason for the failure to develop a theory adequate to
handle the problem of harmful effects stems from a faulty concept
of a factor of production. This is usually thought of as a physical
entity which the businessman acquires and uses (an acre of land, a
ton of fertilizer) instead of as a right to perform certain (physical)
actions. We may speak of a person owning land and using it as a
factor of production but what the land-owner in fact possesses is the
right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions. The rights of a
land-owner are not unlimited.11 7
115 For example, Coase emphasized that ajudge's decision that one party had harmed
another is true only if we assume that the first party's right is the given factor. See id. at 13.
116 Of course, the allocation of resources can affect the total amount of production.
Coase argued that if society only considers economics, it should allocate resources to maxi-
mize production. Society (or the broader study of "welfare economics"), however, may
consider other goals equally important. The libertarian, who believes that humans have a
natural right to property, would resist the forcible reallocation of property for the public
good of wealth maximization. Indeed, one might characterize Epstein's trenchant criti-
ques of the Calabresi-Melamed analysis, which incorporates the law and economics view of
the Coase theorem, as the libertarian's insistence on the importance of property rights,
which we cannot simplistically sweep away on economic grounds. See Epstein, supra note
72, at 2093 ("Over time, the inefficiencies of a liability system cascade until the security of
possession and the security of exchange needed for complex commercial life and a satisfy-
ing personal one are no longer available."). An egalitarian might argue that it is preferable
for society to produce a smaller pie equitably divided, than the largest pie possible.
117 Coase, supra note 63, at 43-44.
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To translate Coase's critiques into my terminology: the economic the-
ory of environmental nuisances is inadequate precisely because it im-
plicitly reduces property to the single element of possession imagined
as an immediate binary sensuous relationship with a tangible thing.
Indeed, economic theory often confuses the right of possession with
the thing itself. We need to remember not only that property consists
of elements other than possession, but also that it is inherently rela-
tional. Environmental nuisances, specifically, involve rival claims to
necessarily competing enjoyments of different objects of property.
Economists (and lawyers) are responsible for determining the relative
boundaries of each rival's rights.
Coase demonstrated this idea with the example of an individual
who had a chimney of a certain height attached to her fireplace.' 18 A
neighbor built a wall on the top of his adjacent house which partially
blocked the chimney so that smoke from the first person's fireplace
billowed into her flat rather than escaping up the chimney." 9 The
chimney owner argued that the neighbor had harmed her by building
the wall. 120 The court found that one could not assume that either
party caused harm to another as a matter of law.' 2 ' Many but-for
causes of the "harm" to the first party existed. For example, "but for"
the neighbor's enjoyment of his own premises by building a wall, the
smoke would not have entered the chimney owner's apartment. It is
equally true, however, that there would have been no smoke "but for"
the chimney owner's enjoyment of her fireplace by building a fire.
The smoke nuisance was caused both by the man who built the wall
and by the man who lit the fires. Given the fires, there would have
been no smoke nuisance without the wall; given the wall, there
would have been no smoke nuisance without the fires. Eliminate
the wall or the fires and the smoke nuisance would disappear.122
In Coase's terminology, the problem in the chimney case lies in the
parties' relative claims to enjoyment being "reciprocal" in the sense
that "[t]o avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A.' 23 On the
one hand, the neighbor's enjoyment of his property (the ability to
build a wall) necessarily made it impossible for the chimney owner
fully to enjoy her property (the use of the fireplace). On the other
hand, recognition of the chimney owner's right to enjoy her fireplace
would impede the ability of the neighbor to enjoy his property (i.e.,
the neighbor would have to both refrain from building walls and tear
118 See Bryantv. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 172, 173 (1879); see also Coase, supra note 63, at 11-13
(presenting Bryant as an example).
119 See Bryant, 4 C.P.D. at 173.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 176.
122 Coase, supra note 63, at 13.
123 Id. at 2 (italics added).
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down any wall he already built.) As I will discuss below, it is this con-
cept of necessarily inconsistent claims to enjoyment of two different
objects, which Coase called reciprocity, that Calabresi and Melarned
misinterpreted as disputes regarding mirror image or symmetrical
claims to possession of a single object.'2 4
Coase intuitively replicated Hohfeld's observation that legal
rights do not exist in a vacuum, but can only be understood as rela-
tions between and among specific legal actors.125 Coase took a step
beyond Hohfeld, however, and approached the Hegelian-Lacanian
conclusion.'2 6 If rights do not pre-exist, then they must be granted.
Law is a matter of creation not discovery; the legal universe is not
static, but at least potentially, dynamic. This theory implies both that
law is open and may create and delineate legal rights and that the
rights it creates will never be perfectly symmetrical because of the nec-
essarily inconsistent competing values. In my terminology, environ-
mental nuisance analysis is trapped in the masculine phallic
metaphor. This metaphor represses the fact that environmental nui-
sances involve disputes over the feminine element of enjoyment, not
the masculine elements of possession and exchange.
II
THE APPLICATION OF THE CALABRESI AND
MELAMED TRICHOTOMY
A. Introduction
As a prelude to my Lacanian-Hegelian critique of the Calabresi-
Melamed trichotomy, I provide a detailed description of the six para-
digmatic hypothetical situations that the trichotomy generates using
Hohfeldian terminology. Their trichotomy presupposes that there is
a pre-existing thing-which they called an entitlement-which is to
be allocated to one of two rivals.' 27 If the party who does not own the
entitlement infringes on the entitlement held by the other, this in-
fringement is deemed a taking of the entitlement by and the transfer
of the entitlement to the infringing party. 2 8 In their original article,
Calabresi and Melamed stated that their system generates four hy-
124 As Carol Rose stated, Calabresi and Melamed analyzed entitlements in terms of
"'bilateral symmetry.'" Rose, supra note 34, at 2177. Rose presented this analysis as one of
their "two widely cited analytical contributions." Id. In contradistinction, I think it is one
of the most fundamental failings of the analysis.
125 Compare COASE, supra note 105, at 119-23 (describing the exercise of property rights
by reference to how they implicate others), with HOHFELD, supra note 29, at 74-75 ("[S]ince
the purpose of the law is to regulate the conduct of human beings, alljural relations must,
in order to be clear and direct in their meaning, be predicated of such human beings.").
126 See Coase, supra note 63, at 19-28.
127 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1115-16.
128 See id. at 1116.
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potheticals, although one is rare in the private realm.129 In fact, how-
ever, if their taxonomy is viable, it generates six hypotheticals because
there are two possible allocations of entitlements and three possible
remedy regimes. As I have already argued, 130 if the right to clean
water and the right to pollute are things that could be alienated in
market relations, then this necessarily implies that society could im-
pose limitations on such alienation. Consequently, the coherence of
the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy depends on there being at least a
possibility of inalienability regimes.
The Calabresi-Melamed analysis implicitly envisions property as a
relation between an owner and a desired object. This view implicitly
reduces property to the single element of possession and imagines
possession as the immediate physical custody of a tangible object by a
human being. Because only one individual at a time physically can
hold an object, such a custodial image of property is inherently exclu-
sive. It imagines any interference with a property right in terms of
wresting the desired object away from the physical custody of the orig-
inal holder-as reflected in the terminology that refers to such a loss
as a "taking." Before the environmental tort, the victim held some-
thing, which now is gone. Note that the necessary corollary to imagin-
ing property as custody of a thing and the interference of property as
the taking of a thing is that the interferer also is imagined as obtaining
the object of desire. In other words, an interference with property is
not only the loss of something by the victim, but also is the transfer of
something from the victim to the injurer. Consequently, any damages
payable are imagined not only as compensation for the loss of the
thing, but also as the purchase price payable by the taker for the privi-
lege of obtaining the thing transferred.
In my initial analysis of the Calabresi and Melamed hypotheticals,
I will apply the well known system of jural correlatives developed by
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.' 3 ' Although I am highly critical of
Hohfeld's particular analysis of property 3 2 and his assumptions of
complementarity,133 I believe his taxonomy of jural correlatives is a
powerful tool of analysis. Hohfeld's primary point is that it is mean-
ingless to speak of a legal right as though it pre-exists and only needs
129 See id. at 1116-17; Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 442-45.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
131 See generally, Ho-IILD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning I, in FuNDMerrAL LEGAL CONCEPlIONS, supra note 29, at 23, 50-51 (articulating
Hohfeld's system ofjural correlatives).
132 I set forth my critique of Hohfeld's property jurisprudence in Schroeder, Chix,
supra note 26, at 290-99, and SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 1-7, 168-79.
133 See infra text accompanying note 176.
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to be identified and allocated. 34 Rather, legal rights can only be
thought of as combinations of rights and obligations between and
among legal subjects. 135 Hohfeld developed his taxonomy to aid iden-
tification and definition of traditional categories of legal relations.136
No doubt we could invent other taxonomies, and we probably could
break down his eight primary categories into subcategories of rights.
Hohfeld's system nevertheless has the advantage of being generally
familiar. It has met the test of time because it displays that rare quality
called elegance-displaying the right balance of simplicity and sophis-
tication. It is easily understood and can be usefully applied to a wide
variety of legal topics.' 37
I will use Hohfeld's system to show several things. First, Calabresi
and Melamed were naive in thinking that they could identify regimes
that merely enforce pre-existing legal rights. Rather, enforcement re-
gimes are part and parcel of the more primitive, necessary task of de-
fining legal rights. Consequently, these regimes correctly lump
134 This obvious point was, of course, not novel to Hohfeld. His taxonomy is, however,
such a succinct illustration of this point that it has become linked to his name.
135 See HoHrFELD, supra note 29, at 65-68; HOHFELD, supra note 131, at 27-29, 35-36.
136 See HOHFELD, supra note 131, at 27-28 (arguing that ambiguous terminology im-
pedes legal analysis), 35-36 (arguing that his system ofjural relations solve the problem of
the ambiguity of legal terminology).
137 Although Hohfeld's project seems unique to our eyes, Joseph Singer has shown
that our judgment is an anachronism. Proposing taxonomies of legal categories was a
standard academic exercise in the late nineteenth and in the early twentieth century.
Scholars almost immediately recognized Hohfeld's system as so superior to those of his
rivals, that their systems were virtually forgotten. SeeJoseph William Singer, The Legal Rights
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, 979
("Hohfeld effectively annihilated both the Benthamite and Austinian views of legal rights
and liberties."). Consequently, Hohfeld, a precursor to the legal realists, is not, as is often
thought, the first modem commercial jurisprude. Rather, he serves as the link between
the nineteenth and twentieth century because he epitomized, and closed, the earlier era.
See id. at 1049-59.
Morris suggested that Hohfeld's taxonomy "is so broad as to be of only limited analytic
value" and proposed her own alternate taxonomy of the structure of legal entitlements.
Morris, supra note 31, at 834. I believe that the test of time had proven Morris wrong even
before she began writing. My disagreements with Morris's analysis are so thorough that
they are beyond any simple criticism. Suffice it to say, I believe that her analysis conflates
different distinct elements of property (for example, subsuming the masculine element of
possession entirely within the feminine element of enjoyment) and conflates the effects of
defining and allocating property rights with the structure of the rights itself (for example,
confusing the identification of which party would most likely initiate negotiations for
changes in property rights with the property rights themselves). Perhaps most mysteri-
ously, Morris incorrectly identified the right to monetary compensation as a unique and
separate right. See id. at 837. In fact, as I discuss in this Article, virtually all if not all legal
rights in our society, at least those arising under the so-called "private law" of "contract,
property and tort," ultimately devolve into the remedy of monetary compensation.
Consequently, when Morris tried to apply her taxonomy she ended up with several
null sets: categories which she admited are incoherent. See id at 875-76. The legal regimes
they generate do not merely fail to describe any existing legal regime, they are theoretically
unthinkable. As Calabresi and Melamed understood, the existence of such null sets char-
acterizes a fundamentally flawed taxonomy. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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"inalienation," which is expressly a matter of limiting and defining
rights, with property and liability rules, which are implicitly matters of
limiting and defining rights. Second, an application of Hohfeldian
terminology to the six possible hypotheticals derived from the Gala-
bresi-Melamed taxonomy reveals that Calabresi and Melamed misin-
terpreted the elements of property involved in environmental
nuisances by concentrating on possession and alienation instead of
the relevant element of enjoyment. Finally, although Calabresi and
Melamed attempted to create a correlative legal system,188 their un-
derstanding of correlative legal conceptions is inaccurate. For exam-
ple, it may follow from the assertion that A has a right to clean water
that B has a duty not to dirty A's water, but it does not follow that if B
were to violate his duty by polluting A's water, then B has taken A's
right. Even if, after the fact, a court were to find that A's only remedy
against B were damages, it does not necessarily follow that B's viola-
tion constitutes a taking.
The heart of the Calabresi-Melamed error is the conflation of the
initial definition and subsequent modification of rights with the taking
of rights. This conflation directly follows from the exclusively objec-
tive nature of the Calabresi-Melamed analysis, which fundamentally
conflicts with the exclusively intersubjective analysis, which is its mir-
ror image. Calabresi and Melamed's imaginary ideal of symmetrical
rights with respect to a single object misconstrues Coase's concept of
the reciprocity of rights. This conflation is a common misunderstand-
ing made as frequently by Coase's detractors as by his defenders. 3 9
In fact, nothing could be further from Coase's point than symme-
try. Coase asserted that in the case of environmental nuisances, the
respective ability of two parties to enjoy their respective objects of de-
sire are necessarily mutually inconsistent. 40 A and B are not arguing
about the same right; rather, A's ability fully to enjoy her water neces-
sarily impacts B's ability to use his factory, and B's ability fully to use
his factory necessarily impacts A's ability to enjoy her water. The em-
pirical ability to enjoy, however, is not the same as the legal right to
enjoy. Coase argued that economists cannot assume that either A or B
has the right to enjoy his or her object and thereby to prevent the
other from enjoying his or her object. 14' Only the law can establish
this right. B's use of his factory and consequent pollution of A's water
is a legal harm to A only if and insofar as the law gives A the right to
138 See infra text accompanying notes 148-50.
139 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 164-66
(1973); Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought,
56 S. CAL. L. REv. 711, 713-14, 717-20 (1983).
140 See Coase, supra note 63, at 8-15 (providing several examples of this inconsistency).
141 See id. at 13-15; Schroeder, supra note 6, at 524-25.
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enjoy her water. 142 The law could, at least theoretically, grant B the
right to enjoy his factory. If it did so, any attempt by A to interfere
with B's production (e.g., by insisting on a right to clean water) would
violate B's right. Harm, and therefore causation, is a legal or eco-
nomic judgment, not a natural determination. Moreover, because
legal and economic goals are not necessarily identical, legal harm may
not be the same thing as economic cost.14 A's and B's desires are not
only qualitatively different-A wants water and B wants widgets-but
also necessarily inconsistent. Therefore, the law of environmental
nuisance cannot be symmetrical. The following hypotheticals demon-
strate this nonsymmetrical reciprocity. 44
Consequently, Calabresi and Melamed's taxonomy is not merely
unsuccessful, but also pernicious because it both fails to create hy-
potheticals that reflect actual legal problems and generates hypotheti-
cals that do not reflect realistic legal problems.
B. The Six Calabresi-Melamed Hypotheticals
Six simple examples demonstrate how the Calabresi-Melamed
model applies in the context of environmental disputes. Suppose that
A and B own adjoining plots of land. A, a consumer, resides on her
plot, which has a spring to supply her with drinking water.' 45 B, a
producer, owns a widget factory on his adjoining plot. The produc-
tion of widgets releases pollutants into the spring on A's land.146 I
142 See Coase, supra note 63, at 2.
Coase stated that:
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice
that has to be made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which
A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain
A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.
To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has
to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to
harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.
Id. (italics added).
143 See id at 13.
144 Coase's choice of the word "reciprocal" is arguably unfortunate. Its primary mean-
ing is "alternating," and its secondary meanings include "inversely related" and "comple-
mentary." WEBsTER'S THimD NEw INTERNATIONAL DiaroNAR,, supra note 37, at 1895. It
does, however, carry the connotation that the relative effects on the two parties are propor-
tional; it is this connotation that one easily can confuse with symmetry.
145 The example in the Calabresi and Melamed article is the right to clean air versus
the right to pollute. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1115-24. I replace air with
water to make it slightly more intuitive with regard to the masculine phallic metaphor. It is
easier to think of taking water because it is more tangible than air. For simplicity, through-
out this Article I refer to the party who pollutes as a "producer," and the party who is
subjected to pollution caused by another as a "consumer." In the real world, however,
consumers also pollute, such as when one bums one's leaves or drives one's car, and pro-
ducers are affected by pollution caused by others.
146 The literature that has developed under the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy ex-
plores possible relations that might exist between production and pollution in order to
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present each regime separately, allocating "the entitlement" first to A
and second to B. For simplicity, each case assumes a pure liability,
property, or inalienability regime. In the real world, however, a vari-
ety of mixed regimes are more likely to exist. 147
1. Hypothetical One: Consumer Entitlement Protected by
Property Rules
If A had the initial entitlement but a property rule applied, then
if B polluted, A would have the ability to stop B from polluting. In
Hohfeldian terms, A would have a right to clean water, and B would
have the duty not to pollute. Presumably, this right and this duty
would be specifically enforceable against B. A could obtain an injunc-
tion and perhaps invoke the criminal penalties of the state to prevent
an involuntary taking. Additionally, A could exercise her right of re-
plevin to reclaim any entitlement wrongfully taken. B could not hold
off A through the payment of objectively (i.e., intersubjectively) calcu-
lated damages. Calabresi and Melamed described this scenario as a
regime in which society respects an entitlement holder's subjective
valuation of her entitlement and does not impose its own valuation. 148
The effect of such a regime is not that transfers of entitlements will
not occur, but that all transfers will be voluntary on the part of the
homeowner-transferor. Under a property rule, the producer-trans-
feree could not obtain the desired entitlement unless he contracted
for it with the homeowner-transferor. In Hohfeldian terms, A has the
power to sell her entitlement and the privilege to retain it. In other
words, B has no right to force A to sell her entitlement and, therefore,
suffers the liability that A might arbitrarily refuse to contract for such
a sale, leaving B disabled from, and A immune from, any involuntary
taking of it.
At first blush, this hypothetical seems successful. The relative
rights and obligations of the two parties seem to fit properly within
the Hohfeldian correlative system. If we assume that all rights of pos-
give numerical examples to suggest that property or liability regimes might be more appro-
priate. For example, production and pollution may be directly and proportionately re-
lated so that each widget produced would produce one additional unit of pollution. The
prevention of all pollution, therefore, would require B to shut down production entirely.
Alternately, we could suppose that B could eliminate or prevent pollution by installing a
scrubbing device or similar technology. I will not discuss these variations because they are
irrelevant to my underlying critique.
147 Calabresi and Melamed clearly understood this point. My rights with respect to a
given object of desire against one person may be protected by a property rule, while my
rights with respect to the same object of desire may only be protected by a liability rule vis-
a-vis the state, which can take my property and pay me just compensation under its power
of eminent domain. Alternatively, one's rights against one specific individual could have
both liability and property aspects. For example, the remedy for minor violations of rights
might be damages, while for major violations, it would be equitable remedies.
148 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1092-93.
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session are assigned to one party who can effectively remain in posses-
sion, then a property rule seems like a pure enforcement regime, not
a means of defining property rules. As I discuss below, further inspec-
tion reveals that this hypothetical is inappropriate because environ-
mental nuisances involve inconsistent rights of enjoyment, not the
taking of a single entitlement.149 Additionally, environmental nui-
sances do not exist, even in the case of true takings of possessory inter-
ests, in a world containing potential third party claimants.
Specifically, if B violates the law and does "take" A's entitlement to
clean water, it is not clear that any remedies could restore the status
quo ante. The traditional remedy of replevin (getting back the object
taken) is unavailable because, in fact, nothing has been "taken." A no
longer has clean water, but not because B now has the water. Conse-
quently, the law can only order B to pay damages for the past pollu-
tion and enjoin B to clean up the water and to prevent future
pollution. In the environmental arena, it may be impossible or im-
practicable as an empirical matter to restore A to her status quo ante
through these remedies.' 50 This analysis provides the first hint that
something is seriously wrong with the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy.
2. Hypothetical Two: Producer Entitlement Protected by Property Rules
In the second hypothetical, B has an entitlement to pollute en-
forced by a property regime. If B pollutes, A can neither stop him nor
receive damages. Although we could state this in terms of Hohfeldian
rights and duties, it is probably better to understand it as B having a
privilege to pollute and A having no right to stop him; as B having the
power to pollute and A suffering the liability of pollution; and finally,
as A having the inability to stop B, who has an immunity from A.
Once again, at first blush, this hypothetical seems like a successful
description of a common fact situation. For example, when I wrote
the first draft of this Article, I was visiting on a campus plagued by
fraternities and located in a town with an antinoise rule, which did not
come into effect until 11:00 p.m. I was informed that the fraternities
and the police would ignore noise complaints until that time, but
would send an officer to make the fraternities turn down the music if I
complained afterwards. 151 Calabresi and Melamed would say that the
149 See infra text accompanying notes 157-58.
150 See infra text accompanying notes 257-58.
151 Calabresi and Melamed used the example of the competing entitlements to make
noise and to have silence. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1102-04. This exam-
ple might indicate that they recognized that these nuisances do not involve disputes over
possession of a single entitlement, but competing rights to enjoy different objects-my
right to my ears and the fraternities' rights to their stereo systems. Nevertheless, even in
this obvious case, Calabresi and Melamed quickly slid into conflating the two objects of
property and, thereby, changed the right from enjoyment to possession. For example, they
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fraternities were granted an entitlement to make noise be enforced by
a property regime until 11:00, and I was granted an entitlement to
quiet enforced by a property regime after 11:00.152
After a little thought, however, one realizes that, in contrast to
hypothetical one, it is more than a little odd to call this an enforce-
ment or remedy regime when the entitlement belongs to the pro-
ducer. When the consumer is the entitlement holder, as in
hypothetical one, the producer can violate the consumer's rights
through "self help"-by producing widgets. The consumer must,
therefore, turn to the law's enforcement regime if she wishes to actu-
alize her rights-by obtaining an injunction or other equitable rem-
edy that prevents B from polluting or restores A to the status quo.
When the allocations are reversed, however, the producer's right,
privilege, and power to pollute do not require judicial enforcement to
be actualized. He exercises his right through self-help (e.g., B just
engages in the business of widget manufacture). A cannot violate B's
rights through either self-help 53 or legal proceedings. If A were to
haul B into court, B's rights would not be vindicated by granting a
remedy enjoining A to take or not take any action. Rather the judge
merely would find that A had no cause of action and would make no
award. Indeed, the judge might impose sanctions for abuse of process
by the plaintiff and her lawyer.
This lack of symmetry between hypothetical one and two provides
the second hint that something is wrong with Calabresi and Me-
lamed's attempt to view the clean water/pollution dispute as the allo-
cation of a single entitlement, which may or may not be taken
(reallocated) either voluntarily or involuntarily with the rights of dam-
ages. The Hohfeldian analysis shows that there is no symmetry be-
did not describe the claim of the noisemaker as the right to use her stereo, which inciden-
tally would impinge on my right to use my ears. Rather they saw it as "the entitlement to
make noise in other people's ears," as though we are fighting over the possession of ears.
Id. at 1103. From this seemingly innocuous initial slip, they went all the way down the
slippery slope as though there is one single "thing" that is being contested.
Kaplow and Shavell recognized that nuisance disputes are different than takings dis-
putes. Nevertheless, they displayed a similar conceptual confusion with respect to the
noise-silence hypothetical. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 766 n.168.
152 The first weekend we stayed in town after the undergraduate semester had begun,
we learned the hard way that the property right to throw loud beer parties began as early as
9:00 a.m. on Saturdays. The only solution, of course, was to assure that our ears were never
in the vicinity of the fraternities on weekends.
153 Now that the age of Druids is past, A cannot by the unilateral act of drinking water
miraculously stop B from polluting and make the water clean. One might be tempted to
argue that A can resort to the self-help of sabotage-she can break into B's plant at night
and take a hammer to the widget-making machines. Unfortunately, this action changes
the hypothetical. A is no longerjust interfering with (taking) B's entitlement to pollute. A
also is violating a number of B's other legal rights; for example, he is violating B's posses-
sory right to exclude A from his factory.
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tween A and B. Consequently, when one allocates entitlements in a
property regime, one also defines the entitlement.
Moreover, the lack of symmetry demonstrates that, in the context
of environmental nuisances, A and B cannot possess, and therefore
cannot transfer, a single "thing." Because the entitlement that the
consumer could have is very different from that which the producer
could have, there can never be a simple transfer of A's entitlement to
B. The debate generated by the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy, how-
ever, assumes just such conveyances of entitlements. This assumption
is an unintentional perversion of Hohfeldian correlation.
Kaplow and Shavell recognized that environmental nuisances,
which they call "harmful externalities," are different in kind from
what they call takings or possessory disputes.'5 4 They implicitly ob-
serve the lack of symmetry between the two possible allocations of the
entitlement in the environmental situation. They fail, however, to
identify fully the nature of the difference. For example, they intuited
that a polluter has no particular interest in the object owned by the
consumer (the clean water), but cares only about his own property
(the widget factory). 5 5 If the producer desired the clean water, then
he presumably would not pollute it. The "taking" of the consumer's
property merely is incidental to the producer's enjoyment of his prop-
erty. In contradistinction, in a true "taking," environmental nuisances
arise because both the taker and the original owner desire the same
object.
This observation is valid equally whether the regime allocates the
entitlement to the consumer or to the producer. The consumer has
no particular desire to own the producer's factory, but her ability to
enjoy her clean water impinges on the producer's ability to enjoy his
factory--the impingement is incidental but necessary. In order for
the consumer's water to remain potable, the producer must refrain or
be prohibited from using his factory. The difference between this
case and the case in which the producer has the entitlement-the dif-
ference between hypotheticals one and two-is the practical ability of
154 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 716 n.2.
15-5 Specifically, in a footnote, they recognized that the person who throws loud parties
would not move in order to live next to someone who loves silence. See id. at 766 n.168. In
the usual case the noise maker may interfere with the silence lover's "entitlement" to si-
lence (or enjoyment of his ears), but the noise maker does not care about the silence
lover's entitlement (or enjoyment) let alone want the entitlement (or enjoyment) for her-
self. She does not even bear any animus toward the silence lover, which might lead her to
make noise purely to cause him distress by taking his entitlement or destroying his enjoy-
ment. All she wants to do is party. I have generalized this point to all environmental
nuisances. The polluting producer, for example, does not want the consumer's clean
water-he just wants to produce widgets despite the effect of production on the consumer
and her water.
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the entitlement holder to actualize her property right-the ability to
enjoy the property-without state intervention on either's behalf.
Jettisoning my arcane academic jargon, we are talking about dif-
ferences in brute power. The producer does not need the state's
assistance to pollute. He does very well, thank you, in a Hobbesian
war-of-all-against-all world. The consumer, however, needs societal co-
operation-either the good will of the producer or the enforcement
power of the state-to enjoy clean water. When B enjoys, he violates
A, but for A to enjoy, she must ask B to remain chaste.
3. Hypothetical Three: Consumer Entitlement Protected by a
Liability Rule
If A had the initial entitlement and a liability rule applied, A
would have the right to clean water, but if B polluted, A's sole remedy
would be money damages. Calabresi and Melamed have described
this regime as one in which society imposes its own valuation upon
entitlement holders. Accordingly, they and their progeny analyzed
this as a regime under which B may force A to involuntarily transfer
her entitlement, provided he pays damages-the societally imposed
purchase price. In Hohfeldian terms, A has a right to clean water, and
B has a corresponding duty not to pollute, but the remedy for violat-
ing the duty is limited exclusively to money damages.156 B has the
privilege and power to cause an involuntary sale, and as long as he
156 The famous case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d. 870 (N.Y. 1970), has a
holding that is similar in effect to hypothetical three, although based on different reason-
ing. In this case, the lower court found that a cement plant was a public nuisance that had
caused actual harm to neighboring home owners. See id. at 872-73. Because the cost to the
manufacturer of closing down the plant, however, was disproportionately high compared
to the harms suffered by the homeowners, the lower court refused to grant an injunction,
but merely ordered damages for past harms. See id. The Court of Appeals disagreed and
held that under New York's common law of nuisance, the homeowners were entitled to
injunctive relief despite the cost to the defendant. See id. at 872. The court claimed to be
analyzing the case in terms of hypothetical one (entitlement in the consumers' hands,
protected by property rules). Nevertheless, the court found that the defendant could post-
pone imposition of the injunction-keep polluting-so long as it continued to pay the
homeowners permanent damages to compensate them for the continuing harm of future
pollution. See id. at 875.
One can argue that this result is not merely consistent with hypothetical three, but
only can be understood in terms of hypothetical three. By the standard conditions of
equitable relief, the court never should have issued the injunction, the remedy under
property rules. It is black-letter law that equitable relief should not be granted unless the
plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm for which no adequate legal remedy, damages, is
available. Specifically, the appellate court found that an injunction should be granted be-
cause the lower court had found that the cement plant was a nuisance and had caused
substantial damage to the plaintiffs. See id. at 872. The fact that the appellate court found
that the defendant could delay the imposition of the injunction so long as it paid perma-
nent continuing damages to the plaintiffs, however, implies that the court thought that the
plaintiffs' harms could be adequately addressed by damages. Consequently, the plaintiffs
should not have been granted an injunction, and a property rule should not have applied.
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pays the objective purchase price, A has no right to stop the involun-
tary sale and suffers the liability that B has forced.
This use of Hohfeldian terminology provides our third hint that
something is wrong with Calabresi and Melamed's theory. Hohfeld
easily could restate hypothetical one as follows: B has the initial right
or privilege to pollute provided he pays damages, and A has the duty
to put up with B's pollution, but has no right to stop him. Moreover,
B has the power to pollute, if he pays damages, and A is subject to the
liability that he will do so. Finally, A is disabled from stopping B from
polluting, if he pays damages, and B is immune from any such at-
tempts. That is, there is no single entitlement which can be allocated
to either party. The Calabresi-Melamed analysis, however, assumes
there is a single, allocable entitlement because it implicitly conflates a
property entitlement with a single, pre-existing thing that is necessar-
ily in the sole custody of one of two rivals.
Consequently, Ayres and Talley correctly note that a liability re-
gime cannot be thought of as an exclusive allocation of a single enti-
tlement to one party, as Calabresi and Melamed assumed. 15 7 Rather, a
liability regime is an allocation of a number of legal rights between two
parties. 158 Unfortunately, Ayres and Talley did not recognize the nec-
essary implications of this observation. They still adopted the mascu-
line phallic metaphor that property (an entitlement) is a real thing
existing outside of the law, which the law merely allocates and en-
forces. They did not fully internalize that the law cannot merely allo-
cate entitlements, but must also define the nature and scope of the
entitlement. Therefore, they still assumed that parties in an environ-
mental nuisance fight over a single thing, which has been divided
among them, reducing the dispute to one of possession.
In Part IV below, I consider how hypothetical three would oper-
ate in a "true" takings context. Calabresi and Melamed devised their
taxonomy to analyze environmental nuisances, which I argue do not
involve true takings. Other writers, however, have generalized the Cal-
abresi-Melamed taxonomy to the seemingly more appropriate situa-
tion in which one party truly wishes to acquire some thing that
another party owns. 159 This characterization has become so common
that Kaplow and Shavell express surprise that the distinction between
environmental nuisances, which they call harmful externalities, and
157 SeeAyres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1041. Calabresi and Melamed, of course, recog-
nized that regimes can be mixed, and that allocations can be divided. See Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 14, at 1093. Nevertheless, they assumed that in the simple polar
hypotheticals one can theoretically have exclusive allocations in a liability regime. This
assumption is incorrect.
158 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1041.
159 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 757-71.
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the taking of things "has not been carefully evaluated.' 60 The appli-
cation of a hypothetical three legal regime to the taking of things
would require, however, a radical change, not merely in substantive
law, but in procedural law as well.
Of course, an economist does not care whether a regime that is
efficient as an economic matter is an existing empirical legal regime or
even is consistent with other existing legal principles. The existence
of an empirical example is relevant, however, to Calabresi and Me-
lamed's goal of developing a taxonomy that accurately describes
American law. More importantly, consistency with other legal princi-
ples is relevant to policy discussions among lawyers concerning legal
reform.
As a self-styled, radical feminist, I do not argue that a proposed
change in the law should be opposed merely because it is a sharp
break from the past. Indeed, if the existing regime is unjust or im-
moral-as it was in the case of slavery-the sharpness of the break is
an argument for the reform. What I do argue, however, is that one
must be critically aware of the implications of one's proposals. Cala-
bresi, Melamed, and their followers present themselves as analyzing
the structure of American property law for the conservative purpose
of increasing both economic efficiency and economic wealth. In fact,
their proposals require radical changes in two of American culture's
most important legal institutions: judicial respect for the status quo
ante, including the idea that courts only can be used to address inju-
ries, and private property rights. These proposals may be good or
bad, but their radicalness needs to be addressed directly. The radical-
ness of these proposals has not been addressed precisely because the
proposals are not serious.
4. Hypothetical Four: Producer Entitlement Protected by a
Liability Rule
If the initial entitlement belonged to B, the producer, and if a
liability rule applied, then B would have the right to pollute, but A
would have the right andability to stop him by paying damages. This
payment of damages is conceptualized as forcing B involuntarily to sell
his entitlement to A in exchange for a purchase price equal to soci-
ety's intersubjective valuation. Although theoretically conceivable,
this regime seems bizarre within our legal system, at least when A is a
private citizen. Calabresi and Melamed were refreshingly honest both
in admitting that empirical examples of this "fourth case" may be rare
or nonexistent in the private market, as opposed to in governmental
160 Id. at 717. Kaplow and Shavell suggested that liability rules might be more appro-
priate to environmental nuisances, and property rules more appropriate to takings of
things. See id.
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actions, and in understanding that finding such examples, or at least
formulating plausible hypothetical four regimes, is essential to the va-
lidity of their taxonomy. 16'
Once again, it is hard to envision hypothetical four as merely an
enforcement regime. Rather, it defines rights rather than merely allo-
cating and enforcing them. In hypothetical three, which reverses the
entitlements with the liability rule in place, the entitlement holder,
the consumer, is the passive party, and the taker initially is the active.
B does not need recourse to the court system in order to take A's
entitlement-he just starts producing widgets thereby incidentally
causing pollution. The consumer, the original entitlement holder,
must go to court to force B to pay the involuntary purchase price.
Hohfeld's terminology clarifies why hypothetical four is not pre-
cisely parallel to hypothetical three. When A, the homeowner, is the
entitlement holder, A has a right to clean water, and B has a duty not to
pollute. When B, the producer, is the entitlement holder, saying that
B has a right to pollute and that A has a duty to tolerate it is inaccurate
precisely because we think of duty as requiring affirmative action.
Rather, B has a privilege to pollute, and A has no right to stop him un-
less she pays damages. One can easily restate this scenario as an enti-
tlement in favor of A. A has the right or privilege upon the payment
of damages to stop B from polluting and B has the duty to stop, or no
right to refuse to stop, if A pays damages. Finally, we could say either
that A has the power to stop B from polluting (upon the payment of
damages) or that B is disabled from preventing A from stopping him
(so long as A pays damages) and A is immune from any attempt to do
SO.
This hypothetical might be realistic in the public realm; it accu-
rately describes so-called "regulatory takings." 62 These takings occur
when a court finds that a government regulation, limiting certain uses
of property, interferes with the rights of the owner to commercially
exploit-enjoy-her property to such an extent that the court deems
the regulation a taking.163 Consequently, either the regulation is in-
validated (the result under a Calabresi-Melamed property regime) or,
if the conditions of the sovereign's right of eminent domain are met,
161 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1117. They insist on its plausibility even
though this possibility is "easily ignored." Id.; see also Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 443-
45 (discussing the plausibility of notorious hypothetical four).
162 Calabresi and Melamed themselves gave the state's power of eminent domain as an
example of hypothetical four, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1106-08, and
described a potential hypothetical four regime as a "partial eminent domain coupled with
a benefits tax." Id at 1116. Coleman and Kraus referred to a hypothetical four private
right of action as a "private takings." Coleman & Kraus, supra note 52, at 1357.
163 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (indicating
that a taking has occurred when land-use regulation denies an owner all economically
viable use of his land).
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the government can maintain the regulation by paying the owner 'Just
compensation."164
The coherence of the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy depends on
this hypothetical being at least theoretically possible in the private sec-
tor. If the right to pollute is an entitlement that can be possessed and
transferred, and if all entitlements can be enforced either by a prop-
erty regime or by a liability regime, then it must be possible to imagine
a liability regime that protects the right to pollute.
Once again, however, it is hard to imagine how such a liability
regime could arise within traditional legal principles and procedures.
A liability regime arises in the public sector because of the govern-
ment's unique power to "infringe" on a producer's "right" to pollute
through use of its police power and its unique eminent domain
power, which allows the government to force involuntary transfers of
entitlement. These rights and powers do not exist in the private
realm.
When A has the initial entitlement to fresh water, she need not
act to enjoy it-she can passively let the water flow. When B has the
initial entitlement to pollute, however, he cannot passively enjoy his
entitlement. Thus, A is not hurt by the mere fact that B has the right
to pollute. Rather, A is only hurt if B exercises his right to pollute.
Also, in contradistinction to hypothetical three and similar to hypo-
thetical two, A cannot, as a practical matter, use "self-help" to infringe.
But here, unlike in hypothetical two, which operates under a property
regime, A must be able to invoke the police power of the state to take
B's original entitlement.
Under hypothetical four, for A to take the entitlement she needs
the right and power to cause a court to issue an injunction prohibiting
B from polluting upon A's tender of the purchase price-damages-
to B. Recognizing the right of a litigant to initiate a legal action to
change the status quo would constitute a radical departure from
American legal principles, which generally leave the status quo in
place and only recognize private actions to redress changes to the sta-
tus quo. Although Calabresi and Melamed recognized that hypotheti-
cal four would be unusual in the empirical world, they failed to
recognize how radical its occurrence would be because they conceived
of damages as the payment of the purchase price for involuntary trans-
fers. 165 This conception is based on the assumption that an award of
damages for polluting a consumer's water against a producer and in
favor of a consumer is economically equivalent to a judicial enforce-
ment of a change in the status quo-a forced transfer of an entitle-
164 U.S. CONSr. amend. V.
165 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1120.
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ment. They incorrectly assume that economic equivalence means
legal equivalence as well. This conclusion is a non sequitur.
Calabresi and Melamed's followers have been keen to find an ex-
ample of hypothetical four to demonstrate the accuracy and useful-
ness of the taxonomy. Consequently, they have seized on the case of
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. 16 6 Unfortunately, as
Krier and Schwab have so eloquently shown, this case does not demon-
strate the two-party hypothetical proposed by the taxonomy. 16 7 These
analysts have repressed the fact that this case involves three parties. I
discuss this case at length below 168 when I argue the impracticality, if
not outright impossibility, of the legal regimes suggested by the Cala-
bresi-Melamed taxonomy.
5. Hypothetical Five: Consumer Entitlement Protected by an
Inalienability Regime
If A has the original entitlement and an inalienability rule ap-
plies, then A may not give up her entitlement to clean water, and B
may not pollute, regardless of whether A agrees that B may pollute or
whether B agrees to pay damages or otherwise compensate A for the
pollution. Applying Hohfeld, A has the right to clean water, and B has
the duty not to pollute, which is specifically enforceable. But
Hohfeld's correlatives break down when we look at other aspects of
the relationship. A has a disability because she has no power to trans-
fer her property. Hohfeld would say this circumstance means that
someone else, such as B, must have a corollary immunity. I suppose
we could say that if A entered into an illegal contract to sell her enti-
tlement to B, and B defaulted, B would be immune from A's attempt
to enforce the contract because it would be void as against public pol-
icy. This formulation seems so forced as to be inaccurate.
As I have said, even Calabresi and Melamed recognized that this
rule does not seem to jibe with the property and liability rules. But
our analysis already has shown that the inalienability rule fits. Prop-
166 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (holding that a developer of country property was
obliged to pay reasonable shutdown costs to the owner of a nearby cattle feed lot whose
operations were intolerable to the residents of the development on the theory that he had
"come to the nuisance"). As Epstein trenchantly argues, Spur Industries does not exemplify
hypothetical four, or indeed any other rules-it is, in fact, a sui generis case. See Epstein,
supra note 72, at 2104-05. As I will argue, this case may indeed be "rogue" in the sense that,
although it may have resulted in rough justice given the facts of the case, it does violence to
both legal substance and legal procedure.
167 Actually, Krier and Schwab introduced this case as an example of hypothetical four.
See Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 444-45. Later in their discussion, however, they distin-
guish it from the archetypical hypothetical four. See id. at 469-70 (noting that Spur Indus-
tries involves multiple parties whereas hypothetical four contemplates a simplistic, two-party
situation).
168 See infra Part IV.A1 (b).
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erty and liability rules are not, as Calabresi and Melamed suggested,
merely regimes that enforce pre-existing rights, but also are means for
defining and limiting entitlements. Moreover, although they have the
opposite result, an inalienability rule is similar to a liability rule in that
society decides that it will impose its own intersubjective valuation of
the entitlement in A's hands over A's own subjective valuation. That
is, in a liability regime, society forces a transfer on A even if A values
the entitlement. In an inalienability regime, by contrast, society pre-
vents a transfer by A even if A ascribes a low value to the entitlement.
Consequently, one's intuitive discomfort with the Calabresi-Melamed
analysis of inalienability puts us on warning that the difficulty may lie
more generally with the assumptions underlying the trichotomy.
Let us briefly consider what an inalienability rule might mean in
practice. We are told that A does not have the right to alienate her
right to clean water. Presumably, this rule means that any contract
that A attempts to make with B to sell her right would be void as
against public policy. An attempt to make such a contract might even
subject A, B, or both to civil or criminal sanctions. What if B goes
ahead and produces widgets and pollutes A's water with or without A's
consent? To say that A's entitlement is inalienable must mean that
she theoretically retains the right to the entitlement;, even though in
fact, she is not in a position to exercise that entitlement because she
no longer has clean water which she can drink. The state's only re-
course at this point is to punish B, and perhaps A, and to attempt to
return A to the status quo ante. A court could order B to stop produc-
tion and restore the cleanliness of A's water (a property regime). Or,
as is likely in the case of environmental nuisances, it may be impossi-
ble to restore the status quo ante and the court will order B to pay
damages to A (a liability regime). Inalienability fits with property and
liability rules not because it is an alternate enforcement regime, but
because inalienability ultimately devolves into property, and property
ultimately devolves into liability. That is, they are not three mutually
exclusive ways of dividing entitlements, but are three mutually depen-
dent aspects of defining property rights.
6. Hypothetical Six: Producer Entitlement Protected by an
Inalienability Regime
The sense of unease in the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy gradu-
ates to discomfort when one considers some of the bizarre conse-
quences that would result if we were to allocate the entitlement to B,
the polluting factory owner, in an inalienation regime. Neither Cala-
bresi and Melamed, nor the resulting debate have considered this em-
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barrassing hypothetical. 169 However, if Calabresi and Melamed were
right that their property-liability dichotomy necessitates at least the
theoretical possibility of hypothetical four, then the validity of their
property-liability-inalienability trichotomy requires the theoretical pos-
sibility of hypothetical six. That is, if the right to pollute is to be con-
ceptualized as a thing that can be either taken or transferred to a
consumer-as something theoretically alienable-then it follows that
we also should be able to impose restraints on its alienation. The in-
ability to formulate a realistic hypothetical six is presumably why Cala-
bresi and Melamed half-heartedly suggested that an inalienability
regime is substantially different from property and liability regimes,
implying that their trichotomy is not really a trichotomy, but is a di-
chotomy plus an inalienability anomaly.' 70
The last potential regime-in which B would have an inalienable
entitlement to pollute-is the most obviously fanciful. If analysts only
pay lip service to the possibility of a homeowner having an inalienable
right to clean water, they pass over hypothetical six in embarrassed
silence.
What could this possibly mean as a practical matter? I have sug-
gested in my discussions of hypotheticals two and four that a right of a
producer to pollute is more accurately a Hohfeldian privilege or
power to do so or an immunity from A's attempts to stop him. But
saying that this right, privilege, power, or immunity is inalienable sug-
gests not only that any contract not to pollute that B enters into would
be void as against public policy, and therefore, unenforceable by A
against B. It also means that if B tries to obey a voluntary contract not
to pollute, the Government would use its police power to save B from
himself. But, how can society keep one from alienating one's privi-
lege, right, or power to take certain action, let alone one's immunity
from being forced to stop?
Does this mean that the State would force B to exercise his rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities? Must B pollute? It is hard to im-
agine any realistic legal regime that would so require. To require
such action would so impinge on B's personal autonomy and ability to
enjoy his factory that it is not only inappropriate, but also likely to
raise constitutional questions of involuntary servitude and regulatory
takings. 171 Such an absurd result inevitably flows from the conflation
of property rights and the object of the property rights, from the con-
169 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1115-16 (listing the four hypotheticals
they discussed).
170 See id. at 1093, 1111 (separating inalienability rules from their discussion of prop-
erty and liability rules).
171 Admittedly, slavery is a legal regime that this and other societies have adopted in
the past. It is not, however, consistent with contemporary political philosophy or moral
values; therefore, I refuse to entertain this as a realistic legal regime.
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ceptualization of entitlements as pre-existing things that are merely
assigned to one person or another, and from the analysis of interfer-
ences with property rights as takings and transfers. In other words,
alienability and inalienability refer to the ability of a claimant to sever
his right to possess an entitlement. In the environmental nuisance
arena, however, we are speaking not of possession, but of enjoyment.
III
PROPERTY
A. The Conflation of Property with Object
Calabresi and Melamed not only reduced property to the single
element of possession epitomized by physical custody of tangible
things, but also treated property as though it were itself the thing. A
Hohfeldian analysis of the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy drives home
the essential point that an entitlement, like any legal right, is a set of
relationships between and among legal subjects. When the entitle-
ment is a property right, these relationships concern the possession,
enjoyment, and alienation of objects. 172 Calabresi and Melamed, how-
ever, treated property entitlements not as the right to possess, enjoy,
and alienate objects, but as the object that is possessed and alienated.
This construction is similar to, albeit slightly more subtle than,
the common error that Thomas Grey called the "lay conception" of
property-confusing property and object.173 Grey refered specifically
to the habit of referring to one's home, car, or whatever as one's prop-
erty when, from a legal point of view, one's property is the rights one
has against others with respect to these things.174 Calabresi and Me-
lamed went further and entirely ignored the object underlying prop-
erty entitlements (in their hypotheticals, the consumer's water and
the producer's factory), and instead, reified the property entitlement.
Both arguments, however, are variations on the masculine phallic
metaphor, which tries to replace the symbolic concept of property
with the real fact of physically holding a thing. As a result, Calabresi
and Melamed confuse the modifications and readjustments of parties'
rights and responsibilities within a property relationship as the con-
veyance of the property relationship.
172 See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
173 Grey, supra note 29, at 69-70. I criticize Grey's prediction that property is disinte-
grating as a meaningful legal concept in SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 156-85 and Schroe-
der, Chix, supra note 26, at 271-305. Grey is right that property is not the thing, but he
(and Hohfeld) are wrong in concluding from this point that things are irrelevant to prop-
erty. An abbreviated version of my argument is discussed infra notes 228-80 and accompa-
nying text.
174 See Grey, supra note 29, at 69.
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1. No Object Is Transferred in the Hypotheticals
Frequently, one party transfers her entire property interest with
respect to a specific thing to another party; it happens millions of
times each day in grocery stores. It is often the case that two parties
claim inconsistent property rights with respect to the same object,
such that for one party to succeed in asserting her property claim, the
other necessarily loses her property claim. Examples of these classic
priority disputes include situations in which both A and B claim to
own the same good purportedly transferred by a double-dealing third
party or in which two secured parties claim first-perfected security in-
terests in the same collateral.1 75
It does not necessarily follow that every interference by one party
with a property right of another is equivalent to a transfer of a thing.
Even if one accepts Hohfeld's proposition that the legal universe is
closed and complementary, 76 it does not follow that all shifts or
changes in entitlements are complementary in the way Calabresi and
Melamed implied. 177 Hohfeld would argue that if A loses a
Hohfeldian right, B is necessarily released from his corresponding
Hohfeldian duty to A: right becomes no right and duty becomes privi-
lege. He would not argue, as did Calabresi and Melamed, that A's old
right is transferred to B, which would imply that B's duty is now im-
posed upon A or another party.178 The legal act that results in the
destruction of A's right might also result in the imposition of a
Hohfeldian responsibility upon her. This obligation, however, would
probably not be the mirror-image duty of her lost right, but would be
either a no-right, a liability, or a disability. Correspondingly, B might
have acquired a privilege, power, or immunity.
Comparing hypotheticals three and four, which illustrate a liabil-
ity regime, and hypotheticals five and six, which illustrate an inaliena-
bility regime, vividly illustrates this last point. Calabresi and Melamed
would describe the difference between these two sets of cases as the
allocation of the entitlement. 79 As we have seen, this characteriza-
tion is not precisely correct. "The" entitlement differs depending on
whether the regime assigns it to A or assigns it to B. A's entitlement
relates to drinking clean water while B's relates to producing widgets,
which incidentally cause pollution. In addition, one might accurately
say that A has a Hohfeldian right that imposes a corresponding
175 I discuss the application of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy in priority disputes in
Part III.D.2.
176 According to Hohfeld, the legal universe is complementary in the sense that every
entitlement in favor of one party, whether a right, privilege, power, or immunity, necessar-
ily requires that at least one counterparty bears an equal but opposite responsibility.
177 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1118-20.
178 See id.
179 Seeid. at 1120.
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Hohfeldian duty on B. When B is the entitlement holder, however,
one might more accurately describe him as having a Hohfeldian privi-
lege, rather than a right. One might make this distinction because A
seems to be subject to a Hohfeldian "no-right" and not a duty. The
difference is even more stark in the inalienability example. When A
holds the entitlement, she is forced to remain in possession of the
cleanliness of her water, but she remains free to drink it or not-she is
disabled from alienating the cleanliness of water, but she has the right
to possess it and has the right and privilege to drink it. When B holds
the entitlement, being forced to retain possession seems equivalent to
a greater loss of freedom. B is not merely disabled from alienating his
possession of his polluting production, but also his right to pollute
now seems to have become a duty to pollute!
The reader no doubt had intuited that something was distinctly
odd about my foregoing description of the inalienability hypothei-
cals. The Calabresi-Melamed analysis of entitlements requires me to
use such noneuphonious constructions as "possession of the cleanli-
ness of water" or "possession of polluting production" to describe that
which is inalienable. I cannot say that in an inalienability regime the
consumer is prohibited from alienating her clean water because Cala-
bresi and Melamed obviously were not proposing that society forbid A
from bottling and selling her water or from selling the residence on
which the spring is located. Similarly, society would not prohibit the
producer from alienating his factory. This distinction once again
should indicate that we are not talking about possessory rights at all.
Rather, we are talking about enjoyment rights.
More importantly, because of the relational nature of legal rights,
including property interests, it is not always accurate to speak of one
person owning a property interest or other entitlement to the exclu-
sion of another person. For example, hypotheticals three and four
illustrate that under a liability regime it is not true, as Calabresi and
Melamed asserted,180 that we either allocate the entitlement to clean
water to A or the entitlement to pollute to B. Rather, in both hy-
potheticals both parties have entitlements (to clean air and to pollute,
respectively), but such entitlements are subject to conditions.
Ayres and Talley suggested that a liability regime is the splitting of
an entitlement between two parties. 18' This suggestion does not go
far enough. There is no single thing, no "entitlement," that is shared
by two persons. In our hypotheticals, the consumer never shared her
clean water with the producer, and the producer never split the prof-
its from the widget factory with the consumer. Each party merely in-
terfered with the other party's ability to enjoy their exclusive property.
180 See id at 1118.
181 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1032-33.
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The question, therefore, is how far these mutually inconsistent enjoy-
ments extend. In other words, a liability regime can only be thought
of as a means of defining, not enforcing, property rights.
2. Property as Object and the Pernicious Physicalist Metaphor
Although environmental harms do not literally involve the physi-
cal taking of immediate custody of tangible things, one might be
tempted to argue that this metaphoric language helps. It aids by
forming an argument from analogy. Indeed, all language consists of
metaphor and metonymy.' 82 I freely admit that we often retreat to
the language of tangibility precisely because of our impoverished vo-
cabulary for intangible property rights. Elsewhere I argue extensively
that the use of the terms "object" and "thing," and by extension "enti-
tement," are not metaphoric when we apply them to intangibles.'8 3
From a philosophic and jurisprudential standpoint, objects are not
natural physical things that exist "out there." Rather, an "object" is
anything distinguishable from a "subject"-a legal actor, a speaking
consciousness. 184 Object is an artificial category, existing in the sym-
bolic realms of law and language in the sense that an object, as so
defined, only exists insofar as it is designated as such by speech or law.
Therefore, it is as appropriate to designate artificial constructs of the
law and language, such as debts, copyrights, and other intangibles, as
objects or property, as it is to designate physical things as objects.
Although this technical definition may seem foreign to colloquial
"lay" conversation, it crops up all the time. For example, we have no
problem speaking of money or investment securities as "things" we
"hold," even though virtually any educated person recognizes these as
intangible rights, which are distinguishable from the pieces of paper
that frequently evidence them. Moreover, for certain purposes, the
law refuses to designate many natural things as objects. For example,
as I already have discussed, I may not sell my kidney to the highest
bidder because American law deems it inappropriate to consider the
human body to be (the object of) property for commercial
purposes. 185
182 See LACAN, supra note 19, at 147-49.
183 See, e.g., SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 35-37, 163-68, 170-75 (discussing the interac-
tion of "objects" and possession); Schroeder, Chix, supra note 26, at 280-81 (discussing
Blackstone's use of the word "things"); Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 26, at
857-60 (discussing Hegel's use of the words "things," "objects," and "possession").
184 For example, see Hegel's definition of the object of property. "What is immedi-
ately different from the free spirit is, for the latter and in itself, the external in general-a
thing [Sache], something unfree, impersonal, and without rights." G.W.F. HEGEL, EiMEmN-rs
OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 73 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1820)
(alteration in original).
185 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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And so my complaint is not with the use of metaphors or reifica-
tion per se. My concern is that if one chooses to use such metaphoric
vocabulary, one needs also remain critically aware that she is doing so
in order to avoid falling into false (or, perhaps more accurately,
unuseful) analogies. 8 6
B. The Property Rights Involved in Environmental Nuisances
Before continuing, it is necessary to consider the concept of
property in greater detail. From the standpoint of Hegelianjurispru-
dence, legal subjectivity is intersubjectivity mediated by objectivity.'8 7
Hegel argues that the abstract, atomistic individual, posited by classi-
cal liberalism as the state of nature, is not capable of being a legal
actor bearing rights. 18  Hegel's argument precisely follows Hohfeld's
insight that both law and rights are social. Therefore, legal subjectiv-
ity is artificial in the sense that it is a human creation. One moment in
the creation of legal subjectivity is property, defined as the legal re-
gime of the relative rights of subjects with respect to the possession,
186 In two Articles, I have shown how the use of the phallic (physical) metaphor for
property had pernicious effects on the law of investment securities. SeeJeanne L. Schroe-
der, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street,
1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 291, 303-08; Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra note 26, at 456-57;
see also Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 557, 587-94 (1990) (suggesting implicitly how
the use of this metaphor has negatively effected the law of security interests under Article
8). Investment securities are intangibles, which cannot literally be physically held. Never-
theless, because the common law had difficulty with the concept of alienation of in-
tangibles, legislation passed in the nineteenth century that enabled securities to be
evidenced by negotiable certificates. Physical custody of the evidentiary token established
possessory rights in the security, and alienation of the security required delivery of the
evidentiary token. This use of the physical metaphor was beneficial in a simple market
when investors tended actually to hold their security certificates.
By the 1970's, however, brokers and other intermediaries held the majority of invest-
ments in securities indirectly. The 1978 Amendments to Article 8 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("UCC") governing property interests in investment securities continued to
view physical custody of certificates as the archetype of possessory interest in securities.
Therefore, it tried to analyze the relationship among investors, brokers, and other parties
in the securities industry in terms of vicarious custody through agents and bailees. A few
spectacular broker-dealer bankruptcies proved that these assumptions were not merely
wrong empirically, but largely unworkable even as a legal fiction. The 1994 Amendments
to Articles 8 and 9 abandoned the physical metaphor when securities are "held" indirectly
through intermediaries and now analyze modem investment "holding" as a new sui generis
form of intangible property. I analyze this regime exhaustively in Schroeder, supra, at 349-
502. See alsoJames Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L.
REv. 1431 (1996) (discussing security law policy and Revised Article 8 by Reporter for revi-
sion project).
187 See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text, for a brief explanation of this phrase.
I developed my theory exhaustively in SCHROEDER, supra note 2, which consists, in large
part, of the refinement of ideas first introduced in Schroeder, Chix, supra note 26; Schroe-
der, Legal Surrealism, supra note 26; Schroeder, supra note 56; Schroeder, The Vestal and the
Fasces, supra note 26; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 26.
188 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 20-24, 27-30.
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enjoyment, and alienation of objects. Below, I discuss the nature of
these three elements in greater detail.' 8 9 Before this discussion, I
must identify the object(s) of property involved in environmental nui-
sance disputes and then identify the rights that claimants exercise and
infringe with respect to such object(s).
C. Identifying that Obscure Object of Desire
As I have discussed, Calabresi and Melamed identified the object
of contention in environmental harms as the entitlement granted to
one party or to the other. Insofar as the entitlement is itselfa property
right, however, it must be a legal relationship with respect to some
other object. I am not arguing that a legal relationship cannot be "re-
ified" in the sense of treating it as the object of a property right. No
"natural" concept of what may or may not be a res of property exists-
the concept is totally artificial in that it is defined purely by positive
law.190 Familiar commercial transactions such as the sale of accounts
receivable or, for that matter, all trading on the New York Stock Ex-
change involve just such reification.
To describe the mutual rights and obligations of individuals in-
volved in a two-party relationship in terms of property is risky.' 91 It
often adds little to, and in this case actually distracts from, a legal anal-
ysis of two-party relationships that do not involve the conveyance of an
object. These rights remain the same regardless of whether we label
them contract or property. I would agree with Hohfeld that, in our
legal system, the term "property" has significance only in the three-
party context. Accordingly, Hohfeld defined property as being "mul-
tital"-enforceable against "the world" in the sense of a relatively large
class of persons. 192
It does become meaningful to reify the relationship between two
parties into property when one of the two parties purports to assign
her rights to a third party. For example, assume that B sells a good to
A on credit so that A owes B the purchase price. In commercial law we
189 See infra Part III.D.2-4.
190 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 35-37, 170-75.
191 From a Hegelian philosophical position, all contracts involve property and serve an
important function in the dialectic of recognition. Indeed, if an object can be anything
that we agree to conceptualize as other than a legal subject, then because one's obligation
can be distinguished from the concept of the obligor, the obligation can be reified as an
object.
192 As we will see, Hohfeld argued that property was not unique and lumped it into his
more general category of "multital rights." HOHFELD, supra note 29, at 85; see infra text
accompanying notes 280-81. Hohfeld uses multital rights as opposed to "paucital" rights,
such as contract, which are enforceable against a specifically identifiable person(s). See id.
at 72. I believe that property must be intersubjectively recognizable for it to perform its
philosophical function of recognitions. It must be observed and honored by-enforceable
against-others. See Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra note 26, at 455-59.
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call A's obligation an account;19 3 in accounting and ordinary business
parlance it would be an account receivable. At this point these are
just terms for A's half of the contract. Now imagine that B assigns his
rights against A to C. It now becomes analytically helpful to think of
A's account as a specific object that B conveyed to C, enabling the
parties to identify exactly what C obtained. Most importantly, it helps
distinguish the terms of the assignment contract-the relationship be-
tween B and C-from that which is assigned pursuant to that con-
tract-the relationship between A and B. Accordingly, Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") treats an assigned account as an
object that is every bit as capable of serving as collateral as a good. 9 4
Another example of how reification only becomes useful in three-
party transactions can be seen in Article 9's treatment of chattel pa-
per. 95 A chattel paper is a right to payment coupled with a property
interest in a specific good-that is, either a security interest or a
lease. 19 6 For example, in the immediately preceding hypothetical, if B
retained a security interest in the good he sold to A, the relationship
would no longer fall within Article 9's definition of an account, but
would fall within its definition of chattel paper. The drafters of Arti-
cle 9 invented this term solely for the purpose of reifying it in the three-
party context. In the two-party relationship between A and B, the term
"chattel paper" is redundant because the expressions "security inter-
est" and "lease" already adequately describe their relationship. When
B conveys this security interest to a third party, however, it helps to
reify the security interest as chattel paper to distinguish the thing
transferred (B's rights against A) from the contract through which B
transfers the chattel paper to C (C's rights against B). Because it in-
volves not only the notoriously confusing two-tiered, double-debtor
problems but also double layers of collateral, this reification is per-
haps more important in the case of the sale of chattel paper than for
the sale of accounts.
In my hypothetical, B retained a purchase money security interest
in a good he sold to A. Assume A takes possession of the good, so that
B must perfect its security interest in the good by filing against A in
the appropriate location.197 B assigns this security interest, which is
now called a chattel paper, to C. Because virtually all assignments of
193 See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995) (defining the term "account" for purposes of Article 9).
194 "Except as otherwise provided... this Article applies (a) to any transaction (re-
gardless of its form ) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property...
including... accounts; and also (b) to any sale of accounts...." Id. § 9-102(1).
195 I present another similar analysis of chattel paper in SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at
171-72.
196 See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b).
197 See id. § 9-302(1).
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chattel paper fall within the rubric of Article 9,198 C must perfect its
interest by either taking possession of the chattel paper or filing
against B, not A, in the proper location. 199 Now assume that B de-
faults in his obligations to C. Cs collateral is the chattel paper, not
the good securing the chattel paper. Therefore, C may only repossess
the chattel paper itself and then either collect or sell the chattel paper
in a foreclosure sale.200 Conversely, if A were to default in her obliga-
tions under the security interest, B, not C, would have the right to
repossess the good.201 Moreover, such a default by A under the lower-
tier security interest in the good would not automatically be a default
under the upper-tier security interest in the chattel paper giving Cthe
right to repossess the chattel paper.20 2 C may not repossess the good
that secures the chattel paper so long as A is current in her obligations
to B under the purchase money security interest that constitutes the
chattel paper. In other words, the object of A and B's relationship is
the good, but the object of B and Cs relationship is the chattel paper.
Distinguishing the chattel paper, by reification, from the collateral
under the chattel paper clarifies this otherwise confusing situation.
The reification of debts and other intangibles becomes even
more important in transactions that involve more than three parties.
In my hypothetical, assume that B is dishonest-a lamentably com-
mon circumstance. After assigning the chattel paper to C, B turns
around and purports to sell the same chattel paper to D. This scena-
rio is a variation on the classic priority dispute to which I have already
alluded. Two "innocent" parties, C and D, assert inconsistent property
rights in the same "thing." Because there is only one "thing," one
claimant will be awarded the "thing," while the other will have to settle
for some form of damages. Article 9 governs this particular dispute
through the priority rules of sections 9-308 and 9-312.203
Returning to the Calabresi-Melamed context of the two-party en-
vironmental nuisance, it is misleading to speak of the object of the
consumer's property right as A's entitlement-the right to drink clean
water. To do so leads to Calabresi and Melamed's misperception that
if A contracts to allow B to pollute subject to payment of compensa-
tion, then A is transferring something to B. This misperception not
198 See id. § 9-102(1) (b).
199 See id. §§ 9-304(1), 9-305.
200 See id& § 9-502(2) & cmt. 4 (noting that the secured party may recover on the "col-
lateral" and explaining that the secured party may sell the "chattel paper"-not the good-
to recover on its interest).
201 See i&. § 9-503 (giving the secured party the right to self-help repossession).
202 Although, it is not unusual for parties to a chattel paper security agreement to
provide contractually that the parties also will consider a default by the account debtor, A,
in its secured obligation an event of default under the upper-tier security agreement.
203 See U.C.C. §§ 9-308, 9-312.
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only assumes, without analysis, that the contract between A and B is a
conveyance, but it also conflates the contract to convey and the thing
conveyed. This conflation is precisely the evil that the drafters of the
UCC tried to prevent by abandoning the common-law analysis of title
while preserving the concept of tide-ownership-which is fundamen-
tal to any account of sales.204
Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter and primary architect of the
UCC, argued that the common law of sales had become hopelessly
confused because common-law tide analysis conflated the contract
and conveyance aspects of sales.205 He thought that carefully distin-
guishing the two would clarify and rationalize the law.206 The contract
for sale, which is two party in nature, should be entitled to the usual
degree of freedom we grant to contracting parties.20 7 In contradis-
tinction, the conveyance of the good sold under the contract is a
property transaction enforceable against third parties and, therefore,
204 I discussed the UCC's treatment of "tile" in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Trans-
figuration: The Myth That the U. C. C. Killed "Poperty,"69 TuMP. L. Rxv. 1281 (1996). In that
Article I disproved the old canard that the UCC disaggregated or abandoned the concept
of title. See id. at 1282-83, 1289-91. Indeed, Articles 2 and 9 are packed ,with references to
tile precisely because tile (ownership) is the sine qua non of a sales contract and a secur-
ity interest. No sale or security interest can occur unless the transferor (the seller or the
debtor) initially has a property right in the thing to be conveyed (the good or the collat-
eral), which she is able to convey to another party (the buyer or the secured party). See
infra text accompanying notes 317-22.
205 I presented this analysis based on Llewellyn's writings on property in Schroeder,
supra note 204. The works of Llewellyn on which I relied were KARL N. LI wELLYN, GAsES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 64-67 (1930) [hereinafter, LLWEIwLLY, SALES]; KARL
N. LIwELLYN, JUuRISPRUDENCE (1962) (collection of articles); K.N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on
Horseback, 52 HARv. L. Rm. 725 (1939); KN. Llewellyn The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales 52
HARv. L. REv. 873 (1939); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931); K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit
Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 159 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract];
Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code? , 22 TENN. L. REV. 779 (1953).
206 See Schroeder, supra note 204, at 1294-1304. In Llewellyn's words, "Title-thinking
[is] Sales law viewed as property law...." Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract, supra note
205, at 191.
[Tihe property concept is repeatedly used by courts as a device to settle
various issues which in themselves are contract and not "property" issues:
i.e., they are matters which the parties have power to arrange at will by ex-
press contractual clauses, if they want to, and think about it.
LLEWELLYN, SALEs, supra note 205, at 64. In contradistinction, he characterized his analyti-
cal approach as being rooted
in the proposition that the modem law of Sale is a law of contract for future
delivery; that the present sale [i.e., the conveyancing of the property right
in the good sold] plays little part today in litigation; and that most problems
commonly dealt with under the heading of "tile" are obscured rather than
clarified by that dealing.
Id. at xiv.
207 See Schroeder, supra note 204, at 1297-1301.
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should be subject to certain objective (in the sense of societally im-
posed) rules.20 8
Despite this framework, Calabresi and Melamed characterized A
and B's pollution contract as a conveyance of A's entitlement to B.20 9
But this characterization would mean that upon payment of the
purchase price, B would acquire what A possessed. What A "pos-
sessed," according to Calabresi and Melamed, was an entitlement to
drink clean water at her residence. 210 B, however, does not seek to
obtain a right to drink A's clean water, and the A/B contract would
not be enforceable against a class of third parties, as it would be if a
conveyance occurred. If A had conveyed her possessory right to clean
water at her residence to B, then she would no longer have that right
against the world. A no longer would have any right to complain if C,
D, and E were to dump toxic waste into her water supply. Indeed, if
the right had been conveyed to B, B would possess the claim against
these other polluters. This obviously is not the case.
It is equally absurd to think of the entitlement as an object of
property and a pollution contract as a conveyance when Calabresi and
Melamed declare B to be the entitlement holder. In hypotheticals
two, four, and six, B possesses the right to make widgets and, inciden-
tally, to pollute A's water. As we have seen, Calabresi and Melamed
asserted that if A pays B not to pollute then B transfers the entitlement
to A. In fact, A does not acquire B's right to pollute, and B does not
lose his right or privilege to pollute A's water.
The problem is that the Calabresi-Melamed analysis assumes that
A's and B's property rights relate to the same object. In fact, A's rights
relate to one object-her residence, or the water at her residence-
and B's rights relate to another object-his factory or his widget busi-
ness. Consequently, the right of possession is not involved at all, and
the parties are not exercising rights of alienation. Possessory disputes
involve mutually inconsistent claims of the right of exclusion with re-
spect to a single object. Environmental disputes involve mutually in-
consistent claims of the right to enjoy different objects.
D. Identifying the Relevant Element of Property
1. Defending the Property Trinity
Several legal scholars have suggested that the modem rubric
"property" has come to describe such a wide variety of different com-
binations that it retains little meaning.2 1' To these scholars, the cliche
208 See id.
209 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1116.
210 See id. (noting that what is possessed "is an entitlement to be free from pollution").
211 See, e.g., Grey, supra note 29, at 70-73 (suggesting that the idea that "property rights
are a distinct category from other legal rights ... cannot withstand analysis").
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that property is a combination of rights, or "bundle of sticks," means
that property has no essence.21 2 Elsewhere, I have argued extensively
that this conclusion is a non sequitur akin to saying that compounds
do not exist because molecules can be broken down into atoms.213
I do not deny that contemporary law recognizes a bewildering
array of manifestations of property as an empirical matter.214 One
should not, however, confuse variety with the impossibility of category.
For example, we have no problem identifying the categories "snow-
flake" and "fingerprint" even though each individual example is sup-
posedly unique. Characterization is precisely the abstraction from
inconsequential, specific, and individual detail and the identification
of salient, common, and general traits.
Of course, at some level of generality almost "everything" is the
same, and at some level of specificity no two things are alike. The
identification of hidden similarities between apparently different
things and hidden differences between apparently similar things is a
primary tool of legal argument. The proper level of abstraction in any
given case depends on both theoretical and practical considerations.
Being heavily influenced by Hegelian property theory, I believe
that the tradition of dividing property into three elements-posses-
sion, enjoyment, and alienability-can be logically derived from the
dialectic of property.21 5 I also believe that the many rights of property
recognized by our legal system and itemized by the critics of property
can all be abstracted into these three general categories.21 6 These cat-
egories remain distinguishable as a theoretical matter, even though
212 I set forth this critique in extensive detail in SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 1-7, 114,
156-61, 299-301; Schroeder, Chix, supra note 26, at 23944.
213 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 168-70; Schroeder, Chix, supra note 26, at 283-85.
214 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 300-01. For an example of a manifestation of a
property, see U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 3 (1995) (describing the array of"tangible and intangible
property" that can serve as collateral).
215 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 37-52. Hegel set forth his argument in THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF IGHT, supra note 184, at 75-114.
216 For example, Lawrence C. Becker (following A-M. Honor6) identified at least thir-
teen-or ten, depending on how one counts subdivisions-possible elements of property
rights, not all of which need be present for a right to be considered property. These rights
are: (1) "The right (claim) to possess"; (2) "[t]he right (liberty) to use"; (3) "[t]he right
(power) to manage"; (4) "[t]he right (claim) to the income"; (5) "[tlhe right (liberty) to
consume or destroy"; (6) "[t]he right (liberty) to modify"; (7) "[t]he right (power) to
alienate"; (8) "[t]he right (power) to transmit"; (9) "[tlhe right (claim) to security"; (10)
"[t]he absence of term"; (11) "[t]he prohibition of harmful use"; (12) "[l]iability to execu-
tion"; and (13) "[r] esiduary rules." See Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property
Rights, in PRoPERT. NoMos XXII, supra note 29, at 187, 190-91 (citing A.M. Honorl, Owner-
ship, in OxFoRD EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE 107-47 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)).
A Hegelian would argue, however, that these thirteen "elements" are more accurately
described as specific empirical manifestations of the three more general elements of prop-
erty or of limitations of the three elements imposed by positive law. For example, rights
one, six, nine, and 10 are different actualizations of the Hegelian concept of possession.
See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 224-25.
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many specific manifestations seem to fall in between the abstract ide-
als. In Hegelian terms, the categories are discrete qualities, even
though there are quantitative differences in the manifestations of
these rights and even though continuous quantitative differences
eventually result in changes in the qualities.217 For example, we can
distinguish between the concept of possession and of enjoyment even
though many empirical property rights seem to fall somewhere in
between.
In Hegelian theory, property is not a "natural" right that pre-
exists law. Property, instead, is created by law. Or, more accurately,
law and property are mutually constituting in that the recognition of
property and contract constitutes the most primitive originary mo-
ment of abstract right-property is artificial in the sense of being a
human creation. It is tempting to assume from this explanation that
property has no essential characteristics but is totally malleable.218
This assumption is a grave error.
Property is created to serve specific functions in any given society.
The requirements of property's functions, therefore, limit the forms
which property can take. To give an analogy, take steel beams which
are not natural. Not only is steel the term for a class of man-made
alloys of iron and other elements, which have different degrees of
strength, flexibility, and malleability, but also steel objects, such as
knives and beams, take on different characteristics depending on the
manufacturing process.219 If one wants to build a skyscraper, one can-
not arbitrarily use steel ofjust any quality or shape. Rather, one must
217 See HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 335-36 (A.V. Miller trans., George Allen & Unwin
Ltd. 1969) (1923). Fully a third of Hegel's Science ofLogic discusses the complex relation-
ship between quality and quantity. I gave a brief account of how quantitative change be-
comes qualitative change in Schroeder, supra note 56, at 1554-58; see also David Gray
Carlson, The Hegelian Revival in American Legal Discourse, 46 U. MLAMx L. REv. 1051 app.
(1992) (reviewing STEVEN B. SMrrH, HEGEL'S CRmQuE OF LIBERALISM (1991)) (giving a
"lightening tour through the early chapters of logic" to show how quality becomes
quantity).
218 For example, Jack Balkin assumed that the implication of Hohfeld's system, when
read together with Saussure's theory of the arbitrary nature of signification, is that society
can arbitrarily re-adjust the relative rights and responsibilities of parties in our legal system
as long as we couple each change, such as the creation of a new right, with another equal
but opposite change, such as the imposition of a new duty, to balance it out. SeeJ.M.
Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMi L. Rv. 1119, 1120-26
(1990). As I have argued elsewhere, this proposition is based on a grave misunderstanding
of Saussure, specifically, and postmodernism, generally. The arbitrary nature of significa-
tion (and law) constrains as well as frees us. See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 220-25; Schroe-
der, Chix, supra note 26, at 285-90. Law and language are artificial in the sense that they
are human creations, but not in the sense that they are unreal. A building is artificial, but
it does not follow from this artificiality that one can make arbitrary changes to its structural
elements.
219 As every home cook who shops for quality knives knows, there is a trade off be-
tween strength and brittleness, sharpness and malleability.
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consider the function the steel will serve in holding up the building.
Hegel believed that the function of property ,was the actualization of
human freedom and the creation of subjectivity through mutual rec-
ognition. 220 Hegel argued that the three elements of property are
necessary to accomplish this function. 221 One might disagree with
Hegel's specific designation of the function of property, but the gen-
eral point that function constrains form remains valid.
At this point, one might be tempted to argue that regardless of
whether I am right about property from a philosophical point of view,
my technical distinctions have no practical implications for the Gala-
bresi-Melamed trichotomy. If, however, property must have certain es-
sential characteristics for other reasons, does not property function
externally from enforcement regimes? Who cares whether property
functions this way because of nature or because of other external con-
straints, such as the Hegelian actualization of human freedom?
I would counter that there is an important difference. The Hege-
lian concept of essential elements of property is theoretical and ideal-
ized and can only be understood in an abstract, acontextual way. For
empirical and practical purposes, however, property rights may take
on an unlimited variety of concrete forms in specific contexts. It is
positive law-enforcement regimes-that defines, or in Calabresi-Me-
lamed terminology "limits,"222 the parameters of empirical manifesta-
tions of the theoretical concept of property.
For example, in some contexts, the grouping of rights into these
three elements may be of only theoretical interest and of little practi-
cal value. The property claimants, which Article 9 calls a "debtor" and
a "secured party," both have rights to alienate the object, called the
"collateral," of their property relation. However, every commercial
lawyer knows that the respective concrete rights of the debtor and the
secured party to alienate the collateral are quite different.223 Conse-
quently, when I advise a secured party how to ran a proper foreclo-
sure sale under Article 9, I am not concerned that the right to hold a
foreclosure sale is qualitatively a right of alienation. Rather, I want to
know the precise limits and conditions applicable to this specific man-
ifestation of alienability.
What does this analysis mean for a critique of Calabresi and Me-
lamed? First, the abstract, triune, Hegelian analysis clarifies that Cala-
bresi and Melamed made a category mistake, as a qualitative matter,
220 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 27-34.
221 See HEGEL, supra note 184, at 76-88; see also SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 37-52 (dis-
cussing Hegel's "three essential elements of property" and describing how they interact
with his theory).
222 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1090-93 (noting that one can view rules
as "limiting or regulating the grant of the entitlement itself").
223 See supra text accompanying notes 195-202.
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when they chose to analyze environmental nuisances in terms of pos-
session rather than enjoyment. Second, the corollary of Hegelian
analysis is that actual manifestations of property rights have wide varia-
tions as an empirical or practical matter. Identifying whether a right is
better analyzed as a form of possession, enjoyment, or alienability is,
consequentially, only the necessary first step in our analysis. Proper
characterization does not tell us the actual contours of the specific
rights of any individual claimant. Consequently, because Calabresi
and Melamed did not recognize that they must first define and limit
the rights they are discussing, they misinterpret all changes in such
rights as conveyances of an unchanging, pre-existing object they call
an entitlement.
To return to my example, a secured party with a perfected secur-
ity interest is a property claimant with certain possessory rights in the
collateral. We intersubjectively recognize that the secured party has
the right to exclude a class of third parties from the collateral. 224 This
recognition alone does not tell us what class of third parties the se-
cured party may exclude and under what circumstances. For exam-
ple, in a hypothecation, the debtor has competing possessory rights in
the collateral: the intersubjectively recognized right to retain physical
custody, to continue to use and, under some circumstances, to alien-
ate the collateral prior to default.
Consequently, the conclusion that a legal dispute invokes prop-
erty principles, the identification of the object(s) of the property dis-
pute, and the identification of the element(s) of property involved in
the dispute, does not obviate the difficult task of defining and limiting
the specific parameters of the property rights subject to dispute. In-
deed, the resolution of a property dispute often involves precisely the
determination of these definitions and limits. Calabresi and Me-
lamed, in contradistinction, assumed that once a legal regime allo-
cates a property right or "entitlement," its definition is
predetermined. 225 Accordingly, they confuse the different, albeit in-
terrelated, tasks of defining the property right and prescribing an en-
forcement regime. My point, once again, is that property exists within
law not, as Galabresi and Melamed implied, outside of or prior to law.
224 As I discuss below, this concept is the Hegelian definition of possession. In the case
of a security interest, the parties that the secured party is most concerned about excluding
are the debtor (after default), the debtor's bankruptcy trustee or receiver, other secured
creditors of the debtor (perhaps most importantly, the Internal Revenue Service), and
unsecured creditors of the debtor who may wish to attach the debtor's assets to pay
judgments.
225 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1090-92 ("The entitlement to make
noise versus the entitlement to have silence, the entitlement to pollute versus the entitle-
ment to breathe clean air, the entitlement to have children versus the entitlement to for-
bid them-these are the first order of legal decisions.").
[Vol. 84:394
CRITIQUE OF CALABRESI & MELAME)
In Lacanian terms, property is symbolic, not real, meaning that the
law never merely allocates and enforces entitlements; rather, the law
always defines entitlements.
The third and final reason that the theoretical or practical classi-
fication is important for a critique of Galabresi and Melamed is the
corollary to the abstraction and idealism that underlies my Hegelian
jurisprudence of property, which is pragmatism. The Calabresi and
Melamed debate, indeed most so-called law and economic analysis,
seeks an objective "scientific" means of deciding specific legal ques-
tions, in this case, whether "environmental entitlements" initially
should be allocated to consumers or producers and how these alloca-
tions should be protected. The dialectic or any other form of mathe-
matical logic cannot algorithmically solve answers to the practical
questions that lawyers face. Rather, answers to practical questions re-
quire practical reasoning and "political" decisions. Logic can only be
applied at a level too abstract for concrete life. As I have mentioned
above and have argued extensively elsewhere, the Hegelian dialectic
establishes that possessory claims must be intersubjectively recogniza-
ble as a condition of general enforceability.226 The dialetic, however,
cannot determine whether society should or should not recognize
something. Only intersubjective agreements-positive law-can make
such determinations. The determination of positive law is necessarily
a matter of politics, not science. Indeed, Coase concluded from his
analysis of environmental torts that "problems of welfare economics
must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals."227
2. Possession
Calabresi and Melamed have been misled by their use of phallic
metaphors. The masculine metaphors initially reduce the complex
set of relations we call property to one element, possession, and im-
plicitly imagine possession as the immediate physical custody of a tan-
gible thing (sensuous grasp). Calabresi and Melamed did not analyze
possessory rights in intangibles in their own terms but rather by anal-
ogy to sensuous grasp. Property as sensuous grasp is exclusive-only
one party can hold the object of desire in his hand at one time. One
violates the property right of sensuous grasp by taking or by wresting
the object from the grasp of another. Consequently, property as sen-
suous grasp risks seeming functionally equivalent to identifying prop-
erty with the grasped object itself, rather than with the
interrelationship of legal subjects with respect to the object. Conse-
226 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. I set forth the Hegelian argument at
length in SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 38-43, 144-56 and Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra
note 26, at 504-34.
227 Coase, supra note 63, at 43.
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quently, Calabresi and Melamed imagined a property regime, requir-
ing that if A has a property right in some object that is taken, then the
actual valued object must be returned to A.
All property rights necessarily relate to objects. I have shown that
the Calabresi and Melamed analysis merges the property rights with
respect to objects with the underlying objects themselves. This analy-
sis is obviously wrong-a variation on what Grey called the naive lay
conception of property,228 and what I call the positive masculine phal-
lic metaphor for property.229
Objects are not, as Hohfeld supposed, irrelevant to property.
Property rights can, and often do, include the exclusive right to physi-
cal possession of tangible things. For example, individuals ordinarily
have the exclusive right to physical possession of their household
goods. Even in this case, however, one's property rights cannot be
reduced to physical custody. The ordinary owner has additional rights
in her goods (as the term "consumer" implies). Additionally, the
right of possession cannot be reduced to an immediate binary rela-
tionship between subject and object epitomized by the sensuous
grasp. As I discuss at length elsewhere, we are rarely actually in physi-
cal contact with the goods we possess nor do we possess many of the
goods with which we are in physical contact.2 30 When I started this
Article, I was spending a sabbatical in Lexington, Virginia. Most of my
consumer goods remained in the apartment I "possess" as owner in
New York City,23 ' although I brought some of them with me and kept
them in the apartment I "possessed" as a renter in Lexington. The
distinction between possession and physical contact, let alone the dif-
ference between property and possession, is even more obvious when
the object of desire is an intangible. 23 2
228 See Grey, supra note 29, at 69-70.
229 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
230 See Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra note 26, at 486-88.
231 During my time in Virginia, I continued to "possess" my apartment in New York
even though I was not then physically occupying it and had sublet it to another professor. I
possessed it in the sense that the co-op that owns my apartment building recognized me as
the owner, and I had legally enforceable rights to exclude most persons from it as trespass-
ers. I also had the right to repossess physical custody of the apartment at the end of the
sublease, or sooner if my subtenant defaulted on his rent. My subtenant had a temporary
possessory interest in that he had a right enforceable against me to remain in physical
custody of the apartment and to exclude me during the rental period.
232 As I discussed elsewhere, to a Hegelian, physical custody is not "possession" per se,
but is only one way of actualizing possession in the sense of making a claim of possession
intersubjectively recognizable. See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 144-47; Schroeder, Legal
Surrealism, supra note 26, at 512-16. Physical custody of tangible things may be the most
determinate actualization of possession in the sense that it is easily recognized. See HEGEL,
supra note 184, at 84. But it is also the most inadequate, in that it can be easily destroyed
by a thief who has no right to possession. Hegel identified marking and altering the object
as other ways of actualizing possession. See id. at 85-88. From this analysis, the provisions of
Article 9 of the UCC, which permit perfection of security interests by filing, are not a
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What does it mean, then, to recognize that an object is pos-
sessed by (assigned to) a subject?... Property, like all legal claims, is
relational.... Possession is not merely the objective relationship of
assignment of object to a subject, therefore. Although my property
interest in an apple might include the right to possess it, in the
sense of holding it in my hand, and the right to enjoy it, in the sense
of eating it, my legal right cannot be reduced to the brute fact of my
holding and eating it. A monkey can hold and eat an apple, but it
cannot own it. Possession, as a legal right, as opposed to a brute
fact, is the intersubjective relationship whereby a specific object is
assigned to an identifiable subject as opposed to another subject. [Fol-
lowing Hegel's property jurisprudence,] "possession" is the inter-
subjective recognition that a specific object is identified to a specific
subject in the sense that the subject has some legal entitlement and
ability to exclude others from [the claim of possession].233 I say
"some ability" because, as an empirical matter, [a claim of posses-
sion] might include different combinations of Hohfeldian rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities. The highest manifestation of
this [possession] may be free and clear "ownership" by an individual
of those personal goods which are exempt property in bank-
ruptcy-such as a wedding ring or glass eye. That is, the owner has
the right, power, and privilege to exclude almost everyone else from
these objects and the immunity from having her property interests
taken or violated by others. Most possessory rights are much more
constrained. Even "fee simple absolute" ownership of real property
is not absolutely perfect possession.23 4
Calabresi and Melamed's definition of a property regime is
equivalent to the first part of this definition of "possession"-the iden-
tification of an object to a specific subject. By recognizing only the
first half of the Hegelian definition, they repressed the mediated in-
substitute for possession (too narrowly identified with custody), but a form of possession. See
Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra note 26, at 517-18.
233 Elsewhere, I argue extensively that intersubjective recognition is a necessary and
essential element of possession because it furthers both the classical liberal value of auton-
omy and the Hegelian theological purpose of the actualization of freedom. See ScHROE-
DER, supra note 2, at 35-37; Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra note 26, at 517-18. This
definition is similar to Blackstone's famous definition of property as that "which one man
claims and exercises... in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the uni-
verse." 2 WILLIAm BiAcKsroNE, GoMMENTARIES *2. Elsewhere, I have defended Blackstone
from Grey's charge that Blackstone adopted the naive lay conception of property as object.
See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 161-81; Schroeder, Chix, supra note 26, at 275-85. As the
language of Blackstone's definition makes clear, he thought that property was a claim-a
legal relation-asserted by one legal subject against other legal subjects. Nevertheless,
Blackstone did not entirely escape the allure of the masculine phallic metaphor. His defi-
nition of property is almost identical to the Hegelian definition of possession. Insofar as
Blackstone's volume on property consists in large part of the arcane common-law rules of
conveyancing, he clearly also recognized the right of alienation. He repressed, however,
the right of enjoyment.
234 SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 41-42 (footnotes omitted and footnote added).
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tersubjective aspect of property and erroneously reduced possession
to an immediate relationship between owning subject and owned ob-
ject. Consequently, they declared that in a property-possession-re-
gime, society does not impose its intersubjective valuation of the
property relationship. 235 The existence of third parties, however, re-
quires the mediation of society and the imposition of its values.
Although possession necessarily involves a relationship between sub-
ject and object, possession cannot be reduced to that relationship.
Empirically no subject ever has perfect possession in terms of a com-
plete and total right and power to exclude all other subjects, under
any and all circumstances, from the object of possession.
For example, Anglo-American real property law posits a theoreti-
cal subject called the "sovereign" to stand in for the impossible posi-
tion of the one and only subject having such an alodial title. Not even
the United States government, the most powerful sovereign of the
contemporary world, has complete possessory rights in its property.
The fiction of feudalism, on which our real property law is built, is
that the sovereign conditionally cedes some of his original possessory
rights to his vassals in exchange for vows of fealty and service, thereby
creating society.236
Law cannot merely assign the right of possession to one party and
then enforce that right, as Calabresi and Melamed presumed. Law
must also define possession in terms of detailing those whom the pos-
sessor can exclude and under what circumstances she can exclude
them. As we will see when I discuss the application of property rules
in a world in which third parties or dynamite exist, any limitation of a
possessory right is equivalent to imposing an intersubjective valuation
on the possessor.237 Property remedies inevitably merge into liability
remedies, and liability regimes presuppose a property regime.
If one thinks of possession as the right of the possessor to exclude
some other subject from asserting some property interest or interests
in the same object, then possession is not necessarily exclusive as a
theoretical matter. In the Calabresi-Melamed hypotheticals, it does
not necessarily follow from the assignment of an entitlement to a
party that the entitlement should be analyzed in terms of the single
property right of possession, let alone that any possessory right should
be exclusive to the party. Nor does it follow that interference with
that entitlement constitutes a transfer of that entitlement to the viola-
tor. Not all changes in legal rights consist of, or can be usefully analo-
gized to, a conveyance.
235 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
236 See Daniel E. Wenner, Note, Renting in Collegetown, 84 CoRNELL L. Rv. 543, 546-47
(1999) (describing the development and the operation of the feudal system).
237 See infra Part IV.B.1.
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3. Alienation
Alienability is the ability of the subject to sever her relation to the
object. Although it is a cliche of American law that we abhor re-
straints on alienation, most manifestations of alienability are not abso-
lute.23 8 Even a fee simple owner of real estate is limited by fraudulent
transfer principles from alienating her estate in a way that would work
a fraud on her creditors.239 Additionally, when I have relatively broad
rights of alienation, I may choose to alienate only a portion of my
property rights. For example, when I lease an object to another, I
divest myself of and transfer to another, my possessory right to physi-
cal custody and sensuous use of the object, temporarily and condition-
ally on the receipt of my rent.
The Calabresi-Melamed hypotheticals ostensibly invoke the right
of alienation-the ability of a subject to sever her relationships con-
cerning the object. Calabresi and Melamed vacillated between
privileging possession and seeing property as a binary subject-object
relation, which they called a property regime, on the one hand, and
privileging alienation through exchange and seeing property as a bi-
nary subject-subject relation, a liability regime, on the other.240
In the property regime and liability regime hypotheticals (hy-
potheticals one and two, and three and four, respectively), the owner
supposedly retains the right to alienate her entitlement by con-
tracting. In fact, however, no transfer of property occurs. For exam-
ple, even if the homeowner contracts away her right to drink clean
water, she still owns her water. The producer obtains no property
right in A's water that he can further convey to the world. The pollut-
ing producer obtains neither the right to drink the clean water him-
self (enjoyment) nor the right to exclude rivals (including other
polluters) from drinking or polluting the water (possession). In addi-
tion, the homeowner-consumer retains the right to exclude from her
water all persons other than the contracting producer. Rather than
severing her relationship with the object or any portion of the object,
she simply has changed the nature of the relationship. In the liability
regime, the nonowner also has the power to sever the owner's rela-
tionship with her object-to "take" her entitlement-provided the
nonowner pays damages. This arrangement, however, should be seen
238 See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 31, at 1917-21 (critiquing the assumption
that free alienability is the norm in American law by discussing "incomplete commodifica-
tion"). I discuss the Hegelian analysis of alienation in SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 46-52.
239 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994) (fraudulent transfer provision of Bankruptcy
Code); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 652-53 (1985); UNIF. FRAUDU-
LENT TRANSFER Aar § 7, id. at 509. For an argument that fraudulent conveyance law belies
the very distinction between in rem and in personam rights, seeJulie Sirota Karchin, Note,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law as a Property Right, 9 CARD ozo L. REv..843 (1987).
240 See supra Part I.
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neither as a limitation of the owner's right of alienation, nor as a right
of alienation granted to the nonowner. Rather, it is a limitation of the
possessory rights of the "owner" and the grant of conditional posses-
sory rights to the "nonowner."
Hypotheticals five and six purport to place limitations on the
owner's right and power to alienate her entitlement.2 41 In the more
realistic hypothetical five, A could not give up her right to dean water.
If the conflict between A and B cannot be analyzed in terms of the
allocation of a possessory interest in a single object, neither can this
paternalistic limitation on A be analyzed in terms of her right to alien-
ate her object. A, as a homeowner, has the usual rights to sell her
home and, subject to obtaining any appropriate licenses, to bottle and
sell her water. Consequently, if it is inaccurate to analyze the environ-
mental nuisance hypotheticals in terms of disputes of possession, it is
equally inaccurate to analyze them in terms of rights of alienation.
4. Enjoyment
It is the third element of property, the "feminine" element of en-
joyment, which is at stake. Enjoyment is the right of a subject to use,
consume, collect, or otherwise exploit the object of the property right.
In Hegelian terms, enjoyment is the actualization of the subject's mas-
tery over the object.242 Possessory rights indicate those whom the
owner can exclude from the object of desire. Alienability rights indi-
cate how the owner rids herself of the object once desired. Enjoyment
rights indicate what the owner may do with and to her object of
desire. 243
Once again, it is common to assume that an owner usually has the
unfettered right to do whatever he wants with "his" property-that "a
241 See supra Part II.B.5 & B.6.
242 See HEGEL, supra note 184, at 88-90; SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 43-45.
243 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 43-44.
Just as possession should not be equated with physical custody, enjoyment
cannot be limited to sensuous consumption. The nature of the right of
enjoyment varies with the type of object involved. A tomato can be eaten,
but one can also admire its beautiful color or fragrance or even use it as a
weapon by throwing it at some politician. Although during the term of a
lease, the lessee has the right to sensuous exploitation of the leased object,
the lessor also retains a right of enjoyment in the form of economic ex-
ploitation (i.e., the right to rent). Enjoyment is often conflated with posses-
sion in the sense of physical custody, because one frequently, or even
usually, needs to be in immediate physical contact with, or at least close
proximity to, a tangible object in order to enjoy it. But even in the case of
tangible goods, the rights of possession and enjoyment are distinguishable.
As reflected in the clich6 that you can't have your cake and eat it too, it is
often the case that enjoyment destroys the object of desire and, therefore,
also destroys the other two property elements. Consumption is the ultimate
form of enjoyment.
Id. at 43-44.
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man's home is his castle." 244 However, rights of enjoyment, like those
of possession and alienation, often are limited. For example,
although I might say that I own my body,245 in most jurisdictions it is
illegal for me to enjoy it in sexual relations with persons other than
my husband (particularly if the enjoyment is commercial in nature),
or to abuse it by ingesting certain drugs, or to consume it entirely by
committing suicide. More importantly, for the purposes of this Arti-
cle, moralistic or paternalistic restrictions are not the only limitations
on enjoyment. Enjoyment is also self-limited by the demands of its
fundamentally relational nature.
From a Hegelian viewpoint, the logic of property is recognition-
it always involves other persons.2 46 Therefore, in accord with the
Hohfeldian analysis, all legal rights, including property rights, must be
intersubjective in nature. Enjoyment, however, seems inherently sub-
jective and solipsistic in nature.2 47 Consequently, I have criticized
Margaret Radin's privileging of enjoyment over the other elements of
property as implicitly individualistic, even virginal. 248
In what way is enjoyment necessarily what I call "relational," and
Coase called "reciprocal"? One could argue that enjoyment is rela-
tional because, as total enjoyment cannot be shared, it necessarily en-
velopes the right of exclusion.2 49 Two people cannot eat the same
piece of cake. But, we already have characterized the right of exclu-
244 E.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
245 Not all object relations are by nature, property relations. As a Hegelian, I question
whether it is appropriate to analyze one's relationship with one's own body in terms of
property. See Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 26, at 67-69, 80-81, 100-01, 147-49 (ar-
guing that we should view this relationship as one of "bodily integrity"). Nevertheless,
there is a long and respectable jurisprudential tradition of considering the body to be
property for at least some purposes. This tradition dates at least back to John Locke's
famous assertion that "every Man has a Property in his own Person." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREA-
TISES OF GOvERNMENT 305 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1690). In more modem times, some
law and economic scholars have concluded that because we have a property right in our
bodies, we should be able to buy and sell our body and body parts, as well as our infants.
SeePosNER, supra note 103, at 167-70; PosNuz, supra note 72, at 409-17; Elizabeth M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7J. LEGAL STum. 323, 344 (1978).
Although MargaretJane Radin also analysed the legal relationship of the body and prop-
erty, she argued that the body should be market inalienable. See MARGARET JANE RADIN
Property and Personhood, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTly, supra note 31, at 40-43; Radin, Market-
Inalienability, supra note 31, at 1921-36; see also SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 178-79, 280-83
(critiquing Radin's theory from a Hohfeldian and Hagelian perspective); Schroeder, Virgin
Territory, supra note 26, at 67-69, 73-76 (same). See generally ALAN HYDE, BoDIES OF LA-W 48-
79 (1997) (providing an analysis of the body and property).
246 See supra note 191 for a brief discussion and SCHROEDER, supra note 2, for an in-
depth analysis of this theory.
247 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 42-43.
248 See generally Schroeder, Virgin Terrtory, supra note 26 (critiquing Radin's imagery of
personal property as the inviolate feminine body).
249 Cf ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITr OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIEs iN HEGELANJURISPRU-
DENCE 32-33 (1995) ("A further consequence of functionalism is that there is no essential
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sion as part and parcel of the right of possession. But, as I have ex-
pressed previously, "to say that enjoyment presupposes exclusion is
only another way to say that possession is the most primitive element
of property."250
Enjoyment is intersubjective notjust because the mutual enjoy-
ment of the same object by two different subjects can be inconsis-
tent, but because one's enjoyment of one's own object can hinder
or even preclude the ability of another to enjoy his own object. To
give an easy example, even rabid libertarians would probably agree
that society can legitimately limit the rights of car owners to enjoy
their cars by driving them on the side walk because that would inter-
fere with the rights of pedestrians to enjoy their bodily integrity....
Exactly what these limitations are (i.e., what degree of interference
we will tolerate as a legal matter) must be determined by practical
reasoning (i.e., positive law).251
In the case of environmental nuisances, B's enjoyment of his object is
inconsistent with A's enjoyment with her object. A's object of desire
in our hypothetical is her residence (or at least the well at her resi-
dence or the water in the well). One of the ways she can enjoy this
object is by drinking its water. B's object of desire is his widget factory
and business. One of the ways he can enjoy this object is by producing
widgets. The problem is that the production of widgets pollutes A's
water. A's complete enjoyment of her water, therefore, is inconsistent
with B's complete enjoyment of his factory. Coase insisted that rival
claims in environmental disputes are reciprocal in nature because of
the impossibility of simultaneous complete mutual enjoyment.2 52
The question in environmental nuisance is not, therefore, which
party possesses an entitlement that may or may not be alienated to the
other party. Rather, the question is, what are the borders separating
the relative rights of the two parties to enjoy their separate objects?
This analysis partially explains why this problem has been so mys-
teriously intractable for so long. Legal scholars have tried to analyze
the problem in terms of proper allocation of possession and in terms
difference between the adjudication of property disputes involving private persons and the
distribution of entitlements among members of a body politic.").
250 SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 44. Although one cannot enjoy or alienate an "object"
unless one first possesses it, one can theoretically have the right to possess without either of
the other two rights, such as in a bailment. A bailee is someone rightfully in the possession
of property of another. In the simple case of a bailment for storage-as when one leaves
one's coat at the cloakroom of a restaurant-the bailee has the temporary and conditional
right to possess the coat, but has no right to enjoy or alienate it. Sometimes the bailee does
have other rights-in the general, as opposed to the technical Hohfeldian sense-in the
balled good. For example, if the bailee is an entrustee under U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1995),
under some circumstances he has the Hohfeldian power, but not the Hohfeldian right, to
alienate it.
251 SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 44-45 (footnotes omitted).
252 See supra Part I.D.
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of when or if society should force onto owners involuntary alienation
or inalienability despite the fact that our property system has worked
out priority and alienation regimes. 253 Their suggestions, therefore,
seem like alien, even radical, intrusions into some of our most cher-
ished legal institutions-those institutions that are central to the
American economic and political system and mythology. These are
the related institutions of private property, which requires, with lim-
ited exceptions, the security of first possession, and the freedom of
contract, which generally presupposes both free alienability of prop-
erty and that owners determine if, when, and on what terms alienation
will occur. In contradistinction, I argue that the feminine element of
enjoyment is repressed by the symbolic order of law that is psychoana-
lytically masculine. The law of boundaries of enjoyment is less worked
out than the rules of possession and alienation. Consequently, the
Calabresi-Melamed debate can be recast as an attempt to resolve long-
standing issues within the existing property regime, not as proposals
to throw out time-honored legal principles.
5. Empirical Overlaps Between the Elements of Property
Kaplow and Shavell observed that although some property con-
flicts fall clearly within the rubric of the classic environmental nui-
sance, and others fall dearly within the rubric of classic priority
disputes, many cases fall somewhere in between. 254 The examples
they gave, however, reveal confusion as to the nature of property.
Specifically, they claimed that one can alternatively view the environ-
mental nuisance hypothetical as the polluting producer interfering
with or taking the consumer's property rights.2 55 They stated that a
polluter can be described as "tak[ing] clean air . . . from the vic-
tim.1256 For a neighbor to block the view from the windows of a build-
ing on an adjoining plot of land is, according to Kaplow and Shavell,
even more analogous to a "taking of a thing."257 As we already have
seen, however, this interpretation is not strictly correct. In the typical
environmental nuisance case, there is no voluntary or involuntary
transfer of any right from the consumer to the producer-merely a
readjustment of their relationship. The producer may destroy the
consumer's possession by precluding her enjoyment, or even by de-
stroying the object of desire, but the producer has not taken the ob-
253 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 715-16 (providing the framework for
the article's argument and amplifying their point by suggesting that if one has "rightful
possession of some thing-such as an automobile or a home-another person ordinarily
cannot take it without [her] permission").
254 See id. at 771-73.
255 See id. at 772-73.
256 Id. at 772.
257 Id. at 772-73.
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ject of desire. In Kaplow and Shavell's examples, the polluter may
have made it impossible for the victim to breathe freely, but her lungs
are still full of air; the builder may have made it impossible for her
neighbor to enjoy an ocean view, but the neighbor's building and its
windows are still intact.2 58 It is true that, in the building example, the
first party lost a view, and the second has a view, but not because the
second party gained the first party's view. Rather, the means by which
the second party chose to enjoy her land-commercial exploitation in
the form of building a hotel so that others will pay to enjoy the view-
necessarily interfered with the first party's enjoyment of her land by
blocking her view.
As mentioned above, the three abstract elements of property are
qualitatively different. These elements concretely can manifest in
many different, and more or less adequate, ways. Although under He-
gelian theory, the concept of qualities is discrete-something either is
or is not a quality-gradual quantitative changes can cause differences
in qualities. The classic example, which I discuss at length elsewhere,
is the comparison of the qualities of hirsuteness and baldness.2 59 One
either is or is not bald. Losing hair, however, is a gradual, quantitative
change. For a hairy man to lose one hair does not make him bald, just
less hairy-a gradual quantitative change has occurred. But at some
point, he will realize that he has lost so much hair, that he is now a
bald man. The quantitative change eventually becomes a qualitative
change, although one cannot, as a logical matter, determine the exact
moment when the change occurred. Rather, determining the mo-
ment of change will be a practical judgment about which reasonable
people may disagree. I may consider a man with a receding hairline
to be bald, while a man with a comb-over may insist that only the "Mr.
Clean" look qualifies as baldness. To Hegel, the relation between
quality and quantity is not merely an empirical observation; rather, it
is logically mandated by the working of his dialectic method. In the
Hegelian dialectic, the resolution of contradiction, known as subla-
tion (aufhebung), occurs instantaneously, as with changes in quality,
but one cannot identify the moment of transition, as with changes in
quantity.260 For this reason, pragmatism is the corollary of Hegelian
idealism.
Consequently, the identification of the qualitative categories of
possession, enjoyment, and alienation does not preclude, but re-
quires, that empirical actualization of these qualities be quantitatively
258 See id. at 772.
259 See HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 217, at 335; Schroeder, supra note 56, at
1554-55.
260 See HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 217, at 334-35, 368 (discussing resolution
in the context of the sublation of quality and quantity); Schroeder, supra note 56, at 1558-
66.
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related. Some manifestations will be more or less possession-like and
more or less enjoyment-like. The most obvious case may be of intangi-
ble rights such as copyrights. I have defined possession as the inter-
subjectively recognized identification of an object or res to a subject
and enjoyment as the rightful exploitation of the res. Because copy-
right can only be understood as the right of commercial exploita-
tion-the right to copy, to sell, or to use-of the expression of an
idea, the enjoyment of the copyright, and the act that marks the iden-
tification of the object to the subject, overlap. On the other hand,
other aspects of copyright clearly relate to possession. For example, to
be enforceable against third parties, copyrights must be registered
with the U.S. Patent and Copyright Office.26 ' Like perfection of a
security interest, the requirement of registration relates to the inter-
subjective recognition of the subject's claim to the object and, there-
fore, is a form of Hegelian possession.262
Similarly, the empirical boundaries between enjoyment and alien-
ation can be blurred. For example, one enjoys a debt by realizing its
value. One can do this by presenting it for payment to the debtor.
But this act, which also extinguishes the debt, is equivalent to alienat-
ing it back to the debtor (as when a corporation buys back its publicly
issued bonds on the open market to avoid paying a prepayment pre-
mium). Conversely, one can alienate a debt to a third party by selling
it, as in the assignment of accounts discussed previously. By selling
the account, however, the seller realizes its value. Consequently, the
alienating act is equivalent to enjoyment. Alternately, one can enjoy
some objects by consuming them, as when one eats a piece of cake.
To do so, of course, also severs any continuing relationship between
the subject and the consumed object. You can't have your cake and
eat it too. Consequently, the act of enjoyment is equivalent to
alienation.
My Hegelian analysis cannot provide a logical method for defini-
tively categorizing any of these actualizations of property as posses-
sion, enjoyment, or alienation. My analysis can only provide a general
framework for the application of practical reasoning. Ultimately, this
decision, like all legal decisions, necessarily contains a subjective polit-
ical component.
261 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1994) (noting that with few exceptions, "no action for in-
fringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copy-
right claim has been made in accordance with this title").
262 See generally Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra note 26 (arguing that the require-
ment of registration relates to intersubjective recognition of the claim to the object).
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IV
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CRITIQUES OF TlE
CALABRESI AND MELAMED TRICHOTOMY
One might be tempted to argue that, although my argument is
technically correct, it is irrelevant given the purposes for which Cala-
bresi and Melamed developed the trichotomy. In the previous Part, I
spoke extensively about the importance of pragmatism. Might not the
trichotomy have practical uses despite its theoretical flaws? Whether
we analyze the problem in terms of a single entitlement allocated be-
tween two parties or in terms of the determination of the boundaries
of two different entitlements held by the two parties, would not the
Coase theory still suggest that the party who valued the disputed right
more will negotiate to pay the other party to allow him to have the
right? We may expect this result whether the disputed right is the
right to possess a single object or the right to enjoy two separate ob-
jects. For example, if A valued her enjoyment of her water more than
B valued his enjoyment of his widget factory, then the parties would
bargain so that B would refrain from enjoyment so that A could in-
dulge in enjoyment, and vice versa. This argument would, in effect,
accuse me of conflating a semantic dispute with a substantive one.
I will show, however, that the Calabresi and Melamed analysis fails
in its stated goal of presenting a taxonomy of existing and possible
legal remedy regimes. In particular, analyzing a producer's ability to
pollute as the allocation of an entitlement is unworkable both in the-
ory and in practice. I have already argued2 63 that hypothetical six, in
which the producer's "entitlement" to pollute is inalienable, is absurd,
and therefore is never discussed in the literature, even though it is
logically required by the taxonomy. More importantly, the implemen-
tation of either a property or a liability regime protecting such an enti-
tlement (hypotheticals two and four respectively), would require not
merely the recognition of new rights, but also the adoption of radical
new legal procedures. Although theorists sometimes recognize this
result with respect to hypothetical four, I will show that it applies
equally to hypothetical two. Whether or not Calabresi and Melamed's
analysis is amusing as a matter of economic theory, it does not repre-
sent a serious alternative for American law. As Frier and Schwab al-
ready have suggested, although couched in the rhetoric of policy
recommendations, the Calabresi and Melamed inspired debate is
purely an aesthetic exercise with no real world implications. 264
Even if one agrees with my critique when it tries to allocate the
entitlement to the producer, one might respond by suggesting that it
263 See supra Part II.B.6.
264 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 482.
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is irrelevant to the bulk of the analysis flowing from Calabresi and
Melamed's theory. Do not most analysts expressly or implicitly focus
on the two most realistic hypotheticals-numbers one and three? As-
suming the status quo-that the consumer has a right to clean
water-would efficiency be better served if we protected her right
through property or liability rules? 265 Whether or not Calabresi and
Melamed are right in describing this problem as the transfer of a
thing, their suggestion does not affect this more fundamental ques-
tion. Moreover, whatever qualms one may have in applying Calabresi
and Melamed's taxonomy in its original context of environmental nui-
sances, surely it is applicable in other contexts in which the parties are
contesting the ownership of a single thing.
In the following sections, I show that a Calabresi-Melamed analy-
sis is misleading for even these more limited purposes. Their analysis
requires that the parties negotiate in the shadow of an enforcement
regime, which requires that they know what enforcement regime will
apply. Negotiation under this condition is not possible because in the
real world of third parties and dynamite, property and liability re-
gimes are indistinguishable.
A. The Empirical Validity of the Trichotomy
The regime that Calabresi and Melamed denominate "property"
bears little resemblance to the American property regime. Is this dis-
tinction merely a semantic quibble? Perhaps Calabresi and Me-
lamed's choice of the word "property" was unfortunate because the
term has other well-understood meanings. This imprecision alone,
however, does not mean that the concept designated by this unfortu-
nate term is defective. If I am worried that the term "property" has
misleading connotations, perhaps I should merely suggest alternate
terminology such as "injunctive" regime, which seems better to fit with
the term "liability" regime. Or why not change the names of both of
these categories to the more traditional "equitable" and "legal"
remedies?
My objection to Calabresi and Melamed's concept, which they
call a property regime, is not simply that it does not describe the ex-
isting property regime, but that it does not describe any remedial re-
gime that does or could exist under any legal system in which the
property right can be irretrievably destroyed or in which there are
more than two parties. Consequently, the trichotomy Calabresi and
Melamed proposed is fundamentally unworkable. To see why, we
265 For example, Polinsky reduced the Calabresi and Melamed analysis to the simpler
issue of when we should impose legal remedies and when we should impose equitable
ones. See Polinsky, supra note 32, at 1075-80.
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must consider Calabresi and Melamed's definition of a property re-
gime in slightly more detail.
One should intuit that the problem with Calabresi and Me-
lamed's property regime is its incompleteness. A property regime,
they stated, is one in which society respects an entitlement holder's
subjective valuation of her property and does not impose its own valu-
ation.266 Consequently, in a property regime, a transfer of an entitle-
ment can only be made with the consent of the entitlement holder-
through contract. This characterization describes the goal of the re-
gime, but fails to describe the remedies it adopts to further its goal. In
order to understand what a property regime is, one may wish to look
at Calabresi and Melamed's description of what it is not-a liability
regime. The Calabresi and Melamed analysis subtly has changed the
traditional nature of damages.
1. Calabresi and Melamed's Liability Analysis as the Revaluation
of Theft
In a liability regime, society imposes its valuation on an entitle-
ment holder. That is, the law enforces an involuntary transfer against
the original entitlement holder so long as the transferee pays the soci-
etally imposed value to the entitlement holder. This seems to mean
that in a liability regime the only remedy available in the case of a
taking is money damages. By negative pregnant, this paucity of reme-
dies implies that the remedy available in a property regime is some-
thing other than money damages or "legal" remedies-such as one of
the traditional "equitable" remedies.
In law, courts customarily impose damages upon a wrongdoer to
compensate the victim for the loss caused by the wrongful act. Cala-
bresi and Melamed suggested that, in economic terms, this remedy is
equivalent to setting an objective-societally imposed-purchase
price for an entitlement so a rival claimant can force an involuntary
transfer on the original entitlement holder.2 67 Most acolytes of Gala-
bresi and Melamed treat these damages in this way.2 68
266 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1092.
267 See supra text accompanying notes 76-81. Radin made a similar critique of the
American tort regime, which she frames in terms of a denial of commensurability. She
agreed with the law and economics approach that requiring a tortfeasor to pay damages,
supposedly equivalent to the loss, to the tort victim is tantamount to establishing a market
for bodily integrity. Implicitly adopting what I call the feminine phallic metaphor, Radin
argued that personal injury is a violation of selfhood that cannot be cured through ex-
change or the payment of damages. All society can do is acknowledge the victim's loss in a
way that respects her dignity. See RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODMES, supra note 31, at 185-
205.
268 See supra note 75.
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This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that economic
equivalence is not necessarily the same as legal, practical, or ethical
equivalence. Quantity is not quality. As Coleman and Kraus have ar-
gued, the Calabresi and Melamed analysis changes the valuation of a
taking.269 Under traditional legal principles, a taking is wrongful.
The fact that the payment of damages retroactively heals this wrong
does not in-and-of-itself change this judgment. In the Calabresi-Me-
lamed trichotomy, however, a taking in which the taker pays the origi-
nal owner the societally imposed value of the property taken is
implicitly rightful. Indeed, if the taker is the higher valuing user, a
utilitarian concerned with wealth maximization would go further and
say that the taking is an affirmatively good thing, which we should
encourage.
But note the legal implications of this valuation. Calabresi and
Melamed suggested that the law should adopt a liability regime if it
would result in more efficient transfers than a property regime.270
Under a Calabresi and Melamed liability regime, however, the claim-
ant should be able to tender the societally imposed "purchase" price
to the entitlement holder and take the property. Any attempt by the
entitlement holder to sue the taker would be dismissed for failure to
state a claim or, at most, a valuation proceeding would be ordered.
This arrangement may or may not be a good idea, but it is clearly a
radical change from our current legal system. This system tends not
only to protect the status quo, but also to guard jealously the right of
first possession because of the certainty of private property as an
institution.
Calabresi and Melamed's conception of such a liability rule is at
least theoretically possible in the area of environmental nuisances.
The producer can easily "take" the coveted entitlement by going
about its usual business of producing widgets. It does not have to
enter the consumer's premises or otherwise breach the peace. This
description is, of course, hypothetical three in which the producer
"takes" the consumer's entitlement to clean water by producing wid-
gets and, incidentally, pollutes.271 Polluters do not have to make use
of the law's enforcement mechanism to actualize their "right" to pol-
lute-they have the practical ability to exercise self-help. This self-
help ability is why I have suggested that it is not just odd, but errone-
ous to analyze this as an enforcement regime.
This implicit but radical departure from the traditional solicitude
towards private property is subtly signalled by Calabresi and Me-
lamed's novel terminology, which changes the meaning of traditional
269 See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 52, at 1352-65.
270 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1093-98.
271 See supra Part ll.B.3.
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categories. First, they label this regime a "liability," rather than a
"damages," regime, thereby avoiding the implications that this remedy
is compensation paid for a wrongful act. More importantly, they dis-
tinguished this regime from a "property" regime. This distinction is
exactly correct. Compensation of involuntary takings is both rightful
and desirable as a weakening, if not an outright rejection, of the con-
cept of possession-the right to exclude others. It is impossible to
have the other two elements of property without the most primitive
element, possession. Hence, Calabresi and Melamed used the weak
economic term "entitlement," rather than the resonant legal and phil-
osophic term "property," to describe legal rights.
This terminology is consistent with the utilitarian philosophy un-
derlying law and economics. Unlike the Libertarian strand of liber-
alism associated with John Locke, private property in law and
economics is not a fundamental natural right of man.272 Unlike the
contractarian strand of liberalism associated with Thomas Hobbes,
property under law and economics theory is not a fundamental right,
established by the positive law of the social contract, to prevent the
war of all against all.273 Unlike Hegelianism, law and economics does
not view property as a necessary step in the creation of the individual
and the state and the actualization of human freedom. 274 To a utilita-
rian, these justifications of a substantive conception of property are
mere sentimental prejudices-the "other justice concerns" to which
Calabresi and Melamed gave lip service. 275 The desire for freedom is
a preference, a mere matter of taste, which one can reduce to either
"utility" or market value. The institution of property is merely a tool,
like any other, which may be used to fulfill the fundamental goal of
utility or wealth maximization.
In an extreme example, Kaplow and Shavell asserted that regard-
less of whether property is a "natural right," we only care about natu-
ral rights if we can justify them for utilitarian reasons. 276 This
assertion is true only ifwe broaden the definition of utility so far that it
becomes analytically useless. The assertion that society should respect
natural rights because to do so is "right" in some ethical, moral, or
religious sense would translate into utilitarian terms as follows: "If one
272 See Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of Property and Its Contemporary Significance, in
PROPERTY NOMOS XXII, supra note 29, at 3, 17; Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The
Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IowA L. Rav. 769, 853-58
(1985).
273 See Minogue, supra note 272, at 18; Rosenfeld, supra note 272, at 790-92.
274 See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 15. For a description of the Hagelian view, see id. at
xv-xvi, 3-4, 15, 19-20, 34, 37-52, 271-73, 294-95, 319-21; Schroeder, supra note 56, at 1533-44,
1566-69.
275 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1102-05.
276 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 746.
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has a preference for ethics, morality, or religion, then complying with
ethics, morality, or religion increases one's utility." It is difficult to
fathom how one could factor such a concept of utility into a practical
economic or legal discussion, which necessarily uses wealth (market
valuations) as a surrogate for utility.2 7 7
According to Calabresi and Melamed, society should adopt a so-
called "property" regime only insofar as it encourages more efficient
transfers of entitlements to the highest valuing user.278 Although a
"property regime" ostensibly privileges possession in that the owner
has an absolute claim to exclude others, possession is only tentatively
justified so long as it encourages efficient alienation. Consequently,
as in a "liability regime," the element of possession is subordinated to
that of alienation through exchange. This subordination is inconsis-
tent with our earlier discussion, which demonstrated that alienation
through exchange requires the more primitive element of possession.
A rival claimant need not negotiate for exchange in a liability regime
unless the first buyer has an enforceable right of possession, and the
rival claimant will not pay for the entitlement unless he is assured that
he will receive some level of possession (security of title). Moreover,
the element of enjoyment is once again repressed and not discussed.
The primary reason why one party would value the object of desire
more than another is because of the anticipated enjoyment that the
higher valuing party would have in the object-whether the commer-
cial enjoyment of producing widgets or the sensuous enjoyment of
drinking clean water. This unacknowledged feminine ghost of enjoy-
ment is precisely the element of property involved in environmental
277 This concept of utility also reverses the usual philosophic understanding that utili-
tarianism is only a pragmatic philosophy without its own independent justification.
278 Calabresi and Melamed's policy conclusion reflects common misreadings of Coase.
For example, Barbara White stated that, "Coase asserts that courts, when ruling on entitle-
ment disputes, must assign the property right not on the basis of traditional notions of
property rights, but on the basis of maximizing total product." Barbara White, Coase and
the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IowA L. Rav. 577, 586 (1987). Unfortunately,
White mischaracterized the Coasean language she quoted to support her interpretation.
What Coase did say is that different allocations of rights can be expected to have different
effects on economic efficiency. Moreover, legal decisions are based on a variety of consid-
erations that may differ from the goals of economics. Consequently, there is no a priori
reason to assume that the status quo is the most efficient allocation because transaction
costs may have prevented correction of inefficiencies. Coase did not suggest, however, that
courts should therefore decide cases based on economic efficiency alone. He expressly
stated that economic and legal decisions "should be carried out in broader terms than
[merely consideration of efficiency] and that the total effect of these arrangements in all
spheres of life should be taken into account." Coase, supra note 63, at 43. He expressly
thought society should examine aesthetic and moral considerations. See supra text accom-
panying notes 113-14. Consequently, Coase's analysis has plenty of room for respect of
"traditional notions of property rights." Id.
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nuisances. In the words of Lacan, what is repressed in the symbolic
(law) always returns in the real.2 79
This hostility toward property results from the implicit adoption
of the phallic metaphor of property as possession and of possession as
sole and unfettered custody of a tangible thing-property as sensuous
grasp. For example, Hohfeld thought he had to reject property as
irrational or as impossible precisely because he could not imagine it
any other way.28 0 As we have seen, the phallic metaphor pops up most
explicitly in the Calabresi-Melamed model's assumption that the enti-
tlement is a thing that is assigned to one party or the other. If one
holds this view of property, property must be disparaged in any situa-
tion in which these absolutist views are unworkable or absurd. Conse-
quently, Hohfeld thought that traditional property analysis was
illogical and proposed the abandonment of property as a separate
legal category. His theory would lump rights traditionally falling
within the rubric of "property" with a number of other rights, such as
traditional torts, into a new category, which he called "multital rights."
In contrast, Calabresi and Melamed merely declared that a liability
rule is nonproperty.
a. Procedural Implications in True Takings
Regardless of one's judgment of either the ethical implications of
the Calabresi and Melamed liability analysis or the usefulness of the
analysis in the limited situation of an environmental entitlement allo-
cated to a consumer, the proposal becomes fanciful when we apply it
to true possessory disputes. For example, suppose that the object of
desire is a diamond ring that A, the owner, always wears. In order to
take the ring from an unwilling A through self-help, B would have to
assault her physically.281 This behavior would interfere with other
rights of A, such as the rights of autonomy and bodily integrity, in
addition to the entitlement, which is the subject of the dispute. Con-
sequently, Calabresi and Melamed must have been proposing that B
be able to enforce his right to impose an involuntary sale on A
through the courts, by utilizing an "enforcement regime." For exam-
ple, B would be able to tender the "purchase price," or pay it into the
court and then obtain an injunction ordering A to turn over the ring.
A regime that gives a plaintiff the right to use the courts to change the
279 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
280 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Grey made a similar conceptual error.
See SCHROEDER, supra note 2, at 163-79; Schroeder, Chix, supra note 26, at 242-44, 271-75,
299-300.
281 I am not accusing Calabresi and Melamed of promoting assault, trespass or other
wrongful behavior as a means of self-help.
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status quo, is alien to our capitalist legal system thatjealously defends
property rights.
Of course, no one is seriously suggesting that we institute a Cala-
bresi-Melamed liability regime in the case of consumer goods.2 2 Let
us, therefore, consider the implications of the regime in a situation
that theorists debate in the literature: the efficient allocation of com-
mercially productive property.28 3
Suppose that Xowns a widget-producing corporation that Ycould
operate more profitably. Standard economic analysis suggests that be-
cause Y is the higher valuing user, society would benefit from the
transfer of control of the corporation from X to Y Under current law
and practice, Ycannot take the business away from Xwithout X's con-
sent. This protection exists in part because a property regime protects
Xs entitlement. X has an enforceable right of possession in the cor-
poration and its assets. As a result, the only way Y can acquire the
corporation or its assets is by bargaining with X 284
To describe a traditional liability regime within Calabresi-Me-
lamed terminology, the rival uses self-help to "take" the object of de-
sire from the original owner who then sues the taker for damages.
The Calabresi and Melamed debate, however, goes further. It ana-
lyzes a liability regime as the ability of Yto force onto Xan involuntary
transfer of the object of desire by paying X society's intersubjective
valuation of the object. In the case of a corporation, however, there is
no practical way for Y to "take" Xs object through self-help. Conse-
quently, in order to impose a liability regime in this case, we must
devise a procedure whereby Ycould invoke the enforcement power of
the state.
In other words, we would have to permit Yto bring a legal action
against X seeking an injunction, which would force X to transfer title
to his equity in the corporation to Y upon Y paying X the "purchase
price." This transfer is involuntary with regard to X and thus the
purchase price would not reflect X's valuation, but would reflect soci-
ety's valuation. Consequently, the action would include some form of
282 Nevertheless, I will argue in Part IV.A.2 below that we do, in fact, protect consum-
ers' property rights by liability as well as property regimes. More specifically, in both the-
ory and practice, we cannot distinguish liability and property regimes.
283 For example, Ayres and Talley started their article with an analysis of a piece of real
estate. The real estate begins in the hands of an owner who uses it for one purpose, and it
is desired by another party who believes that he could develop the property in a more
profitable manner. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1030-31.
284 If the business is a public company, then Xwould not be an individual, but a collec-
tive of individual shareholders. Ycould "bargain" with these shareholders by negotiating a
merger or other business combination with the managers of the business who would then,
in most cases, be required to submit the proposal to the vote of the shareholders. Alter-
nately, Ycould circumvent management and make a tender offer directly to the sharehold-
ers X
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valuation proceeding. Every corporate and bankruptcy lawyer, how-
ever, knows that judicial valuation proceedings are time consuming
and that the corporate world has little confidence in their accuracy.
As Zohar Goshen suggested in a very interesting paper, society
arguably adopts a modified liability rule, requiring a valuation pro-
ceeding in the very limited area of "squeeze-out" mergers.28 5 Under
state law, disgruntled minority stockholders can bring an action in
which interested officers and directors have the burden of proof for
showing both the procedural and substantive fairness of the transac-
tion.28 6 Goshen suggested that this action is equivalent to allowing
the majority to take the minority's interest under a liability rule-the
minority receives a societally imposed price for its entitlement. 287
It is questionable, however, whether anyone in the Calabresi-Me-
lamed debating society really believes that any state legislature would,
in the foreseeable future, consider extending the liability rule of
squeeze-outs to all corporate acquisitions, thereby creating a whole
new class of complex and expensive lawsuits. I do not believe so. In-
deed, upon further reflection it is apparent that the squeeze-out rule
Goshen described is not the exception that proves the rule. It is not a
rejection of the more fundamental proposition that a property regime
generally applies to stockholding, but is an attempt to deal with the
unique problems that arise in collective ownership. The squeeze-out
rule is a relatively recent alternative to earlier corporate law, which
applied a rigid property regime to shareholders individually. Until
the early twentieth century, a merger could not occur unless approved
unanimously by all of the shareholders on the grounds that to do
otherwise would violate dissenting stockholders' property rights in
their stock.288 Even under current law, a merger can only trigger this
squeeze-out procedure if the acquirer first purchases, in voluntary
transactions with the original owners, the requisite number of shares
to force a merger, allowing the original owners to receive a subjective
valuation for their shares.2 89
285 See Zohar Goshen, Breaking the Tyranny of the Majority in Corporate Conflict of
Interests Voting: Liability Rule or Property Rule? (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
286 See id. at 4-5.
287 See id. at 19-20.
288 Obviously, this limitation gave tremendous holdout power to individual stockhold-
ers and rendered the negotiation of mergers of widely held public corporations extremely
difficult, if not impossible. Recognizing that property rights need not be absolute, we now
acknowledge that the extent of a stockholder's property rights may be limited by statute or
by the corporate charter. Consequently, reflecting the fact that corporations are a collec-
tive means of transacting business and holding property, modem corporate law now pro-
vides that many decisions are appropriately made collectively-i.e., by voting.
289 Goshen also suggested that Delaware has further modified this "liability" rule with
respect to squeeze-outs by layering on top of it a modified "property" regime in favor of the
minority as a class. Specifically, parties interested in a squeeze-out can shift the burden of
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Moreover, a valuation proceeding instituted through equitable
remedies would be necessary to implement a liability rule. This neces-
sity weakens Calabresi and Melamed's distinction between a liability
and a property regime. Calabresi and Melamed might try to defend
their distinction on the ground that the original entitlement holder
only obtains damages. Our Hohfeldian analysis, however, has already
indicated the flaw in this reasoning. We have seen that enforcing pos-
sessory rights through a liability regime is equivalent to dividing pos-
session between the two parties. Consequently, although Calabresi
and Melamed would maintain that the party who originally has cus-
tody of the object of desire has an entitlement protected by a liability
regime, which is equivalent to saying that the other party has an enti-
tlement-the right to custody conditioned on paying the purchase
price-enforceable by a property regime.
b. The Notorious Hypothetical Four and a Reconsideration of the
Spur Industries Case
Despite its obvious procedural and substantive novelty, Calabresi
and Melamed actually suggested a regime similar to my takeover hypo-
thetical in which B, the producer, has an entitlement to pollute which
is protected by a liability regime. This scenario is, of course, their
notorious hypothetical four. It is difficult to find examples of hypo-
thetical four in the private realm. A, the homeowner, cannot "take"
B's entitlement to pollute by tendering the purchase price and seek-
ing self-help because she cannot shut down widget production unless
she trespasses.2 90 A's limitation is in sharp contrast with the govern-
ment's ability to execute a taking as a practical matter under its police
power and right of eminent domain. Therefore, for this regime to
work, A would need the right to obtain an injunction to change the
property status quo; essentially, we would have to impose a "private"
takings regime. Participants in the Calabresi and Melamed debate
have assumed that they finally found an example of such a private
takings regime in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. 2 91
They base this conclusion, however, on a careless reading of this case.
fairness by obtaining the approval of a majority of the minority. See Goshen, supra note
285, at 21. Because this approval is voluntarily given by voting after full disclosure, the
price received by the minority as a class will be the class's subjective valuation. See id. Note,
however, that this regime is still arguably a liability regime for class members as individuals
because dissenting minority members will not receive their idiosyncratic valuation.
290 As in the assault case, by entering B's property A would not only be taking B's right
to possess his entitlement, she would be infringing on other rights as well.
291 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). Most commentators assume that this case is, indeed, an
example of hypothetical four. See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1040 n.46; Cole-
man & Kraus, supra note 52, at 1338; Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 444-45. Epstein is
one of the few analysts who agree with me that this case is, instead, sui generis. See supra
note 166.
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In Spur Industries, a plaintiff real estate developer brought an ac-
tion to enjoin the neighboring defendants from continuing their cat-
tle fattening business. 292 The court agreed that the defendants must
shut down their operation, but required the plaintiff to compensate
those defendants for their resulting losses.293 This situation, however,
is not the two-party conflict one imagines in Calabresi and Melamed's
hypothetical four. The Calabresians repress the fact that this was a
three-party dispute in which one bad actor had harmed two compara-
tively innocent ones. In reality, the court merely fashioned a custom-
fit remedy to ensure that the two innocent parties be made whole at
the expense of the wrongdoer.
Spur Industries involved more than just the developer and the cat-
tlemen; the unscrupulous developer built a retirement community
next to a cattle fattening operation. Needless to say, the resident-retir-
ees were horrified by the stench and vermin caused by their neigh-
bor's business and complained to the developer.294 The developer,
trying to protect his investment, sued the cattle operation.2 95 The
judge was in a difficult position because the cattle operation had done
nothing wrong.29 6 Cattle fattening is, by necessity, an insalubrious
business, which is why the cattlemen originally located their business
far from any residential communities. It was the developer who chose
to move in next to the cattlemen. He moved there because he was
able to buy cheap land precisely because it was next to a cattle fatten-
ing operation.2 97 Moreover, the retirees, although perhaps negligent,
were clearly more innocent than the developer, who had misrepre-
sented the quality of the homes.
The usual remedy in a lawsuit like the one that the developer
brought would be to preserve the status quo ante for the innocent
cattle fatteners and to permit the old folk to sue the developer for
damages equal to the difference between the value of the houses as
warranted and the value of houses next to a cattle feeding opera-
292 See Spur Industries, 494 P.2d at 705.
293 See id. at 706-07.
294 The court noted that "There is no doubt that some of the citizens of [the retire-
ment community] were unable to enjoy the outdoor living which Del Webb had adver-
tised" and that they had made "strong and consistent complaints." 494 P.2d at 705. The
odor and flies from the operation were "annoying if not unhealthy." Id. Nothing in the
reported opinion indicates whether any of the residents had attempted to bring legal ac-
tion against the developer.
295 Not only were odor and vermin from the operation causing complaints from ex-
isting residents, it was causing "sales resistance from prospective purchasers." Id.
296 See id. at 708 ("[The cattle operation] is required to move not because of any
wrongdoing on the part of Spur, but because of a proper and legitimate regard of the
courts for the rights and interests of the public.").
297 See id. at 707.
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don.298 This result seems peculiarly unsatisfactory in this case as a
human, if not legal, matter. After all, these elderly people had just
sunk their life savings into the dream of spending the lay end of their
years in quiet contemplation of the Arizona desert. Industrious work-
ers hoard their life savings precisely so that they can spend it on what
they want in retirement, such as a nice retirement home. During re-
tirement, people are more interested in consumption (enjoyment)
than in saving. The judge recognized, law and economics to the con-
trary, that giving these retirees smelly, disgusting homes plus money
damages would not make them whole, although it might ultimately
please their laughing heirs. The court noted that if the residents had
been parties to the action, they would have been entitled to an injunc-
tion against the cattle operation as a public nuisance.299
On the other hand, the cattle feeders interest was primarily com-
mercial in nature. Economic theory more nearly fits their situation.
They should be indifferent between continuing their operations at the
same location, on the one hand, and receiving damages equal to lost
profits and expenses incurred in relocating, on the other.300 Revers-
ing the usual remedy, therefore, seems to make sense in this case.
The question was how to reach this result. The court solved this prob-
lem not by inventing new substantive rights (a la hypothetical four),
but by implicitly creating a new procedure.30'
The express language of the opinion indicates that the court did
not allocate a single entitlement between the developer and the cattle
operation. In addition, this case is not an example of a liability re-
gime as described by hypothetical four. The court stated that if this
were a classic, two-party case between the developer and the cattle op-
eration, it would not have granted an injunction because the situation
was a classic "'coming to the nuisance case.'"302 In Calabresi and Me-
lamed's terminology, between the cattle operation and the developer,
the former had the entitlement, protected by a property rule, to raise
cattle on its property. The court suggested, however, that if this were
a classic, two-party case between the residents and the cattle opera-
don, it would have granted an injunction in favor of the residents and
against the cattle operation-but would not have also granted dam-
ages payable by the residents to the cattle operation-because, vis-d-
vis the residents, the cattle operation was a classic "public nui-
sance."30 3 In Calabresi and Melamed's terminology, between the cat-
298 See id at 706 ("[T]he citizens of Sun City... could have successfully maintained an
action to abate the nuisance.").
299 See id,.
300 See CoASE, supra note 105, at 158; Coase, supra note 63, at 15, 34.
301 See Spur Industries, 494 P.2d at 706-07.
302 Id,
303 I& at 706.
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tie operation and the residents, the latter had a right to clean air
enforced by a property regime. The court, however, recognized that,
although there were only two named parties to the litigation, the dis-
pute, in fact, involved three parties. 30 4
Under conventional procedure, the court should have dismissed
the developer's suit against the cattle operation because it found that
the cattle operation did not violate any rights of the developer. The
residents would then have had the option of bringing a suit for viola-
tion of their rights either against the developer for damages or against
the cattle operation for an injunction. If the residents chose the latter
route and obtained an injunction, the cattle operation could have
brought an action against the developer for damages.30 5 The court,
instead, invented a novel short-cut procedure to, in effect, consolidate
these three potential actions. The court implicitly allowed the devel-
oper to act as a proxy for the residents in order to enforce the residents'
property rights against the cattle operation. The cattle operation
then, in effect, sued the developer in its individual capacity as a third-
party defendant. The court concluded that:
[The developer] is entitled to the relief prayed for (a perma-
nent injunction), not because [he] is blameless, but because of the
damage to the people who have been encouraged to purchase
homes in [the retirement community]. It does not equitably or le-
gally follow, however, that [the developer], being entitled to the in-
junction, is then free of any liability to [the cattle operation] if [the
developer] has in fact been the cause of the damage [the cattle op-
eration] has sustained.30 6
When described as a three-party case, we can see that the case is a
procedural anomaly. It is not, however, either a substantive novelty or
an illustration of a Calabresi-Melamed two-party liability regime. Spur
Industries represents a rare case in which a court could craft an equita-
ble resolution of a competing, inconsistent enjoyment dispute by im-
plicitly applying familiar three-party possessory dispute principles.
That is, Spur Industries is the (perhaps sui generis) case in which one
304 See id.
305 See id. at 708 ("Having brought people to the nuisance to the foreseeable detriment
of [the cattle operation], [the developer] must indemnify [the cattle operation] for a rea-
sonable amount of the cost of moving or shutting down."). The court was insistent that it
was not recognizing any entitlement with respect to the developer itself, but was merely
using the developer as a proxy to assert the rights of the residents.
It should be noted that this relief to [the cattle operation] is limited to a
case wherein a developer has, with foreseeability, brought into a previously
agricultural or industrial area the population which makes necessary the
granting of the injunction against a lawful business and for which the busi-
ness has no adequate relief.
Id.
306 M4
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can analogize nuisances (interferences with enjoyment) to the, argua-
bly, most empirically common type of possessory conflict: the three-
party conflict known as a priority dispute. As I show in Part III.C
above, the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy, which they designed to ex-
plain possessory conflicts, utterly fails in three-party disputes.
In the classic priority hypothetical, we start with an object first in
the possession of an innocent rightful owner, Y A bad person, X
wrongfully obtains the object from Y, perhaps by fraud. X then pur-
ports to convey the object to another innocent party, Z The de-
frauded Yfinds the object and brings an action in replevin against Z.
In this case, we agree that the law should make Yand Zwhole, and X
should bear the loss. Yand Zboth claim property rights to the object.
Our society rarely makes rival property claimants share the object.
Rather, courts generally apply a priority rule and award to one claim-
ant the object, and order the wrongdoer to pay property damages to
the other. If, and this is a big if, X the wrongful party, is solvent, the
two remedies should be economically equivalent. It is not true, as Gala-
bresi and Melamed asserted, that in a property regime the property
claimant receives her original entitlement back. Even though we rec-
ognize that a claimant may be theoretically entitled to the original
entitlement, frequently that entitlement is no longer available. Ac-
cordingly, a property right gives the claimant the right to acquire
damages calculated according to the property damages formula, as
opposed to acquiring either contract or tort damages.
To analyze the Spur Industries case within the framework of tradi-
tional three-party conveyance law, the evil developer bilked two inno-
cent classes out of their property rights. Because there is only one
property right to go around, the judge must give it to one of the two
innocent parties and make the developer pay property damages to the
other. Under the usual priority regime, the cattle feeders would likely
get the entitlement, and the retirees would likely get contract dam-
ages for breach of warranty.30 7 However, the judge in Spur Industries
decided that equity would be served better if the remedies were
reversed.308
307 See id. at 706.
308 Two colleagues at Washington and Lee Law School suggested two unique cases that
might be closer to hypothetical four than Spur Industries.
Professor Gwen Handelman identified the notorious takings case, Poletown Neighbor-
hood Council v. City of Detroi 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). In this case, a citizen's group sought
to enjoin the City of Detroit from condemning a residential neighborhood and conveying
the property to General Motors. See id. at 457. The citizen's group argued that the pur-
pose of the taking was to further the private financial purposes of General Motors, in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment requirement that the City exercise eminent domain only for
proper public purposes. See id. at 458. The Michigan Supreme Court accepted the City's
argument that the condemnation served the public purposes of alleviating unemployment
and revitalizing the economic base of the community, and that the private benefits to Gen-
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2. The Ayres and Talley Critique
Ayres and Talley have made a different critique of Calabresi and
Melamed's concept of a liability regime. They argued that although
many, if not most, analysts accept Calabresi and Melamed's assump-
tion that property regimes are more likely to encourage efficient con-
tracting than liability regimes, they can invent a game in which the
opposite is true. Ayres and Talley argued first that, despite what Cala-
bresi and Melamed suggested, one cannot conceptualize liability re-
gimes as the allocation of an entitlement to a single party.3 09 Rather,
one can better analyze a liability regime as a division of the entitle-
ment between two claimants.3 10 They argued that it is precisely this
division-so that neither party is assured of her rights or knows
whether she will be the buyer or the seller in any resulting contract-
that can lead to successful negotiations.31l They suggested not only
that it would be efficient to adopt liability regimes, but also that a wide
variety of other divisions of property interests, such as joint tenancies
or temporal divisions, might be efficient in a number of cases.312
Ayres and Talley called their proposal "Solomonic bargaining"-
an homage to the famous Biblical account of baby splitting313 and,
eral Motors were incidental. See id. at 459. The case is controversial because the argument
proves too much. One can couch virtually any benefit given to a local business (and per-
haps even to a local consumer) in terms of furthering the local economy. A similar exam-
ple is the right of private condemnation that Congress gave to certain railroads in the
nineteenth century as part of federal policy for settling the West. At least anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the government's use of its power of eminent domain to further pri-
vate interests is becoming relatively more common. See, e.g., Dean Starkman, Condemnation
Is Used to Hand One Business Prperty of Another, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
Professor David Caudill has litigated another proto-hypothetical four-case. The city
council of the City of Austin decided not to enact environmental legislation itself, but to
submit an environmental quality referendum directly to the voters. See David S. Caudill et
al., The Politics of Legal Doctrine: A Case Study of Texas Land-Use Planning Under the Shadow of
Lucas, 5 HorsTRA PROP. LJ. 11, 16 (1992). After the referendum passed, certain produ-
cers, whose production the referendum would limit, sued the City on the grounds that the
referendum was a regulatory taking for which they were entitled to "just compensation."
This case is not a precise hypothetical four because the consumers did not "take" the pro-
ducer's entitlement directly in their capacity as consumers; rather, they took the entitle-
ment indirectly in their capacity as voters. Similarly, a court would not require the
consumers to pay damages to the producers directly; rather, they only would have to pay
indirectly through the City. In Calabresi-Melamed terminology, because the City would,
presumably, pay any condemnation awards out of general tax remedies, nothing guaran-
tees that the liability would fall on the consumer-voters who benefitted from the involun-
tary transfer of the producer's entitlement. Indeed, at least some of the tax burden
probably fell on the very producers harmed by the legislation.
309 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1031-32.
310 See id.
311 See id. at 1030. They suggested that because splitting of property rights through
liability rules may "induce both more contracting and more efficient contracting than property
rules," the liability rules may serve as "market catalysts." Id. at 1033.
312 See id. at 1034.
313 See id. at 1029 n.6.
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implicitly, to their own wisdom. Unfortunately, this story does not
support their thesis that a Solomonic division of title will result in the
two parties bargaining to transfer the entitlement to the highest-valu-
ing user. In the Biblical story, when two women claimed to be the
mother of a single baby, King Solomon ruled that the child be split in
half and divided among the claimants. Immediately upon hearing
this order of infant bifurcation, however, the higher valuing user (the
"true" mother) transferred her interest in the entitlement (her half of
the baby) to the lower valuing user (the "false" mother). It was only
Solomon's wise rescission of this "liability" regime and his institution
of an undivided "property" regime, which gave the exclusive and spe-
cifically enforceable entitlement to the true mother, that achieved a
resolution, which was not merely efficient or just, but
compassionate. 314
More significant than their use of an inappropriate Biblical allu-
sion, however, is the fact that the Ayres-Talley approach breaks down
when one considers third-party claimants.315 Their analysis represses
third-party consideration because they insisted on resorting to game
theory. As I have already mentioned, a fundamental problem of game
theory, as developed to date, is that it is extremely difficult to structure
a three-party game that leads to definitive results.3 16 Consequently, in
the Ayres-Talley games only two parties play at any one time. All exter-
nal (objective, in my terminology) conditions are temporarily frozen
and called "nature." In Lacanian terms, the games treat the world
outside of them, the symbolic, as the real, an unknowable event be-
314 Ayres and Talley argued that the Biblical story is "suggestive" of their game analysis
in that the division of the entitlement caused the disputants to reveal private information.
Id. The problem is that this revealed information did not encourage bargaining, as Ayres
and Talley suggested.
315 Rose also recognized this problem. See Rose, supra note 34, at 2183. A full account
of my objections to the Ayres and Talley analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. For an
interesting critique of their game theory analysis, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do
Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YAJ. LJ. 221 (1995). I
only note at this point that Ayres and Talley seem to conflate the principle of Pareto op-
timality-when an "entitlement" is owned by someone other than the higher valuing user,
it would be more efficient if the parties contracted to transfer the entitlement from the
lower to the higher valuing user-with the conclusion that contracts to transfer entitle-
ments are a good thing per se. They sought to show that dividing entitlements leads to
more contracts to transfer entitlements. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1029 & n.6.
This analysis devolves into the banal truism that if one were to increase the amount of
conflicts in the legal universe, thereby presumably decreasing utilities, one would necessar-
ily increase the number of opportunities for conflict resolution, even if the percentage of
successful resolutions compared to conflicts went down. One way of resolving conflicts is
through contractual transfers. Consequently, depending on one's empirical assumptions,
one could speculate that increasing conflicts might result in an increase in the number of
contractual transfers. It does not follow from this increase, however, that a world that starts
with more conflicts (more divisions of entitlements) will end up with a higher aggregate
utility than a world that starts with fewer conflicts (fewer divisions of entitlements).
316 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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yond time and space. The best that game theory can do to try to ac-
count for three parties is to posit a series of separate two-party games
(for example, first A competes with B; then A competes with C; but A,
B, and C never compete against each other at the same time). Tri-
partite relations are, therefore, thoroughly dualized-recognition of
the third is always postponed to the future. To say the same thing in
Lacanian terms, the feminine is always repressed. Unfortunately,
property and society-third parties-are not real, but symbolic. They
cannot be frozen during any game, as nature can be, because they are
constantly interacting with the game players-they are part of the
three-party game of life and law. No determinate optimal solution
emerges where there are three or more players.
The Ayres-Talley model presupposes that actors in their legal uni-
verse do not have exclusive possession of their entitlements. Neither
party can be sure of her entitlement, therefore, unless she buys out
the other.317 Ayres and Talley ignored the fact that no party will pay
her full subjective valuation for an entitlement, unless she can assure
"security of title."318s That is, a sale presupposes that the transferor has
something to sell-the title in the thing to be sold (a right to exclude
others including the transferee). Consequently, all liability regimes
presuppose some form of property regime. This blindness is particu-
larly glaring because Ayres and Talley raised this problem in passing
in the case of the two-party scenario. They expressed concern that if
the property regime divides an entitlement between two parties, then
both parties may underinvest in the entitlement.31 9 We cannot solve
this underinvestment, however, by having the first party transfer her
interest to the second party unless the second party also receives the
right to exclude other potential rival claimants.
For example, under applicable law, absent an effective disclaimer,
a seller gives an implied warranty of good title to any buyer of a
good.320 Similar rules apply with respect to other forms of property.
When the seller is unsure of the state of the title, she will disclaim this
317 The game that forms the heart of their Article, involves a generic "entitlement." See
Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1048-50. Elsewhere in the Article, they apply their analysis
to a variety of possible fact situations including environmental nuisances. See id. at 1078-80.
318 Others have made similar points. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 722.
See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 52, at 1351, for a similar point that liability and property
regimes complement each other.
In another article, Ayres and his co-author Balkin assumed that because no clear line
divides property and liability regimes, the former is merely a subset of the latter. See Ayres
& Balkin, supra note 73, at 705. This conflation may very well be true of Calabresi and
Melamed's conception of property and liability. As I argue in the immediately following
text, however, a more sophisticated analysis indicates that the concepts of property and
lability presuppose each other, and they are nevertheless qualitatively distinct.
319 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1084-86.
320 See U.G.C. § 2-312 (1995).
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warranty, as when real estate is conveyed under a "quit claim" deed.
Every "deal lawyer" recognizes that a buyer will not pay as much for an
unclear title as she would for a clear one. In New York, no one com-
summates a substantial real estate purchase without first obtaining a
title search from a responsible insurance company.32' In corporate
acquisitions, it is common for buyers to "hold back" or escrow part of
the purchase price for a negotiated period to allow rival claimants to
step forward. In finance, negotiable instruments trade at higher
prices than nonnegotiable ones precisely because holders of negotia-
ble instruments in due course cut off any "adverse claims" of rival par-
ties. Finally, in securities trading, the drafters of the 1995
Amendments to Article 8 of the UCC gave unprecedented protections
to buyers of investment securities against claims of any and all third
parties because the drafters believed that such security of title was es-
sential for continued confidence in the stock exchanges.3 22
Property regimes are essential to contract because obtaining se-
curity of tite is the raison d'tre of sales. In order for a conveyance
contract to occur, the seller must have some enforceable right to the
thing to be conveyed, otherwise the buyer will just take the thing. The
buyer will not offer to pay the purchase price unless he obtains a right
to the thing, enforceable against other persons, including the
seller.3 23 Because Ayres and Talley did not recognize that their model
necessarily reflects this truism, their argument devolves into an infi-
nite regress.
For example, they described as Solomonic the familiar fact pat-
tern in which one party has a conditional estate or an estate for a term
of years in a particular parcel of real estate and another has the rever-
sion.324 If it is necessary to hold a fee estate in order to develop the
property economically, it would probably be efficient for one party to
buy out the other's estate. Note, however, that in order for such a
contract to occur, each party must have an enforceable right of posses-
sion in her own estate that she could convey. This analytical flaw
exists no matter how finely one divides up the estates. Assume, for
example, that the reversionary interest is owned by two parties as ten-
ants in common. At first blush, this scenario seems like a Solomonic
321 It is my understanding that other practices are followed in other states. For exam-
ple, I have been told by friends in practice that in some states, attorneys, rather than insur-
ers, do the title searches.
322 In the words of James Steven Rogers, the Reporter for the 1995 Amendments to
Articles 8 and 9, "The basic policy of present law and Revised Article 8 is that the commer-
cial law rules should be designed to ensure finality. They should protect the security of
title of those who acquire securities." Rogers, supra note 186, at 1539.
323 1 discuss the necessity for title at greater length in Schroeder, supra note 204, at
1292-94.
324 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1080-82.
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division. Closer examination, however, reveals that each cotenant has
an undivided claim in his own cotenancy.
This example is another implicit reliance on the phallic meta-
phor. Ayres and Talley conflated the symbolic concept of property with
the real object of the property interests (the land). Consequently, they
thought that these parties each would have a divided property interest
because the object itself is divided. The tripartite relationship of
property is then analyzed as a division of a single binary relation. In
fact, each party has an undivided property interest in her own estate.
The parties' entitlement is not the land, but their respective legal
rights to possess, to enjoy, and to alienate the land. Once again, we
have an example of trying to turn the tripartite relation of property
(legal rights between two or more subjects with respect to an object)
into a binary relationship (in this case, recognizing the relation of
each subject to the object and forgetting about the legal interrelation-
ship between subjects).
This description should illustrate how Ayres and Talley's analysis
of liability regimes fundamentally diverges from mine despite some
surface similarities. As I discussed above,325 I, like Ayres and Talley,
chide Calabresi and Melamed for assuming that in a liability regime
there is a single entitlement that is allocated to one of two parties.
But, Ayres and Talley could not get beyond the phallic metaphor that
conceptualizes property disputes in terms of the possession of a single,
pre-existing, "real" thing. Consequently, they still believed that there
is a single entitlement that is temporarily divided up between the two
parties.326 They can only conceptualize changes in legal relations in
terms of the conveyance of this single thing.
In contradistinction, I argue that although property necessarily
concerns an object, one cannot analyze property in terms of the ob-
ject alone. Property, like all legal rights, is a relation between and
among subjects. There is no single "thing" called an entitlement that
can be divided between claimants. Rather, each claimant has her own
entitlement in the sense of a set of legal rights and liabilities relating
to either the same or two separate objects. Changes in legal relation-
ships can involve conveyances of the right to possess the object of the
property rights, but other changes in legal relations are possible as
well. For example, the readjustment of the parties' respective rights
to enjoy different objects in the environmental nuisance context con-
stitutes a change in legal relations with regard to an object or objects.
Moreover, a liability regime is not an alternative to a property
regime. Rather, for a liability regime to function, it requires a prop-
325 See supra Part I.A-2.
326 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1030-31 (discussing entitlements as things).
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erty regime to be in place simultaneously.3 27 To determine that one
party has "taken" something from another and must, therefore, pay
damages, one must first determine that prior to the alleged taking,
the second party was the owner of the thing in the sense of some right
to exclude others, including the taker, unless the taker pays the
"purchase price."
Even if one agrees with Ayres and Talley's assertion that entitle-
ments can be shared between two claimants, there is a fatal flaw in
their analysis which results from the repression of the feminine third.
If we had a world in which entitlements were shared, as Ayres and Talley
proposed, then buying out one rival to the buyer's title will not neces-
sarily buy out all rivals. As a consequence, it would be highly unlikely
that two party bargaining could come to a successful conclusion.
The problem is that Ayres and Talley thought of entitlements in
terms of possession. There are, however, an unlimited number of po-
tential rivals for possession of an object. Even if B successfully bar-
gains with A, C, and D for title, so long as title is divided, as Ayres and
Talley hypothesized, E can come along the next day to claim title and
extort title from B. Obviously, Ayres and Talley's model cannot antici-
pate an unlimited number of parties sharing title. Unfortunately, they
did not offer any theory or explanation of how this class of claimants
could be limited. Alternately, if the class is limited and if bargaining
occurs, one expects that the highest valuing party eventually will buy
out the entitlements of all other claimants. As a result, the system
quickly will return to the starting point they are challenging-alloca-
tion of the entitlement to one party. The Ayres and Talley system is
ultimately a one-shot game between two people.
If, alternatively, we analyze environmental nuisances in terms of
inconsistent enjoyments of separate objects, we more successfully cre-
ate the system that Ayres and Talley sought. The enjoyment analysis
reflects the fact that we can expect there to be empirical, if not theo-
retical, limitations on the class of subjects with conflicting enjoyments.
That is, B's pollution of the water supply can be expected to affect
only those who occupy land within some geographic limit. Conse-
quently, if B is the highest valuing enjoyer, it may be practical for him
to bribe all persons who claim inconsistent enjoyment to forego their
enjoyment, thereby creating the security of title B requires for invest-
ment. An analysis of environmental nuisance as inconsistent enjoy-
ment both presupposes an initial dispersal of rights among different
claimants that might promote efficient bargaining and ensures that
327 As I argue elsewhere, rights of possession are a prerequisite to any contractual ex-
change. See Schroeder, supra note 204, at 1293; see also Coleman & Kraus, supra note 52, at
1351 (indicating "how liability rules might strengthen the integrity of the property rule").
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the highest valuing user can buy out all inconsistent users, thereby
assuring for herself the benefit of her bargain.
B. The Theoretical and Empirical Impossibility of Calabresi and
Melamed's Distinction Between Property and Liability
The analytical utility of the liability-property dichotomy (let us
temporarily put aside the pesky inalienability embarrassment), is that
the parties must know which regime applies to any specific entitle-
ment. The Calabresi and Melamed analysis assumes that the parties
always bargain within the shadow of a known remedy regime. They
must, therefore, be reasonably sure which regime is likely to apply in
any given case. The problem, however, is that regardless of the prop-
erty regime, the parties can never have this assurance in a world in
which either (1) the property can be destroyed by the "taker" or (2)
third party claimants are possible. Because this scenario describes our
world, injunctive and monetary remedies are both necessary and com-
plementary remedies of a single property regime.3 28
This conclusion is a variation on the familiar proposition that we
only really care about the difference between property and contract
when a scarcity exists. If multiple substitutes for the object of desire
are available on the market, and if the defendant is rich enough to
pay damages, then the plaintiff should be indifferent between getting
the original object back and receiving damages sufficient for her to go
to the market and buy a substitute object.329 Unfortunately, when
there is scarcity, there often is an inadequate number of objects to
satisfy all property claimants-as is often the case with destruction or
with third-party claimants. In this section, I show that property is
often unavailable or inadequate precisely when it is needed.
328 Polinsky correctly argued that although there is a distinction between injunctive
and monetary relief, this distinction breaks down because entitlements are rarely, if ever,
absolute. See Polinsky, supra note 32, at 1086-87. I am making a slightly different point.
329 As I discuss above, this indifference does not mean that she would be indifferent
between never having had the original object taken from her and receiving these remedies
after the object was taken. To make her truly whole, we probably would have to give her an
additional remedy to compensate for the outrage to her autonomy caused by the taking.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Consequently, one should not analogize a rem-
edy for a wrongful taking to an involuntary sale.
From a purely economic point of view, this requirement of an additional remedy
would be the case even if the object of desire were what Margaret Radin would call "per-
sonal property"--that is, objects to which the owner has a sentimental attachment or for
which the owner otherwise has a idiosyncratic subjective valuation. See Radin, Property and
Personhood, supra note 31, at 959-61. For that plaintiff, the object is scarce in that no, or few,
adequate substitutes exist in the marketplace. To Radin, not just any gold ring could re-
place a lost or stolen wedding ring. See RADIN, supra note 245, at 36-37. In my Pulp Fiction
hypothetical, infra text accompanying note 355, as far as Bruce Willis is concerned, no
market substitute can replace his father's watch.
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1. Dynamite
The law and economics theorist might argue that although a
party to a property dispute might destroy the coveted object of desire
in the messy empirical world, destruction cannot occur in their hypo-
thetically perfect market in which all actors are economically rational.
The parties fight over possession of a valuable entitlement. It would
be irrational for either party to destroy the entitlement they both de-
sire. To do so would be the irrational act of the jealous lover who
murders his beloved shouting, "If I can't have you, then nobody will!"
My use of this misogynistic analogy is intentional. These analysts
repress the feminine. They want to see property as possession of the
phallic object of desire (analogous to the male organ and the female
body). Perhaps the rational lover will not destroy what he desires-
but since when is desire rational? As the song suggests, if not always,
then you all too frequently hurt the one you love.3 30 Calabresi and
Melamed's analysis represses the fact that the classic environmental
nuisance does not involve the masculine rights to possess and alienate
the (feminine) object of desire. Rather, it involves the feminine rights
to identify with and enjoy the object.
Enjoyment often destroys the object of desire. The ultimate form
of enjoyment is consumption. 331 If the object of desire is a limited
resource-the old growth forests of the Pacific Northwest, for exam-
ple-enjoyment in the sense of commercial exploitation eventually
will destroy the resource. 332
Probably more importantly, in the case of the classic environmen-
tal nuisance, enjoyment by one party of his object of desire may per-
manently and irreparably destroy the other party's ability to enjoy her
quite separate object of desire. Indeed, the enjoyment of the first may
destroy the second object altogether. If environmentalists are cor-
rect,333 then the lumber company's commercial enjoyment of the old
330 CLARENCE FROGMAN HENRY, You Always Hurt the One You Love on AIN'T GOT No
HOME: THE BEsr OF CLARENCE FROGMAN HENRY (Uni/Chess Records 1994).
331 From a Lacanian viewpoint, this consumption goes both ways. Not only does the
owner seek to consume the object of desire, but there is also the danger that the object of
desire will consume the owner.
332 Of course, modem logging practices in this country frequently include reforesta-
tion. If one thinks of the forest purely as an economic resource, logging, therefore, no
more destroys the "forest" than harvesting this season's wheat crop destroys the farm. If,
however, one views a forest as an ecosystem, then an old growth forest may be very differ-
ent from a reforested one, meaning that logging destroys the desired resource. Much of
the irreconcilable conflict in this area springs precisely from the fact that loggers and envi-
ronmentalists do not value the forest in the same way.
333 I, regrettably, know too little about this issue to take sides. Purely for the sake of
illustrating a point, I am presenting a simplistic version of the environmentalist position.
1999)
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
growth forests through logging will destroy not only the forest as ob-
ject of desire, but also the spotted owl. 33 4
For example, in our hypothetical, let us assume that the water our
hapless consumer drinks comes from an underground river that
passes under the neighboring widget factory. Assume that the word
"widget" refers to plutonium batteries that power space vehicles.
Their production irradiates the aquifers under the factory. This radia-
tion lasts longer than the expected life of the consumer and of her
children, and it is so difficult to clean out of the aquifers, that it lasts
for the economic equivalent of "forever."
Therefore, once B violates A's rights, it becomes impossible to put
A back in the same empirical position she was in before the violation.
The only remedy that a court can give A is damages. Consequently, as
in a liability regime, we have (in Calabresi-Melamed terminology) a
"forced sale." One can give the consumer the right to get an injunc-
tion to prevent B from opening his plant, but defendants can, and
often do, ignore injunctions. When they do, the plaintiffs must go
back to court and get some other form of relief.
Consequently, the only way to make a property regime truly dis-
tinguishable from a liability regime in many environmental nuisance
situations is not to impose equitable remedies. Rather, courts must
impose sanctions for violation of the property right, which are so dra-
conian that no rational actor would ever risk them.3 3 5 Consequently,
Ayres and Talley were correct in assuming that a true property remedy
(in the Calabresi-Melamed sense of the term) must be either exorbi-
tant damages or significant criminal sanctions. 336 The government
can impose damages or penalties large enough to prevent, rather than
remedy, environmental harms. Environmental harms and theft of
property rights are often crimes. We also permit punitive damages in
some cases in which we believe the defendant acted egregiously. The
economist would argue that theoretically, it is possible to impose a
334 Ayres and Talley noted that the competing rights with respect to the spotted owl
and old growth forests are "qualitatively incompatible." Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at
1091. Their discussion, however, reveals that they do not fully realize that this problem of
qualitatively incompatible uses and that the possibility of destruction of the object of desire
are general to environmental nuisances. Nor do they understand the implications of this
problem for the validity and utility of the Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy.
335 For example, although Kaplow and Shavell seem to assume that a property regime
consists primarily of equitable remedies and criminal sanctions, their description is broad
enough to cover draconian damages as well. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 723
("We might imagine, for instance, that an injurer would suffer such a stringent sanction if
he caused harm that he would not dare to cause it .... ").
336 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1036 & n.35. These, of course, are the options
available in our legal system. In other systems-such as those established by organized
crime-other options are not only available but used, such as threatening to kidnap the
taker's kids or to send the taker to "sleep[ ] with the fishes." THE GODFATHER (Paramount
Pictures 1972).
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Calabresi-Melamed property regime by criminalizing or by imposing
punitive damages for all property violations, although the lawyer
would question whether we could, and the jurisprude whether we
should. This regime may be a good idea, but it certainly would be a
radical proposal. For example, to impose punitive damages on a se-
cured party who loses a priority dispute, let alone to throw her in jail,
would be a radical departure from current practice.
2. True Takings and Third-Party Claims
Even if the property-liability dichotomy is unworkable for analyz-
ing environmental nuisances when a risk of irrevocable destruction of
the innocent party's object of desire (or, at least, of her ability to enjoy
it) exists, one might be tempted to argue that it remains workable in
other property disputes that truly are possessory in nature. No ra-
tional claimant would destroy the single object of desire being fought
over. Although this lack of action may be theoretically true in a uni-
verse of two economically rational parties, in the real world of more
than two potential claimants, the dichotomy breaks down for another
reason-the impossibility of giving Calabresi-Melamedian property
remedies to more than one person. The existence of a third party in a
possessory dispute is equivalent to dynamite in the enjoyment dispute.
From a Hegelian-Lacanian perspective, property is a hysterically erotic
relation. In property, as in love, three is a crowd.
I wish to go back to the basic priority dispute I already have intro-
duced because it is so basic that it forms the first lesson in the typical,
introductory commercial-law class.33 7 On day one, the object of desire
is assigned to A-A has the exclusive right of possession. On day two,
B somehow obtains power over the object under such circumstances
that A does not consent to B becoming the permanent possessor of
the object. This transfer of possession could happen in a number of
ways. Because of the absolutist rules American law applies to theft, for
simplicity we will posit that B did not "steal" the object,338 but ob-
tained the power3 39 in some other way. For example, B may have
purchased the object from A on credit extended against fraudulent
misrepresentations to A as to his ability or intent to pay for the object.
337 For example, the first chapter of the Farnsworth, Honnold, Harris and Mooney
commercial law casebook, which I use, is devoted to variations on this problem under
Articles 2, 3 and 7 of the UCC. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL, COMMERCIAL LAW: GASES
AND MATEmALS (5th ed. 1993).
338 In other words, he did not sneak into A's house in the middle of the night and
carry off the television.
339 I will punt at this juncture as to what "power" over the object means. In the classic
priority dispute involving goods (tangible things)-the unspoken archetypical object
under the masculine phallic metaphor-however, power usually is also assumed to be phys-
ical custody. Possession is confused with sensuous grasp.
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Another classic example of B obtaining power over an object is when
A entrusts a good to B as a bailee.
In any event, when B fails to live up to his contractual obligations
with respect to the object (B fails either to pay the purchase price for
the object, in my first example, or to return the entrusted goods, in
my second), he violates A's property right. One of the classic rights
available to A is replevin-the court will order B to return the good to
A, restoring the status quo. This scenario seems to be a classic Cala-
bresi-Melamed property regime.
But even in this simple two-party regime, things are not so simple.
Another classic remedy for violation of property rights is available-
trover. That is, the court will treat B's interference with A's property
right as a sale and will order B to pay a determined purchase price-
the valuable object is "put" to B. Calabresi and Melamed would argue,
persuasively at this juncture, that so long as the election of remedies
belongs to the original owner, this result is totally consistent with their
definition of a property regime. As the reader will remember, a prop-
erty regime is one in which society neverforces its intersubjective valua-
tion down A's throat. Although the conversion remedy is an
intersubjective valuation, A will never elect conversion over replevin
unless she expects that the intersubjective valuation of the object will
be greater or equal to her subjective valuation.
But, the universe of property is never two party in nature. There
always will be other potential claimants for possession of the object. All
but the totally self-sufficient hermit has creditors who have inchoate
claims to one's assets in the event that one does not pay one's debts.
A defender of Calabresi and Melamed might argue that the mere the-
oretical existence of these potential claimants with their inchoate
claims does not necessarily impinge on their system. If A has taken
whatever steps necessary to protect her property rights in the valuable
thing, then A should retain her alternate claims of replevin and trover
and prevail over the creditors. But, the fact that certain creditors will
prevail over certain "owners" does not change this analysis so long as
the valuable thing is still in B's hands when the dispute arises. The problem
with this is contingency. The validity of the dichotomy requires that
the parties know what remedy would apply before bargaining begins.
This validity is lost if the remedy depends on the later facts.
Let us now be more realistic. People who cheat other people fre-
quently, if not usually, do so for financial gain. Consequently, if B
takes A's object without paying for it, more likely than not, he will try
to monetize his gain by "selling" the object to a third party. Moreover,
one bad act may be evidence of a bad heart. A is aware that B's viola-
tion of her property rights makes it likely that B has cheated other
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people as well. If B has not paid his debt to A, chances are he will not
or cannot afford to pay his debts to others.
In the classic priority hypothetical, therefore, B purports to trans-
fer A's object of desire to C,340 who may be a very sympathetic charac-
ter. He may be not merely unaware of B's wrongdoing, and his
actions even may have been "as pure as grace,/As infinite as man may
undergo."341 He may have paid cash for the object. He may be a tort
victim who seeks to attach the good in order to pay a judgment ob-
tained against B. Either way, the problem is the same: we now have
three claimants for the same object.
It is easy to dispose of B, the crook. But, we must decide which of
A's and C's innocent but mutually inconsistent claims of possession
should prevail. We have fairly well worked out rules for deciding
these cases. For most categories of property, the original "owner"
prevails unless the second-in-time claimant can sustain the burden of
proving that she qualifies as a preferred transferee such as a buyer in
the ordinary course of business or a holder in due course.342 The
specific rule does not concern us for the purposes of this Article.
The point is that only one of the two parties can get the object
back and exclude the other rival-Calabresi and Melamed's defini-
tion of property. Calabresi and Melamed might counter that their de-
scription of property is accurate in the sense that, in a dispute
between A and C, the court will decide that only one of the parties has
a property right and will cut off the property claims of the other. Con-
sequently, property and specific performance seem to go together.
The problem is that this analysis considers only one leg of the
triangle at any given time and represses the feminine third. The dis-
pute that Calabresi and Melamed examined is not that between A and
340 I say "purports" because a sale is the conveyance for value of title from one party to
another. The dishonest B often does not have title. He may only have the fact of actual
custody and voidable title-as in the fraudulent misrepresentation case-or no title, but a
limited conditional right of possession in the form of custody-as in the entrustment case.
In most, but not all, areas of American property law, the background or default rule is
"derivation"-a conveyancee's rights derive from the conveyancer so that the former only
gets what the latter had. Most areas of property law also have a "negotiation" rule, which is
procedurally and substantively an exception to derivation pursuant to which the con-
veyancee gets more than the conveyancer has. In our case, if a derivation rule applied, B's
attempted conveyance would not be a sale; if a negotiation rule applied, it would. Conse-
quently, in this context, a priority dispute is precisely the determination of whether some-
thing that the conveyancer purported to be a sale, was a sale.
341 WILLIAM S-AxsP ARE, HAMLEr act 1, sc. 4.
342 It is incorrect to deduce from the fact that as a legal matter this "derivation" rule
(first in time, first in right) is the default rule, and the "negotiation" rule (favored buyers
prevail over first-in-time claimants) is an exception, that it is the norm for owners to pre-
vail. Who prevails in the "normal" situation is an empirical question. In the case of inven-
tory financing and check clearing, the negotiation rule (subsequent purchaser prevails) is
by far the more common.
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C, a third-party claimant. It is the original two-party dispute between
A and B. There is no question that A has a property claim enforceable
against B, even if a court finds that A's claim against C is cut off. In-
deed, A's loss of her claim against C confirms B's act as wrongful, yet
there is no way for A to regain the object. A cannot go against C
under the relevant priority rules; B no longer has the object and, as
the wrongdoer, cannot replevy the good from C.
A's enforceable property claim against B can only take the form
of money damages.3 43 Although a court will calculate these money
damages according to property law principles, they will result in the
imposition of society's intersubjective valuation upon the unfortunate
A. A will retain her option of remedies: replevin and trover. Conver-
sion, as we have seen, is precisely the type of forced sale that Calabresi
and Melamed called a liability regime. A will be able to deem the
taking a sale of the object to B as of the date of the taking and will be
entitled to the market price on that date.
It is the replevin remedy that necessarily changes in the "lost ob-
ject" scenario. A has the right to have the object back-the meaning
of possession. But, there is no object in B's hands to return. Conse-
quently, the most that she can get is restitution damages. The goal of
restitution is to place the plaintiff in the identical economic position
she would have been in if the taking had never taken place. She is
entitled to the value of the lost object as of the date of the judgment.
In other words, if the lost object goes down in value between the
date of the taking and the date of the judgment, then the plaintiff
should prefer the conversion action and its turnover remedy-sale as
of the date of the taking. If, on the other hand, it goes up in value,
she should prefer the remedy of restitution damages-sale as of the
date of judgment. In either case, society imposes its intersubjective
valuation on the plaintiff-the plaintiff only gets to choose the date of
valuation.
It is impossible in a society with more than one potential claimant
to impose the liability/property dichotomy, which Calabresi and Me-
lamed proposed. Because we can never assure a property owner
ahead of time that she will be able to recover an object taken from
her, claimants must consider the remedy for a taking to be money
343 As I discussed in Part IV.A. (b), the Spur Industries case is not an example of hypo-
thetical four in which there is one entitlement divided between two parties protected by a
liability rule. Rather, it is a third-party case similar to a priority dispute. In both cases, two
innocent parties each have an entitlement enforceable against a third-party wrongdoer
under a property rule. When it is impossible for both parties to obtain the equitable rem-
edy of replevy or injunction against the wrongdoer, one of the parties must be awarded
damages.
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damages. A property regime is not an alternative to a liability regime, it re-
quires a liability regime to function.3 44
Ayres and Talley intuited that the only practicable way to make
the Calabresi-Melamed dichotomy meaningful is to substitute its im-
plicit damages-injunction dichotomy with a new theory based entirely
on damages. In a perfect Calabresi-Melamed property regime-one
in which society's valuations are never forced on original claimants-
courts would award a prevailing plaintiff damages equal to her subjec-
tive valuation of the lost object. This solution probably is unworkable
in the real world. Aside from the problem of proof (in many, if not
most, cases the only evidence of the victim's subjective valuation will
be her self-serving testimony), it is doubtful whether we want to im-
pose such potentially unlimited damages.
3. Subjective or "Tailored" Damages
Ayres and Talley assumed that subjective (tailored) damages are a
form of the Calabresi-Melamed liability rule.3 45 I argue that they are
better understood as falling within Calabresi and Melamed's defini-
tion of a property regime in which society never imposes its intersub-
jective valuation upon an owner. In any event, a discussion of
subjective damages belongs in Cloud-Cuckoo Land, not in the late
twentieth century United States.
Pursuant to the Coase Theorem, society need only care about the
allocation of entitlements and the choice of remedy regimes if there is
market failure.3 46 Ayres and Talley asserted that tailored and
nontailored remedies are alternate ways of addressing market failure.
The former are "market-mimicking substitutes" that try to replicate
what would have resulted absent market failure.8 47 Probably because
they mistrust attempts to reproduce a hypothetical "subjunctive" uni-
verse, Ayres and Talley suggested instead that nontailored damages
facilitate negotiations and therefore restore something closer to an
efficient market-adding a new "failure" might counterbalance the
344 As I briefly discussed supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text, the Calabresi and
Melamed regime of inalienability also requires property to function, and property ulti-
mately devolves into liability (the right to damages). Consequently, I disagree with Mor-
ris's attempt to identify the right of "monetary compensation" as a unique element of the
structure of entitlements. Morris, supra note 31, at 837. Morris argued that many entitle-
ments do not carry such a right, such as when something-like a human kidney-is de-
clared market inalienable. See id at 837. As we have seen, however, in our modem legal
system all rights ultimately devolve into the right to monetary compensation for the viola-
tion or the original right.
345 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1033.
346 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1094-95 ("In such a frictionless society,
transactions would occur until no one could be made better off as a result of further trans-
actions without making someone else worse off.").
347 Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1038.
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original market failure.348 Curiously, participants in this debate as-
sume that tailored damages are the norm, and nontailored damages
only comprise exceptions, such as liquidated damages.3 49
In our legal system, property damages are not "tailored" but are
set by a societally imposed standard-usually market value. 350 At first
blush, contract remedies seem to respect subjective valuations in that
they are set with respect to the contract price. The Calabresi and Me-
lamed concept of a liability regime, however, presupposes that no con-
tract exists. In addition, upon further consideration, it is clear that
even contract damages are not purely subjective. A contract price is
not the broadly intersubjective valuation of society; rather, it is the
more limited intersubjective valuation of the two contracting parties.
The contract price may or may not, therefore, be equal to the actual
subjective valuation of either party. One would expect that one of the
most common reasons that a party breaches a contract is that the con-
tract price no longer reflects her subjective valuation at the time of
breach. Moreover, the contract price may no longer reflect the sub-
jective valuation of the party seeking to enforce the contract
(although presumably he would not seek to enforce it unless the con-
tract price was equal to or greater than his subjective valuation).
348 See id. at 1038-39. Much of Ayres and Talley's article is just such an attempt to
justify nontailored damages as a partial "cure" for market failure. Their argument is a
classic economist's attempt to deal with the problem of the "second best." The doctrine of
the second best holds that if the conditions of a perfect market do not exist, it does not
follow that restoring one of the conditions will make the market more efficient. See Pos-
NER, supra note 103, at 301 n.1 (providing an example of the problem of the "second
best"). Consequently, some economists, like Ayres and Talley, suggest that rather than
trying to remove any one inefficiency in any market, one should try to devise mechanisms
that counteract the inefficiencies.
349 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1040 n.48 (assuming tailored damages are
the norm). One may more accurately analyze many liquidated damages clauses as special
cases of tailored damages, reflecting one party's highly idiosyncratic valuation of the harm
that a breach would cause. As a result, a court will only enforce a liquidated damages
clause when the enforcing party can show that the liquidated amount has some relation to
some conventional intersubjective measurement of damages, such as a reasonableness test.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1995) (enforcing a liquidated damage clause in a sales contract
only in "an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibilty of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy" and noting that "[a] term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty").
I believe much of this confusion between tailored and untailored damages results
from a basic confusion between property and contract damages. Tailoring of damages is,
of course, the norm in contract law in which damages are set with respect to the "benefit of
the bargain" reached by the parties. For example, in their discussion of tailored damages,
Ayres and Talley give the example of Hadley v. Baxendae, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1854), type of lost profits recoverable under contract law. See Ayres & Talley, supra note
38, at 1066. The courts do not grant these "lost profits," however, for property violations.
350 Even Krier and Schwab, who discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of
tailored and nontailored damages, admit that objective damages are the usual remedy in
litigation. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 457.
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When courts award contract damages, they make no attempt to ascer-
tain the enforcing party's actual valuation.
Moreover, in contrast to Ayres and Talley's assertion, liquidated
damages are disfavored precisely because they are based on suspicious
subjective valuation of harm rather than on the market valuation of
harm. Even "lost profits" are not based on the subjective valuation of
the nonbreaching party. The UCC and common law require that lost
probes be either "reasonably foreseeable" by the breaching party or
that the breaching party had actual knowledge of potential damages
at the time of entering the contract.351 Consequently, the debate over
tailored and nontailored damages either reflects a mistaken and
highly inaccurate description of current law or represents an uncon-
scious policy debate over proposed radical changes in American law.
This error once again seems to spring from repression of the
(feminine) third. Ayres and Talley never discuss where nontailored
damages come from. To them, the only way to tailor damages is by
reference to the victim's subjective valuation.3 52 The court, therefore,
randomly sets nontailored changes.353 Despite all their talk about re-
storing markets, Ayres and Talley have been incapable of incorporat-
ing markets into their analysis. Ayres and Talley based their analysis
on game theory which, by its own terms, only deals with the behavior
of the two playing parties. The rest of the world is frozen in time and
labeled "nature."354 Markets, however, are not frozen in nature. They
include a potentially unlimited set of "others" who simultaneously act
and thereby set a market price.
4. The Impracticality of Subjective Damages in a Property Regime
Let us consider what a tailored liability regime would look like.
Those who have had the dubious pleasure of seeing the movie Pulp
Fiction 55 will remember that the character Bruce Willis played places a
seemingly limitless subjective value on a wristwatch that his father, a
POW, left to him, and his father's friend, Christopher Walken's char-
351 This, of course, is the famous rule of Had/y v. Baxenda/e. Even incidental damages
are limited by the intersubjective test of reasonableness. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-715(1).
352 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 38, at 1065-69.
353 In the games Ayres and Talley presented to demonstrate untailored damages, the
judge only knows the range of valuations for the entitlement in the community and sets the
liability amount within this range. See id. Apparently, the judge sets the damages randomly
within this range because Ayres and Talley merely presented alternate games with different
untailored damages and no reference as to how this number is set. See id. For example,
they presented one game in which the polluter values the entitlement at $60 and the dam-
ages are $40. See id. at 1067. If these damages represented the market price, why didn't
the polluter just go into the market and buy the entitlement, rather than taking the entitle-
ment and paying the same amount in damages?
354 See supra discussion at notes 313-16.
355 PuLP FICrION (Miramax 1994).
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acter, preserved for him at great sacrifice of physical integrity. Willis
risks not only his ill-gotten gambling gains, earned by not throwing a
fixed prize fight, but also death at the hands of the gangsters he be-
trayed and rape and murder at the hands of a pair of sexual perverts.
Now imagine a parallel universe in which Bob Dole won the 1996
presidential election. Hollywood buckles to White House pressure to
clean up its act. One result of this is that Quentin Tarantino makes a
very boring sequel to Pulp Fiction called LegalFiction. Scene one begins
with Willis living off his ill-gotten gains in the lap of luxury in Cloud-
Cuckoo Land, enjoying blueberry pancakes with his ditzy girlfriend.
She accidentally, but charmingly, drops his prized watch and breaks it.
In scene two, Willis brings the watch to the local jewelry shop for re-
pair. As is not unusual, the jeweler not only repairs watches, but also
is in the business of selling pre-owned watches and other jewelry. In
scene three, a stranger walks into the jewelry store and buys Willis's
watch. In scene four, Willis meets with his lawyer. It turns out that
Cloud-Cuckoo Land has adopted the UCC. The lawyer gives him the
bad news that when he brought the watch to the jeweler, Willis was an
"entrustor" and the jeweler was an "entrustee" within the meaning of
U.C.C. § 2-403(2). Moreover, the facts indicate that the stranger was a
"buyer in the ordinary course of business" within the meaning of
U.C.C. § 1-201(9), and the jeweler was a merchant in the business of
selling previously owned watches. Consequently, the stranger would
prevail over Willis pursuant to the priority rules of U.C.C. § 2-403 (2).
The good news, however, is that Willis has a property claim against the
jeweler. Unfortunately, because the jeweler no longer has the watch,
and the stranger has the right to keep the watch, Willis will not be able
to get it back and can only obtain money damages.
Scene five is the climactic courtroom scene. Willis has estab-
lished the jeweler's liability, and the parties are now arguing about
damages. In Cloud-Cuckoo Land, unlike in the United States, dam-
ages are tailored. Usually, a plaintiff can only establish her subjective
valuation by testimony, which juries may discount as being self-serving.
Luckily for Willis, however, he can corroborate his testimony by show-
ing out-takes from Pulp Fiction. The jury agrees and awards him his
actual subjective damages-one zillion dollars. In the denouement,
we see Willis and his ditzy girlfriend in an even more luxurious and
exotic location eating even higher stacks of blueberry pancakes. The
End.
This scenario, obviously, does not comport with our concept of
civil damages. In fact, the law bases restitutionary damages on the
market value of the lost object3 56 In other words, even if we say that
356 As I mentioned earlier, Ayres and Talley included lost profits as a type of tailored
damages. This inclusion is correct, but irrelevant to their analysis. Courts do not award
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Willis has sole possessory rights in the object of desire and that he is,
therefore, entitled to equitable remedies, we cannot practically estab-
lish Calabresi and Melamed's property regime prospectively. Willis
cannot know ahead of time whether he will be able to get his property
back if someone attempts to take it or whether society's intersubjective
valuation of the watch will be forced upon him. He can only know
this post hoc, when all of the facts are available.
Indeed, even in our parallel universe in which the Legal Fiction
regime of subjective damages is in place, we cannot assure Willis that
he will ever get his subjective valuation. It is unlikely that the jeweler
(or her insurer) will have one zillion dollars. That is, Willis will not
only have to compete with the jeweler and the stranger for physical
possession of the watch, but he also will have to compete with the
jeweler's future creditors for both the watch and its value. Indeed,
insolvency is dynamite. When the jeweler goes broke, he effectively
destroys not only the object of desire, but also all potential substitutes
therefor.
5. Punitive Damages
The impartiality of subjective damages discussed above probably
explains Ayres and Talley's intuition that in order for the Calabresi-
Melamed dichotomy to be workable, it cannot rely on the traditional
legal-equitable remedy dichotomy. Yet, they did not propose the cum-
bersome regime of Legal Fiction (in which subjective valuations are ac-
tually litigated) as a property regime. Rather, they suggested that
tailored damages are a form of liability regime. They implied that we
can achieve the substantive effects of a property regime-that society's
intersubjective valuation is never forced upon a holder-another way.
As a practical matter, it should be sufficient if the societally imposed
damages were sufficiently draconian-so disproportionate vis-d-vis the
market value of the object as effectively to prevent any rational rival
claimant from attempting a taking and so big as to presumptively ex-
ceed the original claimant's subjective valuation.
We presumably could achieve this result in one of two ways. On
the one hand, we could impose enormous punitive damages on the
loser of all priority disputes. On the other, we could criminalize all
lost profits for interference with property rights; rather, they are a contract remedy. Con-
tract, unlike property, sets damages by reference to the subjective valuation of the parties,
but even then, only insofar as the valuation is incorporated into the terms of the contract
or, in the case of lost profits, is reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party. See Thomas
S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83
MicH. L. REv. 341, 376 (1984) ("[C]ontracting parties would stipulate remedies that, at the
most reasonable cost, adequately protected the value they anticipated from completion of
the contract.").
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property law and make all priority disputes subject to extensive civil
and criminal penalties.
Whatever its theoretical virtues, it seems highly unlikely that our
society would adopt the former.357 Of course, many types of property
disputes are criminalized-this is the law of theft and fraud. But, to
require the state to criminalize all property disputes or all property
disputes of a certain kind would require the state to bear all of the
costs'. Today, we leave most priority disputes to the parties in interest.
If the increased costs associated with criminalizing all property dis-
putes are substantial and if this really is the "end of the era of big
government," this change in the law seems unlikely from a political
standpoint.
We do impose civil and criminal sanctions on polluters in many
situations, but in most cases, criminal pollution laws are not Calabresi-
Melamed property regimes, but inalienability regimes. To go back to
the six original hypotheticals, in a property regime the state would
enforce either the consumers' entitlement to clean water or the pro-
ducer's entitlement to pollute. Because the enforcement decision be-
longs to the state, the individual entitlement holders cannot contract
away their entitlements.
Of course, assigning control of all pollution and priority disputes
to the state does not by itself preclude the possibility of contract, nor
does it necessitate an increase in government expense. We could cre-
ate a legal regime that would mimic a property regime with entitle-
ments allocated to the consumers. For example, the state could hold
the homeowner's entitlement to clean water, somewhat like a trustee.
The state would, therefore, charge the expenses of enforcing environ-
mental rights against the homeowner-beneficiaries, rather than
against the general tax coffers. The state could, as trustee, also con-
tract away entitlements on behalf of the homeowner-beneficiary.
Unfortunately, it is probably impracticable to administer such a
system as a true Calabresi-Melamed property regime. In a property
regime, each homeowner is entitled to her individual subjective valua-
tion of her entitlement. The state would therefore have to set up
some procedure to determine the subjective valuation of each home-
owner. If, however, the state used some other means of setting the
sales price for the entitlement, the regime would be a liability regime
357 This view is, of course, my personal opinion. The virtues of a punitive damage-
property regime are beyond the scope of this Article. I note, however, that we generally do
not allow juries to impose punitive damages unless they believe the defendant's behavior
was particularly heinous. Even business groups increasingly attack these damages as unjust
precisely because the damages are disproportionate.
The competition between pragmatic arguments for, and outrage over, a punitive dam-
age-property regime disproportionality fuels much of the debate about class actions as well.
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because the intersubjective valuation-the valuation set by "society,"
in this case the state-would be imposed on the homeowner.
One could attempt to save this system, rhetorically, by saying that
it is a property regime, but the entitlement holder is the state-the
collective of consumers, producers and others-not the individual
consumer. This scenario, in fact, more nearly matches certain ex-
isting environmental programs in which firms are allowed, in effect, to
purchase the right to pollute.358 This result is, however, quite differ-
ent than the law and economic philosophy reflected by Calabresi and
Melamed that identifies individuals (both natural persons and firms)
as the proper subject of law and that wishes to harness the impartial
mechanisms of the market.
Consequently, the Ayres-Talley solution to the problem with the
Calabresi-Melamed trichotomy would be the adoption of one of two
possible radical changes in the law. In one, all takings of a certain
kind would result in draconian punitive damages. In the other, the
government would be trustee for all entitlement holders with the
power to contract on their behalf, but only after determining each
homeowner's subjective valuation of her entitlement.
The liability-property taxonomy that Calabresi and Melamed of-
fered to analyze takings of entitlement does not and cannot match the
American property system in theory or in practice. As a practical mat-
ter, all property claimants must consider that damages will be the only
remedy available in a dispute over possession of an entitlement.
CONCLUSION: THE PHALLIC METAPHOR
The difficulty with Calabresi and Melamed's dichotomy springs
from their adoption of the phallic metaphor. They analyzed environ-
mental nuisances in terms of disputes over the possession of entitle-
ments, essentially making it a priority dispute. Because priority
disputes always have the possibility of third-party claimants, no priority
regime could be a Calabresi-Melamed property regime.
The classic environmental nuisance is not, however, a priority dis-
pute at all. The parties are not contesting possession of a single thing.
They are contesting necessarily inconsistent enjoyments of different
358 Firms can make these purchases in a number of ways. The government can try to
determine how much abatement of pollution would be efficient and then charge a fee to
all polluters designed to increase the average marginal cost of their production. Each
polluter would then decide, based on its own costs of production, whether it is more effi-
cient to continue production with its current equipment and pay the fee, or to invest in
scrubbers or other new equipment and avoid the fee. This technique is little used because
of the difficulties in determining the proper amount of the fee. Recently, the government
has initiated an alternative. It has caused the Environmental Protection Agency to auction
off transferable licenses (marketable pollution allowances) to produce sulfur dioxide emis-
sions. SeeJames E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 449, 449 (1994).
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things. As we have seen, these enjoyment disputes do not presuppose
a theoretically unlimited class of third-party claimants. It is, therefore,
theoretically and often pragmatically, possible to impose a regime
whereby one set of enjoyers always has an injunctive right against the
limited universe of conflicting enjoyers. For example, homeowner A
could always get an injunction to stop widget-maker B from polluting
her water, regardless of whether B has made a contract with C to pol-
lute his water.8 59
Therefore, it is possible to have a variation of a pure Calabresi-
Melamed "property" (injunctive remedy) regime applicable to classic
environmental torts. Unfortunately, because the Calabresi-Melamed
taxonomy confuses environmental disputes with priority disputes, it
does not and cannot describe American environmental law. This
shortcoming is why several of the six possible hypotheticals generated
by Calabresi-Melamed are not just alien, but are absurd.
From a Lacanian standpoint, property is phallic. It is the creation
of subjectivity with respect to the possession, enjoyment, and ex-
change of an object of desire. Property, being legal, is symbolic. As
with subjectivity, however, our desire to achieve the wholeness Lacan
called the real leads us to try to identify the symbolic with natural
analogs. We are drawn, therefore, to identify property with the physi-
cal. When we stand in the masculine position, we concentrate on the
masculine elements of possessing and alienating. We confuse possess-
ing and alienating with holding, exchanging, and taking tangible
things that remind us of the penis and the female body. Furthermore,
when we stand in the masculine position, we tend to repress the femi-
nine element of enjoyment. As we have seen, despite the fact that
environmental nuisances involve disputes over the feminine element
of enjoyment, analysts have persisted in analyzing it in terms of the
obviously inapplicable masculine elements of possession and aliena-
tion. But, whatever is repressed in the symbolic returns in the real.
And so, a feminine phallic metaphor for property is also implicit, but
usually hidden, in property discourse.
The Calabresi-Melamed analysis necessarily fails as a taxonomy of
enforcement regimes because the remedies they proposed do not re-
late to the harm committed. The trichotomy is not only an inade-
quate description of the legal relationship known as property, but also
it cannot serve as a limited analytical tool in a universe of more than
two legal actors. As a result, what at first blush seems like a politically
359 Of course, if we grant an entitlement to be free from pollution to a large class of
consumers, it may be impracticable for a potential polluter to contract with all of them.
Negotiating with large classes raises the possibility of both hold-outs and free riders-two
of the classic market failures, which Calabresi and Melamed suggested a liability regime
may mitigate. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1107-08.
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conservative debate about the increase of economic efficiency, is in
fact a call for a radical restructuring of American legal principles.
In other words, Calabresi and Melamed do not present a view of
that Cathedral we call property. Rather, in order to present some-
thing that can be viewed, they clandestinely attempt to destroy the
actual, sublime Cathedral and replace it with something simple and
banal. Monet used metonymy to frame human experience, depicting
only that which is proximate to it. Calabresi and Melamed erected a
metaphor to stand in for experience, claiming to have captured its
essential qualities through similarity. Monet tried to suggest how
human beings experience the Cathedral's facade; Calabresi and Me-
lamed built a facade and called it a cathedral.
